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OPENING  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 2 -- 3-
ladies and  Gentlemen, 
I  am  pleased  to  welcome  you  to  this  Conference  on  Financial 
Conglomerates.  Indeed,  the  Commission  is most  grateful  to  you  for  your 
participation  in  this  Conference.  A Conference,  which  certainly for  me, 
and  I  suspect  for  most  of  you,  represents  something of  novelty. 
Of  course,  even  at  European  level,  the  problems  of  financial 
congolomerates  have  been  perceived  and  studied  in  various  bodies 
already.  As  far  as  the  banking  sector is concerned,  for  instance,  the 
Banking  Advisory  Committee  and  especially  the  "Groupe  de  Contact"  of 
Banking  Supervisors  have  done  most  valuable  work  in  looking  into  links 
between  banking,  insurance  and  securities markets  and  in  raising some 
of  the questions  which  we  will  have  to study,  for  instance the  question 
of  a  broader  consolidation which  might  be  required  for  banking  groups. 
In  the field  of  insurance,  the  "Conference  des  Services  de  Controle  des 
Assurances  des  Pays  de  la  CEE"  has  set  up  a  sub-group  which  has  started 
to  study  the  borderlines  betwe~n banking,  insurance  and  other services. 
The  "High-Level  Committee  of  Secu~iiies Markets  Supervisors",  likewise, 
has  perceived  the  problems  which  can  arise  with  the  blurring  of  the 
frontiers  between  the  various  sectors of  the  financial  industries. 
What  is  novel  about  this  Conference  is  the  fact  that  the  authorities 
responsible  for  all  three  sectors  are  meeting  together  for  the  first 
time  at  the  European  level;  and  as  far  as  we  are  aware  even  on  national 
level  the  extent  of  inter-disciplinary  cooperation  between  the 
supervisors  of  all  the  sectors  varies  considerably  between  Member 
States. 
There  are  two  reasons  why  we  thought  a  Conference  of  this  novel 
character  would  be  timely  and  useful.  The  first  is that  supervisors  in 
the  three different  financial  markets  represented  here  are  increasingly 
being  confronted  by  difficult  problems  arising  from  the  breakdown  of 
the  frontiers  between  different  types  of  financial  institution;  from 
the  blurring of  the distinctions  between  apparently different  financial 
products  (insurance  and  savings)  and  from  the  growth  of  conglomerates. 
It  seemed  to  us  that  it  would  therefore  be  of  interest  to  bring - 4-
together  all  three  groups  simply  in  order  to  enable  experiences  to  be 
shared  between  the  different  disciplines  and  between  the  different 
Member  States.  (In  saying  what  I  have  just  said,  I  am  aware  that  I  am 
already  begging  one  important  question.  That  is whether  the  phenomenon 
of  financial  conglomerates  is  really all that  new.  At  Least  one  Member 
State with  a  universal  banking  system  has,  it  could  be  argued,  lived 
with  the  phenomenon  for  decades  without  apparent  difficulty.  That  in 
itself  may  provide  an  interesting point  for  argument). 
The  second  reason  for  setting  up  this  Conference  is  the  potential 
impact  of  financial  conglomerates  on  the  Commission's  own  work  in 
legislating for  the  internal  market  in  financial  services,  which  we  are 
all  committed  to  achieving  by  1992.  I  will  be  talking about  this aspect 
at  greater  Length  tomorrow  morning;  so  will  not  go  into detail  now.  But 
the  possible  implications  for  our  work  here  in  Brussels  if  different 
prudential  and  policy solutions are  found  in different  Member  States to 
the  problems  of  supervising  conglomerates. 
The  Commission's  approach  as  you  know  is  based  on  the  triad  of 
harmonization  of  supervisory  rules,  mutual  recognition  and  home-country 
control  in  each  of  those  sectors  - banking,  insurance  and  securities 
rna rket s.  A  Long  series  of  Directives  in  each  of  these  sectors  have 
prepared  the  ground  on  which  mutual  recognition  and  home  country 
control  can.be  based.  But  this very  basis  might  be  jeopardized  if all 
Member  States  felt  the  need,  and  in  different  ways,  to  bring  in  new 
techniques  and  legislation  to  deal  with  financial  conglomerates. 
Suppose  that  different  countries  have  different  rules  as  to  the 
structure  and  composition  of  financial  conglomerates.  Imagine 
individual  Member  States  want  to  introduce  specific  rules  to  avoid 
conflicts of  interest or  to guarantee the appropriate capitalisation of 
an  entire  conglomerate.  If  each  country  follows  a  different  path,  we 
could  face  a  situation  in  which  our  coordinating  efforts  in  all  the 
sectors are  disrupted  and  the  basis  of  home-country  control  and  mutual 
recognition  are endangered. 
We  hope  therefore  the  Conference  wilL  concentrate  very  much  on  the 
practical problems  which  supervisors  are  having  to  face  as  a  result  of 
the  growth  of  conglomerates  and  that  we  should  avoid  purely  academic 
debate  for  example  on  how  to  define  a  conglomerate,  except  where  this 
is strictly necessary  for  the discussion. - 5-
PROF.  &OWER 
INTRODUCTION 
We  are  here  to  discuss  the  problems  posed  by  financial  conglomerates  in 
relation  to  the  planned  completion,  by  the  end  of  1992,  of  the  internal 
European  market  in  so  far  as  concerns  financial  services.  If  we  are  to do  so 
we  need,  as  I  see  it, first to ensure  that  we  are all  in agreement  about  what 
we  understand  by  (a)  "financial  services"  Cb)  an  "internal  European  financial 
market  <and  the  proposed  methods  of  achieving  it)  and  (c)  "financial 
conglomerates".  My  main  task,  if I  have  understood  my  instructions aright,  is 
in  20  minutes  to  outline  my  understanding  Cor  misunderstanding)  on  each  of 
these  and  then  to  allow  you  10  minutes  in  which  to  question  and  correct  my 
misunderstandings. 
(a)  Financial  Services 
This  expression  clearly  includes  all  types  of  service  <whether  that  of 
marketing,  managing  or  advising)  relating to  banking,  insurance  (general  and 
long  term>,  or  securities and  other  investments.  Its range  is therefore wide  -
even  wider  than  that  of  "investment  business"  which  is  the  expression  used  in 
the  UK  to  describe  the  scope  of  its  Financial  Services  Act  1986.  We  do  not 
need  to attempt  to define  its precise  boundaries  and  I  do  not  suppose  that  the 
Commission  would  thank  us  if we  did that.  What  is clear,  however,  is that  at 
present  most  Member  States  have  no  regulation  of  many  of  these  types  of 
financial  services.  This  has  obvious  implications  on  the  Commission's 
programme.  The  object  of  that  must  be  to  provide  comprehensive  and  adequate 
standards  throughout  the  Community  without  requiring  any  country  which  has 
effective  regulation  in  some  areas  to  lower  its  standards  - unless  these  are 
excessively anti-competitive;  in other  words,  to harmonise  up  and  not  down.  If 
adequate  harmonised  standards  throughout  the  Community  are  to  be  achieved  by 
1992  it will  be  a  remarkable  feat. - 6-
(b)  The  European  Internal  Financial  Market 
The  European  Internal  Financial  Market  obviously  does  not  mean  just  the 
integration of  European  organised  markets  such  as  stock  exchanges  and  futures 
exchanges.  It  includes  that,  but  goes  much  wider.  What  is  aimed  at  is  a 
situation  in  which  a  firm  established  to  provide  financial  services  in  one 
Member  State  will  be  able  lawfully  to  provide  such  services  in  every  other 
Member  State,  so  that  the  former  independent  national  markets  are  fused  into a 
unified  Community-wide  market  without  internal  frontiers.  And  it is clear both 
from  the  published  statements  of  the  Commission  and  from  the  remarkable 
progress  that  it  has  already  made,  particularly  in  relation  to  banking, 
insurance,  unit  trusts and  mutual  funds,  and  marketing  of  listed securities, 
that the main  mechanisms  for  achieving this  are  envisaged  as  :  the  abolition 
of  restrictions  on  the  right  of  establishment,  freedom  of  capital  movements, 
freedom  to  provide  financial  services  across  frontiers  without  establishment 
and,  to  the extent  necessary,  harmonisation  of  legal  regulations. 
This  programme  faces  obvious  dangers  which  will  have  to be  guarded  against  and 
obvious  problems,  which  will  have  to be  solved.  The  problems  are  particularly 
acute  in  relation to  financial  conglomerates  but  before  I  turn  to  them  may  I 
draw  attention to three  general  points. 
The  first  arises  from  the  distinction  which  the  Commission  draws  between  the 
right  of  "establishment"  <where,  as  I  understand  it,  there  will  need  to  be 
harmonised  prudential  regulation)  and  freedom  to  provide  services  across  the 
frontiers  (where  the  conduct  of  business  and  marketing  rules  of  each  host 
State  can  operate  with  only  minimal  Community  prescription  - though  some 
general  harmonised  principles  may  need  to be  laid down).  This  seems  to assume 
that  once  the  firm  concerned  has  been  tested  as  fit  to  provide  financial 
services  in the  Member  State where  it is established  (the  home  state),  it can 
safely  be  treated  as  fit  to  supply  such  services  in  every  Member  State  and, 
indeed,  that  the  home  state,  when  allowing it  to be  established,  will  have 
checked  that  it is so  fit.  Neither  part  of this assumption  can  really be  true. 
Both  might  be,  if  fitness  depended  only  on  capital  adquacy  and  absence  of 
criminal  convictions  but  it  obviously  depends  on  mcuh  more  than  that  -
including familiarity  with  the  language  and  legal  regulation of  the  host  state 
or  states.  It  is  true  that  if the  firm  proves  unfit  to  carry on  business  in - 7-
any  host  country  it  may  ultimately  be  prevented  from  continuing  to  carry  on 
business  there.  But  this  will  take  some  time  and  the  objective  of  initial 
prevention  rather  than  later  cure  is defeated.  Presumably  the  Commission  feels 
that that  is a  price  worth  paying  for  greater  freedom  across  frontiers.  And 
maybe  it  is,  having  regard  to  the  undoubted  fact  that  it  is  normally 
impossible  to  prevent  services  being  provided  so  long  as  this  is done  without 
establishing  a  place  of  business  but  (for  example)  through  the  post  or 
telephone.  Nevertheless,  it is a  bit disturbing. 
My  second  point  is  that  already  in this  area  a  global  twenty-four  hour  market 
is  developing.  Not  only  are  links  being  established  between  exchanges 
(including  links  by  those  within  the  Community  and  those  outside)  but,  thanks 
to modern  technology,  an  order to  a  broker  in,  say,  London  may  be  executed 
immediately  on  any  one  or  more  of  the  world's  financial  centres  - and,  in 
practice,  is often more  likely to  be  executed  in  New  York,  Chicago,  Tokyo  or 
Hong  Kong  than  within  the  EEC.  Moreover,  the  technology  already exists which 
will,  before  long,  enable  an  investor  from  his  home  computer  instantly  to 
·obtain  the  best  quotation  being  offered  by  any  market-maker  anywhere  and  to 
have  the order  executed  immediately.  The  principal obstable at  present  is not 
absence  of  technology,  but  primitive  legal  rules,  particularly perhaps  those 
relating  to  formal  transfer  of  securities  which  lead  to  inordinate  delay  and 
expense  in  completing  the  paper-work  subsequent  to  the  bargain.  This  can  be 
solved  only by  "dematerialisation" of  securities,  a  process  which  may  p~esent 
peculiar difficulties  to those  European  countries  where  bearer  securities  are 
popular. 
If the  creation of  a  European  market  were  to  lead to anything  in  the  nature of 
a  cordon  sanitaire around  it,  handicapping  European  investors  in  the  use  and 
benefits of  the  developing  global  market  it would  be  calamitous.  They  would  be 
deprived  of  "best  execution"  and  internationally  the  European  market  would 
become  a  stagnant  backwater.  The  European  market  has  to be  seen,  as  indeed  the 
Commission  does  see  it,  as  a  contributing to  the  developing  global  market  by 
substituting  one  European  market  for  12  national  ones.  But  is  there  not  a 
danger  that  it might  prove  an  obstacle  ? - 8  -
My  third point  relates  to the  apparent  belief  of  the  Commission  that,  in the 
field of  financial  services,  when  harmonisation  is needed,  the  same  type  of 
harmonisation  as  that  achieved,  say,  by  the  Company  Law  Directives  will 
suffice.  In  other  words,  that  Directives  should  lay  down  objectives,  leaving 
national  legislation  to  provide  the  means  <although  Directives  have  in  fact 
become  in  fact  increasingly  detailed).  This  may  have  sufficed  in  relation to 
the progress  made  so  far  but  I  venture  to doubt  whether  it  will  in  all  future 
parts of  the  programme.  It seems  to  me  that  it just  is not  good  enough  to say 
simply  that  Member  States  shall  not  allow  the  establishment  of  firms 
undertaking  financial  services  unless  they  are  satisfied  that  the  firms  are 
fit  and  proper,  leaving  each  member  to  prescribe  its  own  tests  of  fitness. 
There  must,  surely,  be  detailed  prescriptions  at  least  on  such  matters  as 
capital  adequacy  for  each  type  of  financial  business  ?  And,  at  least  in  some 
areas,  the  same  applies,  I  suggest  to  conduct  of  business  and  marketing 
regulations.  For  example,  the  Commission  has  identified  the  segregation  of 
clients'  money  as  a  matter  on  which  harmonisation  will  be  needed.  But,  if a 
firm  undertaking  business  which  impinges  on  more  than  one  State  finds  itself 
subject  to  different  sets  of  rules  in  relation  to  the  same  transaction  or 
client, it will  find  life impossible.  This  is a  problem  with  which  SIB,  in  the 
UK,  had  already  has  to  wrestle.  The  regulatory authorities  in  the  UK,  the  USA 
and  Australia  have  segregation  rules  - but  they  differ  somewhat  and,  in  some 
circumstances,  it  is  impossible  to  comply  with  one  without  breaching  another. 
If  that  occurs  where  all  the  countries  concerned  are  Common  Law  Countries 
which  recognise  trusts,  it  is still  more  likely  to  happen  when  two  of  the 
Member  States are  Common  Law  Countries  and  the  rest  Civil  Law  Countries.  And 
the  same  applies,  I  would  have  thought,  to  insider dealing.  The  Commission 
will  need  to  prescribe  the  rules  - perhaps  by  Regulations  rather  than 
Directives.  In  such  matters,  as  it seems  to me,  harmonisation  needs  to be  as 
near  to  unification  as  can  be  achieved  while  the  Community  lacks  one  common 
language. - 9  -
<c>  Financial  Conglomerates 
Belatedly,  I  turn  to "financial  conglomerates".  The  meaning  of this is clear 
and  so  is  the  fact  that  financial  conglomerates  pose  particularly  grave 
problems  for  the  Commission's  programme  - we  would  not  be  here  if  they  did 
not.  We  mean  firms  which,  instead  of  carrying  on  a  single type  of  financial 
business,  carry  on  several.  It  matters  not  whether  they  do  so  throught 
separate  incorporated  companies  or  through  branches  or departments.  It will  be 
tempting  to  try  to  solve  some  of  the  problems  by  requiring  separate 
incorporation of  certain types  of business  and  for  each  separate  establishment 
in  the  EEC.  I  hope  this  temptation  will  be  resisted.  Business  structures 
should  be  determined  by  the  commercial  needs  and  not  by  the  convenience  of 
bureaucrats. 
This  introduction  is  not  the  place  to  attempt  to  itemise  the  particular 
problems  thrown  up  by  conglomerates.  Many  of  them  are  identified  in  the  Third 
Commission  Working  Paper  and  others  will  doubtless  emerge  in  the  course  of our 
discussions.  And  some  are  self-evident;  for  example  assessing  capital 
adequacy,  increased  opportunities  for  insider  dealing  and  conflicts  of 
interest  or of  interest  and  duty  <the  Bank  of  England,  in one  of  its papers  on 
"Big  Bang",  identified 14  possible  conflicts arising from  a  single  transaction 
by  a  conglomerate). 
All  I  want  to  do  in  concluding this  introduction  is  to  emphasise  that  here  we 
are  dealing,  not  with  a  situation which  will  or  may  arise,  but  with  one  that 
is  already  with  us.  In  the  UK,  for  example,  the  greater  part  of all  types  of 
financial  services  is  now  undertaken  by  and  through  financial  conglomerates. 
They  control all but  one  of  the major  member  firms  of  the  Stock  Exchange.  Some 
are  "pure"  financial  conglomerates,  others  also  carry  on  a  wide  range  of 
industrial  and  commercial  activities.  For  example,  BAT  combines  its 
traditional,  but  declining,  tobacco  interests with  a  range  of  financial  ones. 
The  Burton  Debenham  Group,  which  originally arranged  for  a  stock-broking  firm 
(itself part  of  a  multi-national  financial  conglomerate)  to  run  share  shops  in 
its department  stores,  now  itself operates  such  shops.  The  clearing  banks  now 
control  broker/dealers,  mechant  banks,  insurance  companies,  unit  trust 
management  companies,  insurance  brokers,  estate agencies,  etc. - 10  -
The  major  financial  conglomerates  operate  globally.  In  the  case  of  the most 
powerful  their  homes  and  heads  are  not  in  the  Community  but  in  the  USA  or 
Japan.  The  more  dubious  conglomerates  operate  from  off-shore financial  centres 
with  lax  or  no  regulation.  All  this  aggravates  the  problems  of  Community 
regulation.  Moreover,  as  the  Working  Paper  points out,  of  the  Member  States, 
only  Denmark  <and  it  only  since  the first  of  January)  has  a  single  regulatory 
authority for  all  its  regulated types  of financial  services.  That  is typical 
of  the  non-EEC  world  also  :  the  only  other  country  known  to  me  that  has  a 
single authority  is  Signapore.  Most  have  at  least  three.  That  may  change  as  a 
result  of  the  "Crash  of  1987";  it has  been  suggested  in  the  USA  and  in  the  UK 
that  a  single overseer  is needed  and  that  it should  be  the  banking  regulator. 
Since  banks  now  dominate  so  much  of  the  financial  services  industry that  makes 
some  sense  and  might  solve  some  problems  more  effectively  than  consultation 
between  several  regulators.  But  the  suggestion  has  not  gone  down  well  with  the 
other  regulators  and  has  not,  in  my  view,  been  thoroughly  thought  through. 
My  20  minutes  is up.  I  have,  I  fear,  said too  little about  conglomerates  and 
too much  about  other  matters.  But  I  though  that  background  was  what  was  needed 
at  this  stage  in  our  deliberations  and  I  hope  that  I  have  at  least  proved 
sufficiently provocative  to  encourage  you  to fill  the  next  10  mintes. - 11  -
Discussion after Prof.  Gower's  speech 
Mr.  Fitchew 
Thank  you  very  much  indeed  Prof.  Gower  for  what  I  think  certainly  from  the 
Commssion's  point  of  view  is  both  a  stimulating  and  a  provocative 
presentation.  Provocative  in  the  sense  that  you  were  I  think  at  certainly one 
point  suggesting  that  we  should  go  down  a  rather different  road  from  the one 
we  are  actually  going  down.  Namely  in  your  suggestion  that  our  legislation 
will  need  to  be  more  rather  than  less  detailed;  in particular  you  suggested 
that  we  needed  not  to  follow  the example  of  the  Company  Law  Directives,  which 
you  described  as  being  concerned  essentially  with  the  principles  and  leaving 
the  Member  States  to  fill  out  the  details.  I  have  to  say  that  that  is  a 
suggestion  which  certainly took  me  by  surprise,  because  if anything,  since  I 
am  also  responsible  for  company  law,  as  well  as  financial  markets,  on  the 
whole  the  approach  that  we  have  been  following,  is  precisely  the  opposite, 
namely  that  we  have  taken  the  view  that  company  law  directives  do  not  present 
a  good  model,  because  they  are  if anything  too detailed.  I  would  like  to  ask 
two  specific  questions  arising out  of  what  you  said  : 
1. Is there  a  conflict  between  the point  to which  I  just  referred,  namely  your 
view  that  we  ought  to  be  going  down  the  road  of  more  detailed 
harmonisation,  is  there  a  conflict  between  that  and  the  second  phenomenon 
which  you  identified,  namely  the globalisation  of  the  market  and  the  fact 
that  any  individual  investor,  anywhere,  with  a  home  computer  will,  sooner 
or  later,  if  not  already,  be  able  to  contact  a  supplier  of  financial 
services,  a  dealer,  anywhere  else  in  the  world,  not  merely  in  the  major 
financial  centres,  but  in the off-shore  centres  as  well,  and  do  a  deal  on 
his  own  terms.  Is  the  kind  of detailed  approach  to  regulation,  which  you 
are  suggesting  for  the  Community,  compatible  with  that  kind  of  world  ? 
2.  You  raised  the  question  whether  the  fact  that  a  bank,  or  an  insurance 
company,  which  is  considered  to  be  fit  and  proper  in  one  Member  State, 
really qualifies it to do  business  in another  Member  State  ?  It  seems  to  me 
there  is  rather  an  interesting  comparison  there  with  the  manufacturing 
sector,  where  there  is  no  test  of  fitness  and  propriety  applied  in  the 
manufacturing  sector.  Why  should  one  go  beyond  the  simple  tests of  deciding 
whether  these  people  are fit  and  proper  people  to  run  a  bank,  the  kind  of - 12 -
people  that  you  are  prepared  to  see  in  charge  of  a  bank  in  terms  of  their 
previous  experience,  their  honesty  and  integrity  and  so  on,  and  capital 
adequacy  being  the  two  main  tests.  I  must  say  I  remain  unconvinced  by  the 
need  to  test  their  language  ability  and  their  knowledge  of  local 
legislation,  it  seems  to  me  clearly  if  they  want  to  do  business  in  other 
Member  States,  they  will  make  sure  that  they  are  equipped  in  that  way  and 
it is not  the  business  of  supervisors  to determine  that  aspect  of  it. 
Reply  by  Prof.  Gower  to  these  questions 
I  intended  to  be  controversial  and  provocative  and  I  seem  to  have  succeeded. 
All  I  think  I  am  saying  is that  there are  many  areas,  and  I  think this is one, 
where  harmonisation  in  the  sense  that  you  merely  prescribe  general  principles 
and  leave  the details  to  be  worked  out,  just will  not  work.  You  have  got  to 
have  something  approaching  unified  regulation  in  so  far  as  that  is  possible, 
so  long  as  we  don't  have  a  single  language  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
Community.  You  will  never  get  complete  unification  while  the  language  is 
different,  because  regulation  depends  on  words  and  the  translation  of  words 
from  one  language  to  another  immediately  alters  to  some  extent  the  content, 
but  I  do  not  believe  that  you  can  really  achieve  what  is needed  without  doing 
your  damnedest  to  have  unification. 
Your  second  point,  I  think  was  "is that  approach  not  in  conflict  with  the 
fact  that  somehow  the  European  market  has  got  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  the 
growing  global  market  ?"  I  would  have  thought  the  answer  is,  far  from  its 
being  in  conflict,  it's  an  essential  part  of  it,  but  that  is  perhaps  more 
arguable.  So  far  as  banking  is  concered,  I  think  it  is correct  what  you  have 
said about  fitness  in one  place  may  suffice to  show  fitness  everywhere,  but  we 
are  not  dealing  in  this  programme  only  with  banks,  we  are  also  dealing  with 
individual  investment  advisers for  example,  and  they  may  be  individuals.  It 
just  is  ludicrous,  to  me;  I  might  be  able  to  pursuade  the  Securities  and 
Investments  Board  that  I  am  a  fit  and  proper  person  to  act  as  an  adviser  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  I  imagine  Kenneth  Berrill will  shake  his  head  at  that,  but 
still it  is  just  conceivably possible.  But  the  idea  that  because  I  have  been 
allowed  to  undertake  that,  means  that  I  am  a  fit  and  proper  person  to  advise 
~reeks on  investments  in Greece,  is absolutely  ludicrous.  In  other  words,  if 
you  think  you  can  apply  the  bank  analogy  to  every  branch  of  the  financial 
services  industry,  I  think  that  you  are  wrong. - 13 -
Mr.  Fitchew 
I  think  I  accept  that  point  certainly  in  relation  to  investment  advisors  and 
rather for  that  reason,  we  have 
Interruption  by  Prof.  Gower 
At  the  moment  you  pretend  to  have  some  sort  of  harmonisation  of  insurance 
brokers,  with  a  directive  on  this, but  it does  not  mean  much. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
I  accept  that  point  as  well,  the  reason  why  is that  there  are  a  host  of  other 
obstacles  which  have  prevented  the  investment  intermediaries  directive  from 
working  in  practice.  Could  I  ask  whether  anyone  else one  from  the  floor  would 
like to put  any  questions  to Prof.  Gower  at this stage  ? 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
You  thought,  Prof.  Gower,  that  company  law  directives only  set out  objectives. 
I  think  if you  take,  for  example,  the  fourth  company  law  directive,  I  can  not 
imagine  even  a  national  law  being  more  detailed.  The  only  thing you  could  do 
to  stop  the  choices  which  Member  States  have  is  simply  to  say  there  are  no 
choices.  Is that  what  you  mean  ?  That  is  my  first  question. 
My  second  question  was,  you  said that  when  you  dematerialise  the  papers,  or  if 
you  have  bearer  shares,  then  you  would  have  international  problems.  Why  ?  We 
in  Denmark  happen  to have  both  and  we  think  we  have  an  advantage  there  and  not 
a  disadvantage.  Why  should  there  come  up  problems  ? 
Prof.  Gower 
It  seems  to  be  generally  accepted  that  if  one  is  to  solve  the  back-office 
problem  in  investment  dealing,  the great  problem  is not  so  much  completing  the 
bargain,  but  in  the  formal  transfer  of  the  investment  after  that  has  been 
done,  and  everybody  is  saying  the  only  solution  of  this  is  to  dematerialise 
securities,  so  that  the  whole  thing  is  done  on  some  computer,  which  should 
enable  it to be  effected  immediately.  I  do  not  see  how  you  can  dematerialise a 
bearer  bond.  It  may  be  that  there  is  no  problem,  but  I  suspect  there  is;  I 
mean,  somehow  you  have  got  to  have  a  system  whereby  the  man  who  has  bought  his 
bearer  security,  gets  the  bearer  bond.  That,  in  some  countries,  clearly is 
presenting  grave  problems. 14  -
.. - 15  -
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  calling of  this  Conference  is in  itself  a  sign 
that  the  Commission  is becoming  increasingly  aware  of  the 
need  not  only  to  dismantle  national  frontiers  but  also  to 
help  manage  a  period  of  financial  change  that  affects 
markets,  institutions,  and  supervisors.  This  attitude  is  to 
be  welcomed. 
To  be  in  tune  with  the  Conference  and  well 
about  the  Commission's  thinking  I  have  carefully 
briefed 
read  the 
"Third  Commission  Working  Paper  on  Financial  Conglomerates". 
Let  me  say  that while  the  subject  of  this  Conference  is 
exceptionally stimulating  and  topical,  the  paper  does  not 
fully  render  the  scale  of  the  change  under  way  or  the  extent 
to  which  some  longstanding basic  features  of  our  financial 
systems  are  now  being  challenged. 
The  expression  "blurring of  frontiers"  conjures  up 
the  idea  of  changes  in  the  man-made  administrative 
superstructures of  an  immutable  physical  geography.  But  what 
we  are  witnessing,  I  suggest,  are  important  earth  tremors, 
if not  earthquakes.  And,  to describe  what  is happening,  some 
countries  have  even  drawn  an  analogy with  the  cosmic  event 
of  a  "big  bang". 
I  shall  not  redescribe  or 
rapid  financial  changes  that  are 
seek  to  interpret  the 
taking  place  worldwide. 
Inflation,  uncertainty,  progress  in  telecommunications.  and 
incentives  to  circumvent  regulations  have  frequently  been 
identified as  the  driving  forces.  Not  only  new  instruments 
but  also  new  intermediaries  have  emerged. 
the  impression  of  living  through  a  period 
Many 
of 
of  us 
parallel 
have 
and 
interconnected  change  in  financial  markets  and  regulatory 
frameworks  of  an  intensity  not  seen  since  the  thirties. - 19 -
Indeed,  some  of  the  pillars that were  erected  then  are  now 
being  seriously questioned  for  the  first 
has  only  strengthened  a  sense  of  urgency 
time.  October  19 
that  was  already 
there.  Enthusiasm  about  deregulation  has  cooled  not  only 
among  supervisors  but  also  among  market  participants.  Almost 
universally,  the  search  is on  for  regulatory principles  that 
will  be  consistent with  the  new  shape  of  financial  markets. 
In  Italy this  process  is taking several  routes,  all 
converging,  I  would  say,  on  the  objective of  1992.  One  is  to 
contribute,  as  constructively as  we  can,  to  the  drafting  of 
the  Community  directives  that will  provide  the  legislative 
basis  for  a  unified  European  financial  market.  Another  is  to 
use  the  ample  room  for  manoeuvre  allowed  by  Italian  banking 
law  to  reshape  our  regulatory  framework  in  line  with  the 
emerging  Community  legislation  and  the  requirements  of  a 
continental  market.  Yet  another  is  to  modernize  and  complete 
our  legislation  to  meet  the  need  for  a  more  efficient 
securities  market  and  effective  control  of  non-bank 
financial  intermediaries.  It would  be  hard,  in  this  process, 
to disentangle  the  national  from  the  international  strands 
of  the  problem.  This,  in itself,  is  a  sign  of  the  times. 
My  remarks  are  based  on  two  firmly  held  convictions. 
First,  the  process  of  financial  change  is  such  that  we  have 
to  examine,  and  sometimes  to  re-examine,  the  very 
foundations  of  our  financial  systems  and  regulatory 
frameworks.  Second,  we  have  to  do  this  together,  i.e.  at  an 
international  level,  because  one  of  the key  aspects  of  the 
process  is the  blurring of  national  financial  frontiers.  This 
is why  I  will  try to  draw,  albeit sketchily  and  tentatively, 
a  comprehensive  picture.  I  shall  start  by  reviewing  our 
conceptual  framework  and  then  address  selected  issues  with 
which  we  are  concerned  in our  work. - 20-
II.  THE  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK 
II.l Contracts 
To  understand  the  blurring 
and  the  problems  it  poses,  it  is 
considering  the different categories 
exchanged  in  financial  markets.  This 
has  its origins  in  the  interbreeding 
of  financial 
necessary  to 
of  products 
is  because  the 
of  contracts 
frontiers 
start  by 
that  are 
blurring 
that  used 
to  be  separate  and  associated with  specialized  institutions. 
Fundamentally,  contracts  signed  on  financial  markets 
fall  into three  broad  categories:  insurance,  equity,  and 
debt. 
Insurance  provides  for  the  transfer  of  risks  from 
individuals  to  institutions that  pool  them  with  many  others 
of  the  same  kind.  To  some  exte~t this  risk-sharing  function 
is,  of  course,  performed  by  every  contract 
future,  but  the  unique  feature  of  insurance 
least  in principle,  it allows  the  insured  to 
risk-burden  onto  the  insurer. 
spanning 
is  that, 
shift  all 
the 
at 
the 
At  the  opposite  extreme,  equity  typically  involves 
uncertainty about  both  the  flow  of  income  that  will  accrue 
to  the  holder  and  the  capital  value  of  the  investment.  Such 
uncertainty exposes  shareholders  to  the  risk  of  incorrectly 
assessing  the  performance  of  the  firms  on  which  their 
capital  and  their earnings  ultimately depend. 
Finally,  debt  can  be  seen  as  covering  an 
intermediate  area,  since  the  nominal  value  of  the  asset  is 
certain.  The  holder  of  a  debt  contract  nonetheless  incurs 
both  an  interest  rate  risk,  since  its  market  value  may 
fluctuate  with  general  market  conditions,  and  a  credit  risk, 
i.e.  the  risk  of  the  debtor  being  insolvent.  Depending  on 
the  difficulty of  assessing  the  solvency  risk,  the  debt  may 
or  may  not  be  negotiable;  in  other  words,  a  bond  or  a  loan. 
Bonds  are  typically issued  by  medium-sized  and  large  firms 
with  well-established  reputations,  so  that  the  solvency 
risk  can· be  assessed  by  potential  investors  on  the  basis  of 
general  market  indicators.  By  contrast,  loans  require  a 
thorough  and  costly credit-evaluation process  and  their  non-
negotiability  stems  from  the  duplication  of  information 
costs  that exchanges  of  such  claims  would  entail. - 21  -
If insurance,  equity,  and  debt  exhaust  the  basic 
taxonomy  of·  financial  contracts,  the  recent  wave  of 
financial  innovation  has  extended  the  domain.  By  blurring 
the  frontiers  of  the  specialization  of  intermediaries,  it 
has  created  new  financial  products  that  increasingly  mix  the 
features  of  the  different basic  contracts.  NIFs,  FRNs  and 
options are  examples  of  contracts  that  combine  insurance  and 
debt  features.  Convertible  bonds  stand  mid-way  between  bond 
and  equity financing.  Loans  are  transformed  into  bonds,  with 
securitization eroding  the  distinction  between  negotiable 
and  non-negotiable  debt.  Finally,  unbundling  involves 
splitting the  basic  contract underlying  bonds  into  different 
parts that circulate  separately. 
II.2 Institutions 
The  relationship  between  financial  contracts  and 
institutions is often less  simple  and  straightforward  than 
one  might  wish.  This  is true  not  only  in  fact,  since  the 
different categories  of  contract  are  often  to  be  found 
together  in  the  balance  sheet  of  a  financial  institution, 
but  also  in  principle,  since  the  intermediation  of  a 
financial  institution may  be  logically necessary  for  certain 
contracts,  while  for  others  an  "impersonal"  capital  market 
may  be  a  sufficient  link  between  savings  and  investment. 
Let  me  briefly elaborate  on  this  point.  Insurance 
and  loans  (non-negotiable  debt)  have  to  pass  through  the 
balance  sheet  of  an  institution in  view  of  the  nature  of  the 
underlying  contract.  Insurance  contracts  need  specialized 
institutions,  because  their  profitability  for  the  insurer 
ultimately depends  on  economies  of  diversification  rooted 
in  the  law  of  large  numbers.  Consequently,  it  is- hardly 
possible  to  conceive  of  a  market  for  insurance  without 
specialized institutions providing  services  on  a  large  scale. 
In  the  debt  market,  by  contrast,  the  role  of 
financial  institutions  changes  considerably  according  to 
whether  the  debt  contract  is  negotiable  or  non-negotiable. - 22-
Loans  are  characterized  by  the  very  specific  skills 
and  credit-evaluation procedures  lenders  have  to  possess. 
Indeed,  it is  the  costliness  and  confidentiality  of  the 
information  on  which  lending  is  based  that  make  loans  a 
generally non-negotiable  type  of  debt.  One  can  even  argue 
that,  as  lending  is  carried  out  on  a  strictly  bilateral 
basis,  information  costs act as  an  effective barrier  to  the 
development  of  a  wide  and  efficient loan  market.  Thus,  there 
is  a  logical  need  for  institutions  specialized  in  collecting 
savings  and  channelling  them,  on  the  basis  of  a  complex  and 
relatively standardized credit-evaluation procedure,  to  the 
most  creditworthy final  borrowers,  if lending  is  not  to  be 
an  occasional  activity,  and  develop  into  a  well-defined  and 
important  economic  function.  Historically,  this  basic 
function  has  been  performed  by  banks,  which  could  draw  on 
the  technical  expertise  and  confidential  information 
acquired  in  making  payments  on  the  customers'  behalf. 
The 
11delegation"  inherent  in  banking  needs  to  be 
stressed.  When  savers  deposit  their  funds  with  a  bank,  they 
entrust  the  final  decision as  to  where  t~ey should  be  placed 
to  the  bank's  management,  confident of  its  superior  credit-
evaluation ability.  As  a  result  of  such  delegation,  banks 
are  able  to direct  funds  towards  financial  uses  that  would 
otherwise  have  been  neglected. 
There  is  an  essential  element  of  financial 
transformation  in both  insurance  and  banking  that  makes  the 
intervention of  an  intermediary  indispensable.  The  funds 
received  from  depositors  or  from  insurance  policy  holders 
are  transformed  into assets  of  a  different  kind,  and  the 
ability  of  institutions  to  meet  their  commitments  to 
customers  depends  crucially  on  numbers  being  very  large 
-- on  each  institution intermediating  a  substantial  volume  of 
funds. - 23-
II.3 Market  Making  and  Delegated  Investment 
While  insurance  and  loan  contracts  call  for  the 
performance  of  an  intermediary  to  function,  when  one  turns 
to  negotiable  assets,  whether  bonds  or  equities,  the 
relationship between  contracts  and  intermediaries  becomes 
more  complex  and  indirect.  When  the  emphasis  is  on 
negotiability,  the  market  naturally  comes  to  play  a  central 
role.  In  other  words,  if  such  assets  are  to  be  widely 
acceptable,  the  first  requirement  is  an  efficient 
marketplace. 
The  efficiency of  the  market  for  negotiable  assets 
primarily depends  on  the  pricing  system  being  able  to  send 
the  appropriat~ "signals"  to  all  market  participants.  In 
this  regard,  the  importance  of  those  specialized  operators 
who  supply  market  making  services  cannot  be  overstated, 
since  they  provide  the  market  with  their  professional 
expertise  in  establishing  the  "right"  prices  of  assets, 
thereby facilitating  the  completion  of  trades  by  individual 
investors.  Nonetheless,  it  is  worth  stressing  that  such 
specialists are  but  one  component  of  an  impersonal  capital 
market,  and  cannot  be  called  "intermediaries"  in  quite  the 
same  sense  as  banks.  They  contribute  to  the 
the  whole  market  process,  but  do  not  receive 
efficiency 
a  direct 
of 
or 
indirect mandate  from  final  lenders  to  choose  either  assets 
or  final  borrowers,  nor  do  they  change  the  nature 
funds  received  from  investors,  who  remain 
responsible  for  their  investment  choices  and  bear 
associated  risks. 
of  the 
entirely 
all  the 
However,  other  institutions,  such  as  unit  trusts, 
pension  funds  and  portfolio  management  companies,  also 
participate  in  the  market,  though  they are  neither  necessary 
for  the  smooth  working  of  the  market  nor  foreseen  by  the 
contractual  forms  underlying  the  assets  traded.  The  economic 
rationale  of  such  institutions  is  to  be  found  in  the 
economies  of  scale  in gathering  and  handling  information  and 
the  scope  for  risk  diversification  offered  by  large 
portfolios.  The  growing  complexity of  financial  markets,  and 
the  application  of  new  technologies  to  centralized 
information  management,  considerably  enlarge  the  role  of 
institutions  of  this  type.  What  matters,  for  our  purposes, - 24-
is  that,  despite  the  significant  differences,  all 
institutions that collect  funds  for  discretionary  investment 
have  a  delegated  investment  power  very  similar  to  that  of 
banks.  Like  banks,  they  are  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
channelling  the  final  investors'  funds  towards  the  most 
profitable uses  the  market  can  offer,  performing  in  various 
degrees  that  transformation  function  which  used  to  be  the 
banks'  exclusive  domain. 
The  blurring  of  financial  frontiers  enhances 
fiduciary  role  played  by  such  institutions,  while  the 
of  basic  contractual  into  innovative  assets  makes  it 
difficult,  not  only  for  individual  investors  but  also 
institutions,  to  assess  the  risks  involved. 
the 
blend 
more 
for 
The  provision of  market-making  services  and  delegated 
investment  are  conceptually  distinct  activities,  requiring 
different skills and  involving  different  risks.  Moreover, 
their association  may  give  rise  to  conflicting  interests, 
because  the  necessary neutrality as  to  the  level  at  which 
securities prices are  set  may  be  threatened  by  the  same 
institution acting as  an  investor,  whether  on  its own  or  on 
the  customers'  account. 
Thus,  I  think  that  the  time-honoured  distinction 
between  insurance,  banking  and  securities  institutions 
based  on  the  now  questionable  assumption  that  the 
underlying  contractual  forms  could  be  neatly  and  rigorously 
identified - should  perhaps  be  treated  as  subsidiary  to  the 
more  general  distinction between  suppliers  of  market-making 
services  and  institutions  with  a  mandate  to  make 
investment  choices  and  a  transformation  capacity. 
Needless  to  say,  drawing  a  clear demarcation  line 
between  the  two  fields  may  prove  a  difficult  task.  Examples 
of  institutions  engaged  in  market  making  and  delegated 
investment at the  same  time  can  be  easily found  in  each  of 
our  domestic  financial  markets.  However,  I  do  believe  that 
by adopting  the  proposed  binary  scheme  we  can  gain  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  phenomenon  of  financial  conglomerates 
and  its  implications  for  the  regulatory  system  and  the 
stability of  financial  markets. - 25  -
II.4  Instability and  regulation 
It may  not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the 
crucial  role  in  a  growing  economy  based  on  the  division  of 
labour  is  actually  played  by  the  financial  sector.  The 
efficiency of  the  allocative  process 
the  economy  are  heavily dependent  on 
sector  to  combine  efficiency  and 
and  the  stability 
the  ability  of 
stability  in 
of 
this 
the 
performance  of  its monetary,  credit  and  payment  functions. 
Efficiency and  stability  interplay  in  a  complex  fashion. 
While  in  the  short  run  there  may  be  a  trade-off  between  the 
two,  in  the  longer  run  they are  mutually  reinforcing. 
This  is true  of all  forms  of  financial  activity  and 
makes  financial  markets  inherently  unstable.  If  the 
"fundamental"  values  of  assets,  regardless  of  their 
contractual  form,  are  unknown,  rumours  and  misleading  or 
false  information  from  whatever  source  may  cause  "manias, 
panics  and  crashes". 
Financial  regulation  is  thus  the  authorities' 
attempt  to  achieve  the  maximum  efficiency  of  the  financial 
sector  while  averting  the  risk  of  its  transmitting 
potentially uncontrollable  shocks  to  the  real  economy. 
The  primary  public  interest,  and  hence  the  first 
task  of  regulation,  is  therefore  to  make  the  market 
efficient  in 
assets.  This 
managing 
is  the 
information  and  pricing 
basic  aim  of  all  the 
financial 
forms  of 
intervention  regarding  the  market  as  such,  the 
its participants,  the  procedures  for  matching 
demand,  disclosure  requirements  and  the 
contractual  standards.  Such  interventions  take 
"rules of  conduct"  and  are  concerned  with  the 
of  the  market. 
behaviour  of 
supply  and 
setting  of 
the  form  of 
transparency 
However,  even  a  properly  organized  and  efficient 
market  is unlikely  to  be  exempt  from  the  danger  of  financial 
crises.  Not  only are  standards  and  rules  of  conduct  incapable 
of  removing  all  market  imperfections,  but  most  economic 
systems  adopt  a  policy designed  to  prevent  the  occurrence, 
and  lessen  the  macroeconomic  consequences,  of  severe 
financial  shocks  caused  by  the  failure  of  a  financial 
institution to meet  its  payments  obligations  or  a  sudden 
collapse  in  the  public's confidence.  Either  of  which  could 
severely  affect  a  large  number  of  savers.  Accordingly, 
regulations  are  put  in  place  to  enhance  confidence  in,  and - 26-
the  stability of,  institutions entrusted with  the  management 
of savings.  Such  provisions usually  go  under  the  name  of 
"prudential  regulation"  and  are  concerned  with  the  stability 
of  the  financial  system. 
It  can  therefore  be  seen  that  the  concepts  of 
entrusted  funds  and  delegated  investment  or  placing  power 
are  crucial  if the  domain  of  prudential  controls  is  to  be 
appropriately defined.  From  this standpoint,  it makes  little 
difference  whether  the  institution  to  be  shielded  against 
financial  instability  is  a  "bank"  or  a  "mutual  fund". 
Ultimately,  what  matters  is  whether  that  particular 
intermediary does  or  does  not  have  the  power  to allocate  and 
transform  funds  on  behalf of depositors  or  investors.  (As  I 
shall  argue  below,  however,  banks  continue  to  hold  a  special 
place  in this broader  category.) 
The  growing  complexity  of  financial  markets  and 
intermediation  thus  leads,  somewhat  paradoxically,  to  the 
need  for  greater generality and  simplicity in  the  conceptual 
base  of  the  regulatory  framework.  And  I  would  suggest  that 
this need  can  be  satisfied by  starting  from  a  binary  scheme 
that orders  the  vast  array  of  regulatory  functions  and 
interventions  into  two  main  domains:  market  transparency  and 
the  stability  of  the  financial  system,  respectively 
safeguarded  by  rules  of  conduct  and  prudential  controls. 
Two  considerations  need  to  be  taken  into  account  if 
regulatory  functions  are  to  be  correctly organized  along  the 
lines  of  this  binary  scheme.  First,  in  a  sense  both 
transparency  and  stability  are  indivisible  social  goods. 
Second,  these  social  goods  should  be  protected  by  two 
different authorities.  Let  me  briefly  explain  these  two 
points. 
Stability is  an  indivisible  social  good  not  only 
because  the  danger  of  contagion would  be  greatly  increased 
if the  oneness  of  the  financial  system were  not  matched  by 
an  equally unique  regulatory  framework,  but  also because  the 
blurring of  financial  frontiers  means  that  any  segmentation 
or  loophole  in  the  system of  prudential  controls  could  have 
perverse ·consequences.  In  this  regard,  for  example,  mosaic-
type  supervisory arrangements  - whereby  each  company  in  a 
conglomerate  is supervised  by  a  different  authority  is 
almost  certainly  undesirable.  Similarly,  just  one 
responsible  authority  may  be  necessary  to  achieve  efficient - 27-
markets  through  general  rules  of  conduct  and  avoid  the  risk 
of  differences  in  contractual  information  and  trading 
standards  leading  to  undesirable  arbitrage  between  the 
various  parts  of  the  financial  market. 
While  indivisibility implies  that  each  of  the  two 
domains  should  be  covered  by  a  single  authority  or  by 
closely  coordinated  authorities,  as  a  general  rule, 
separation  implies  that  the  authority  responsible  for 
prudential  supervision  should  not  be  the  same  as  that  in 
charge  of  market  transparency.  The  task  of  ensuring  the 
stability  of  the  financial  system  and  preserving  the 
public's  confidence  requires  confidentiality  of  information 
and  discretion  in  dealing  with  individual  cases,  whereas 
such  an  approach  could  actually  be  counterproductive  when 
the  transparency  of  financial  operations  is  the  primary 
objective.  However,  the  desirability of  a  system  of  "checks 
and  balances"  in  no  way  implies  that  the  two  goals  are  in 
conflict;  quite  the  contrary,  they  are  basically 
complementary  and  must  be  pursued  consistently  by  the 
authorities  to which  they  are  entrusted. 
It is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  analyze 
regulatory  instruments  and  discuss  how  they  should  be 
assigned  on  the  basis  of  their  primary objective  in line with 
the  binary  scheme  suggested  above.  Further  work  is needed  to 
reach  such  a  stage.  Tentatively,  one  can  envisage  a  small 
set of  basic  instruments  such  as  licensing,  capital 
requirements,  fit and  proper  criteria and  prudential  returns 
-- to  be  applied  to all market  participants.  But  this  common 
framework  would  be  supplemented  for  each  type  of  institution 
by  other  provisions  reflecting  its  peculiarities.  For 
instance,  actuarial  reserves  cannot  reasonably  be  applied  to 
anything  except  insurance  companies;  on  the  other  hand, 
deposit  insurance,  discretionary  supervision  and  lending  of 
last  resort would  naturally  be  limited  to  banks.  Conversely, 
market  making  institutions,  such  as  brokers  and  dealers, 
should  be  subject  to  disclosure  ·requirements,  anti-fraud 
provisions,  regulations  governing  selling practices,  investor 
protection  rules  and  others  specifically designed  to  regulate 
activities not  involving  the  allocation  and  transformation 
of  funds  on  behalf  of  investors. 
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III.  SELECTED  ISSUES 
An  immediate  implication of  the  foregoing  analysis  is 
that all  institutions with  a  mandate  from  their  customers  to 
choose  either assets  or  final  debtors  should  be  subject  to  a 
consistent set  of  prudential  controls:  authorization  and 
monitoring  by  a  supervisory  body;  solvency 
limits  on  risk  concentration;  managerial 
integrity criteria,  and  so  on.  The  regulatory 
requirements; 
competence  and 
frameworks  of 
most  countries were  designed  for  a  system  of  specialized 
financial  institutions  in which  the  bulk  of  intermediation 
was  c~rried out  by  banks.  They  are  no  longer  appropriate 
because  the  formation  of  conglomerates  and  the  development 
of  non-bank  institutions managing  large  amounts  of  savings 
on  the  basis  of  customer  mandates  make  it  increasingly 
difficult to  ensure  the  stability  of  the  whole  financial 
system  by  controlling  only  one  category  of  institution, 
however  important  this  may  be.  Moreover,  the  various  parts 
of  the  financial  system  have  become  so  interlinked  that  the 
mere  fact  of  considering  them  as  separate  is  a  threat  to 
control  and  stability. 
Apart  from  this  general  conclusion,  some  specific 
regulatory principles  can  be  identified  that  may  help  reduce 
the  risk  of  systemic  instability while  financial  innovation 
takes  its course.  The  following  is  by  no  means  an  exhaustive 
list.  The  selection  was  made  in  the  light  of  the  main 
practical  problems  addressed  by  this  Conference,  but  was 
also  influenced  by  work  under  way  at  the  Community  level  and 
institutional  features  particular  to  Italy. 
III.l The  Special  Nature  of  Banking 
Banking  should  continue  to  be  considered  as  a 
special  business,  requiring specific  regulation. 
The  particular  combination  of  mostly  non-negotiable 
assets  and  . monetary liabilities makes  banking  "special"  in 
two  ways.  Firstly,  it results  in  the  banking  system  being 
the  principal  channel  for  the  transmission  of  monetary 
policy,  not  only  because  deposits  happen  to  be  the  main 
component  of  monetary  aggregates  but  also  because  the  low 
short-term  substitutability  of  bank  loans  results  in - 29-
fluctuations  in  the  volume  of  bank  lending  influencing 
aggregate  investment  and  hence  economic  activity.  Secondly, 
it means  that  banks  play  the  key  role  in  the  payment  system, 
since  the  book-keeping  nature  of deposits entails that  banks 
themselves  have  to  handle  the  complex  process  set  in  motion 
by  their  customers'  payments. 
The  unique  role  of  banks  in  the  credit,  monetary  and 
payment  systems  is also  the  reason  for  the  special  systemic 
risks  associated with  banking.  In  particular,  it  exposes 
banks -- alone  among  financial  institutions -- to  the  risk  of 
"runs",  that is  to  sudden  and  massive  withdrawals  of  funds 
as  a  result  of  depositors  losing  confidence.  Apart  from 
threatening  the  solvency of  the  institution  concerned,  runs 
tend  to  be  contagious,  so  that if  the  bank  in  trouble  is 
large  enough  the  run  may  well  spread  to  other  banks  in  the 
system,  with  the  risk  of  a  general  disruption  of  banking 
activity and  a  deflationary  impact  on  the  real  economy  owing 
to  the  evaporation  of  a  sizable  part  of  the  money  stock. 
Moreover,  even  without  a  collapse  in  depositor  confidence, 
the  failure  of  a  bank  to  meet  its  payments  obligations, 
whatever  the  ultimate  cause,  may  trigger  a  crisis leading  to 
widespread disruption  in  the  payments  system  as  a  whole. 
Recognition  of  the  special  nature  of  banking  not 
only  implies  that  banks  have  to  be  subject  to  more  thorough 
controls  than  other  institutions  with  delegated  investment 
powers,  but  also  requires  general  prudential  controls  to  be 
supplemented with  more  flexible  and  specific  methods  of 
intervention.  Lending  of  last  resort  is  of  fundamental 
importance  in  this  respect,  since  it  not  only  provides 
monetary authorities with  an  effective  tool  for  imparting 
macroeconomic  impulses  to  the  banking  sector  in  normal 
times,  but  also enables  them  to  inject  liquidity  into  the 
financial  system  in  the  event  of  a  crisis. 
Newly  created  types  of  finance,  such  as  leasing  and 
factoring,  based  on  a  case-by-case  assessment  of  borrowers' 
creditworthiness  really  belong  to  the  field  of  banking, 
regardless  of  whether  they  are  supplied directly by  banks  or 
by  other  institutions which  raise  funds  by  issuing  bonds  or 
borrowing  from  a  bank.  Such  institutions  are  involved  in 
"banking activities"  and  are  thus  exposed  to  the  risk  of - 30-
illiquidity,  which  increases  with  the  amount  . of  maturity 
transformation undertaken.  This  is why  legal  provisions  and 
supervisory procedures  currently  applicable  to  banks  and 
designed  to  promote  stability should  be  extended  to all  such 
institutions,  as  the  new  French  banking  law  has  done.  This 
does  not  exclude  graduating  regulatory  provisions  according 
to  the  characteristics  of  each  category  of  intermediary. 
III.2  Finance  and  Commerce 
The  autonomy  of  banking  is  an  essential  condition, 
both  for  the efficient allocation of  resources  and  for  the 
stability of  the  financial  system.  Too  tight  a  link  between 
banking  and  commerce  could  give  rise  to  instability and  cause 
a  potential conflict of  interest  between  banks  and  their 
depositors.  Historical  evidence  supports  this  general 
conclusion. 
The  separation  between  banking  and 
usually  enforced  through  provisions,  often 
banking  laws,  regarding  participation  links 
lending,  or  both.  There  are  several  examples  of 
the  US  Bank  Holding  Company  Act;  the  Dutch 
bank  supervisors  to  limit  the  voting  rights  of 
shareholders;  and  the  Belgian  "Protocol  on 
of  the  banking  function",  according  to  which 
of  a  bank  undertake  to  assure  its  autonomy 
interests of  the  controlling shareholders.  The 
commerce  is 
embodied  in 
or  connected 
the  former: 
law  enabling 
certain  bank 
the  autonomy 
the  directors 
vis-a-vis  the 
second  type 
of  regulation exists  in almost  every 
takes different  forms:  a  typical 
country, 
example  is 
although  it 
the  German 
provision  requiring  a  loan  to  a  shareholder  of  a  bank  to  be 
unanimously  approved  by  the  Board of Directors. 
In  Italy,  recent decisions  taken  by  the  competent 
Interrninisterial  Committee  have  strengthened  the  regulations 
in this field.  Non-financial  companies  will  not  be  allowed 
to acquire,  directly or  indirectly,  a  dominant  stake  in  the 
share  capital of  newly  founded  banks  and  the  restrictions  on 
connected  lending  have  been  tightened. 
The  blurring  of  financial  frontiers  has  two 
important  consequences  for  the  relationship  between  banking 
and  commerce. - 31  -
The  first  concerns  the  informal  role  and  the 
unwritten  rules  of  bank  supervisors  when  control  in  a  bank 
changes  hands.  Both  are  crucial  to  maintaining  the  separation 
between  banking  and  commerce,  and  derive  their  strength  from 
the  desire  of all  the  parties concerned  to  comply  with  the 
behavioural  rules  of  the  club.  The  blurring  of  national 
boundaries  undermines  the  effectiveness  of  such  unwritten 
rules  and  makes  it necessary  for  such  informal  provisions  to 
be  transformed  into  formal  regulations.  In  so  doing  these 
provisions will  have  to  be  harmonized,  if  we  are  to  avoid 
creating  a  serious  source  of distortion  within  the  unified 
European  market. 
The  second  consequence,  which  is not  related  to  the 
process  of  internationalization,  is due  to  the  emergence  of 
non-bank  institutions as  major  delegated  investors  of  of 
savings.  The  conflict of  interests affecting  banks  may  also 
arise  for  such  institutions.  Accordingly,  the  issue  of 
"banking versus  commerce"  becomes  one  of  "finance  versus 
commerce". 
III.3 Banking  and  Insurance 
Although  most  countries'  legislation  makes  a  clear 
distinction  between  insurance  companies  and  credit 
institutions,  the  practical  effect of  this  distinction  has 
traditionally been  diminished  by  two  kinds  of  blurring: 
the  development  of  products  combining  insurance  and  financial 
features  and  the  establishment  of  ownership  links  between 
banks  and  insurance  companies.  While  neither  of  these 
developments  is  new,  both  have  acquired  new  impetus  in  the 
recent  wave  of  financial  changes. 
The  grafting of  financial  contracts  onto  insurance 
contracts  is  almost  as  old  as  the  insurance  business: 
indeed,  it  has  been  traced  back  to  the  17th  century. 
Recently,  the  share  of  mixed  products  in  households' 
portfolios  has  grown  and  the  marketing  channels  of  insurance 
and  financial  products  have  increasingly overlapped. 
The  ownership  link  has  its  rationale  in  the 
analogies  between  the  two  categories  of  institution:  both 
produce  information  about  their  customers,  have  liabilities 
that are  fixed  in  nominal  terms,  and  act  as  financial 
intermediaries,  with highly-diversified portfolios. - 32-
However,  neither  of  the  two  links  is  without  its 
problems.  When  a  bank  enters  into  a  commitment  that  does  not 
result  in  a  specific  balance-sheet  entry,  it  becomes 
difficult for  both depositors  and  supervisors  (and  sometimes 
even  for  bank  managers)  to  assess  the  riskiness  of  the 
bank's  overall  position.  Similarly,  the  unrestricted 
production  of  financial  instruments  by  insurance  companies 
could distract  them  from  their  core  business.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  establishment  of  ownership  links  between  banks 
and  insurance  companies  may  weaken  certain  prudential 
regulations  concerning  banks.  As  Professor  Schneider  points 
out  in his  report,  the  limits  on  banks'  large  exposures 
could  be  circumvented  by  a  conglomerate  in  which  the 
insurance  company  supplies  the  loans  that  the  bank  is  not 
allowed  to  make.  Thus,  the  blending  of  insurance  and 
traditional  banking,  if  not  adequately  monitored  and 
regulated,  could  accentuate  instability. 
The  banking  and  insurance  sectors  are  by  far  the 
oldest  components  of  our  financial  systems.  Operations, 
customs,  and  prudential  controls differ  in  the  two  sectors 
as  a  result  of  a  historical  process  spanning  several 
centuries.  Today,  it would  be  unwise  to  make  radical  changes 
in  this institutional  framework  merely as  a  reaction  to  a 
market  trend  that  is  not  yet  consolidated.  It  would  be 
preferable  to  reinforce  the  existing 
appropriate  powers  of  intervention 
apparatus,  by 
to  the  public 
giving 
bodies 
already operating  in  the  two  sectors  and  providing  for  closer 
coordination  of  their activities. 
In  Italy,  the  links  between  banking  and  insurance 
have  recently  been  reviewed  by  a  special  Ministerial 
Commission  and  in  a  hearing  of  the  Bank  of  Italy's  Governor 
before  Parliament.  The  emerging  view is that,  in  principle, 
there  are  no  objections  to  banks  acquiring  controlling 
interests  in  insurance  companies  and  viceversa,  as  long  as 
adequate  provision is  made  for  the  managements  of  the  two 
sets of  firms  to  be  kept  separate  and  provided  the  relative 
size of  the  two  companies  is  such  that  the  link  does  not 
alter  the  nature  of  their  business.  The  acquisition  of 
controlling interests  in  banks  should  be  avoided  when  the 
insurance  company  in question  has  substantial  links  with  non-
financial  groups. - 33  -
III.4  The  Securities  Market 
In  the  aftermath of  last  October's  stock  exchange 
crisis,  the  regulation  of  the  securities market  has  become  a 
major  cause  of  concern.  It is  now  widely  agreed  that  the 
matter  deserves  to  be  reassessed,  both  because  the  present 
legislation governing  securities markets 
fragmented  and  heterogeneous  than  that 
is  generally  more 
applying  to  other 
forms  of  financial  activity,  such  as  banking  and  insurance, 
and  because  this  lack  of  uniformity  may  be  particularly 
costly in  a  segment  of  the  financial  system  that  is  becoming 
"global"  more  rapidly  than  any  other. 
I  have  suggested  that  such  a  reassessment  should 
perhaps  lead  to  a  sharper  distinction  between  regulation 
aimed  at  the  market  as  such  and  prudential  requirements 
applying  to  institutions  that,  in  the  normal  course  of  their 
activity,  operate  in  the  securities  market  predominantly  on 
behalf  of  final  investors.  In  a  sense,  regulating  the 
narrowly-defined  securities market  should  be  seen 
different  from  regulating  institutions  involved 
securities business.  While  I  have  so  far  dealt 
as  quite 
in  the 
with  the 
latter issue,  let me  now  touch  upon  the  former,  which  I 
called market-making  regulation. 
In  a  well-functioning market  for  negotiable  assets 
two  requirements  have  to  be  satisfied:  one  concerns  the 
price  setting  mechanism,  the  other  the  publicizing  of 
information  regarding  financial  assets. 
The  process  whereby  the  price  of  a  negotiable  asset 
is set is  a  highly  complex  one  that  requires  technical 
infrastructures,  clear  procedures  and  specialized  operators. 
To  clear  demand  and  supply effectively,  and  thereby  perform 
their allocative  function,  prices  should  continuously  reflect 
all  the  available  information  about  the  assets  traded  in  the 
market.  Consequently,  there  is  an  obvious  public  interest  in 
improving  the  efficiency of  the  price  formation  mechanism. 
However,  ~chieving efficiency  in  the  sense  defined  above 
does  not  mean  that prices  will  never  jump,  nor  that  the 
expectations  of  economic  agents  will  always  be  fulfilled, 
even  less  that  "widows  and  orphans"  will  never  lose  their 
money,  nor  even  that  those  to  whom  they  entrust  their 
savings will  always  prove  worthy  of  their  confidence.  There - 34-
will  always  be  events  about  which  information is  simply  not 
available,  or  bits of  relevant  information  that are  withheld 
from  the  market,  so  that  they  cannot  be  discounted  in  the 
formation  of prices.  Indeed,  the  regulations  and  supervisory 
authorities  governing  the  price  setting mechanism  should  be 
neutral with  respect  to  the  interests of  final  borrowers  and 
lenders,  and  aim  exclusively  at  enhancing  the  overall 
efficiency of  the  process  itself. 
It should  be  a  part  of  this  regulatory  function  to 
ensure  such neutrality among  specialized 
In other words,  rules  should  be  designed 
market  operators. 
that  will  prevent 
firms  professionally involved  in the  price  setting  process 
from  exploiting their  privileged  position  ·to  pursue  aims 
that could  conflict with  their  primary  function.  The  risk  of 
conflicting  interests  may  increase  as  a  result  of  the 
tendency  for  large  brokerage  houses  to  function  ever  more 
also  as  investment  banks,  by  offering  their  customers 
securities  in  the  form  of  mutual  funds  and  other  accounts. 
Security companies  of  this  type,  which  in  the  United  States 
and  Japan  have  already yielded  a  considerable  market  share, 
provide  their  customers  with  both  market  making  and 
delegated  investment  services;  as  a  result,  the  appropriate 
regulation  to which  they  should  be  subjected  may  become  a 
matter  of dispute.  To  my  mind,  it would  be  unwise 
the  risk  of  instability  that  could  result 
unregulated  blurring  of  market-making  and 
investment.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would 
to  ignore 
from  an 
delegated 
perhaps  be 
unrealistic to  deny  the  economic  reasons  that  underlie  this 
market  trend  and  dispose  of  the  problem  through  a  wholesale 
prohibition to  engage  in  both  types  of  business.  Rather,  the 
rules  that  company  managers  should  adhere  to  in  their  daily 
business  should  be  carefully spelled out,  while 
effective  coordination  of  activity  between 
supervisory bodies  involved. 
ensuring  an 
the  various 
The  second  task  of  securities 
to  ensure  that access  to  the  market 
market  regulation 
is  granted  only 
is 
to 
financial  assets  about  which  an  adequate  amount  of 
information  is  made  available  to  the  general  public.  In 
principle,  this function  should  also  be  basically  neutral 
with  respect  to  the  quality  and  value  of  the  assets 
exchanged;  its main  purpose  should  be  ensure  the  trans-
parency of  the  contractual  terms  offered  to  investors. ... 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Public authorities are  facing  a  complex  task.  On  the 
one  hand,  financial  intermediaries  can  no  longer  be  safely 
classified,  as  they often are  in  today's  banking  laws,  on 
the  basis  of  their primary.functions.  Consequently,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  revise  the  institutional  and  normative 
frameworks  of  financial  markets -- a  task  whose  difficulty 
at  the  national  level will  be  inversely proportional  to  the 
flexibility built into legislations.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
must  make  sure  that  the  process  of  re-regulation  does  not 
infringe  the  basic  regulatory principles  I  have  described. 
The  complexity of  the  task  is  in  itself  a  warning 
against  radical  solutions.  In  my  opinion,  the  idea  of 
building  regulatory  "Chinese  walls",  i.e.  of  introducing 
a  partition between  intermediaries  or  even  between  different 
sections  of  the  same  intermediary,  is  no  more  viable  than 
that of  an  outright  return  to  "universal"  banking.  In  policy 
decisions  a  solid  conceptual  scheme  has  to  be  combined  with 
a  large dose  of  pragmatism if we  want  to maintain  control  of 
a  sector  that  by its very nature  has  vague  contours  and  is 
subject  to  continuous  change. 
In  a  period  in  which  the  evolution  of  financial 
activity  is  sweeping  away  not  only  the  barriers  of 
specialization but  also national  juridical  frontiers,  it  is 
essential  that  the  effectiveness  of  supervision  should  be 
maintained.  Although  the  "transnational"  dimension  of 
financial  conglomerates  is not  yet  fully apparent,  there  are 
already clear  signals,  which  are  bound  to  grow  stronger  as 
1992  draws  nearer,  that  the  market  is  heading  in  this 
direction.  The  European  Council's  endorsement  of  the 
principles  of  "mutual  recognition"  and  "minimum  harmoniz-
ation"  of  the  regulations  governing  financial  activity  in 
the  member  states is  a  considerable  step  forward . - 36-
However,  this  may  not  be  enough  to  ensure  stability 
if supervisory practices  are  not  also  made  more  consistent 
in  the  first  place  by  strengthening  operational 
cooperation  between  national  authorities. 
such  practices,  particularly when  rooted  in 
Disparities 
differences 
in 
in 
basic  approach,  may  well  result  in  cross-border  supervisory 
example,  the  gaps  or  inconsistencies.  To  mention  only 
formation  of  conglomerates  is prohibited 
one 
at 
some  countries,  whereas  in others  not  only  is 
but  the  direct participations of  the  parent 
have  to  be  notified while  those  of  subsidiary 
the  moment  in 
it  permitted 
company  alone 
or  affiliated 
companies  do  not.  International  supervision  should  clearly 
remain  based  on  the  principle  of  home-country  control,  but 
serious  problems  can  clearly  arise  if  the  supervisory 
arrangements  for  conglomerates differ significantly  from  one 
country  to  another,  especially if some  group  companies  run 
into difficulties. 
• - 37-
o;scuss;on after Dott.  Padoa-Sch;oppa's  speech  : 
Mr.  Fitchew 
There  is  one  question  which  I  would  like  to  ask,  myself,  perhaps  a  rather 
detailed  one,  relating  to  your  proposition  that  there  should  be  a  clear 
separation  between  banking  and  commerce.  Do  you  advance  that  as  a  two-way 
proposition,  namely  that  it  should  imply  a  prohibition  both  on  the  ownership 
of  banks  by  commercial  interests  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the 
ownership  by  banks  of equity participations,  particulary  in  the  non-financial 
sector. 
Dott.  Padoa-Schioppa 
In  the  Italian system,  separation  is  both  down-stream  and  up-str~ ~m  and  this 
is also the  case  with  other  systems;  as  you  know,  it not  so  for,  for  instance, 
in the  German  banking  system.  Let  me  say  that  the  links  do  not  t~· ~  only  the 
form  of  ownership-links  they  take  the  form  of  credit-links as  well.  I  am  not 
suggesting  that  ownership-links  should  be  forbidden  in  any  circumstance  both 
up- and  down-stream,  I  think  that  to  limit  the  possibil-1 .. -:es  of  developing 
credit-links  in  a  non  limited  way  when  ownership-links exist,  may  be  a  way  to 
deal  with  the  problem.  I  think  at  this  moment  the  cases  in  which  a  bank  is 
owned  by  a  non-banking  or  non-financial  institution  are  more  relevant  than 
those  in  which  the  bank  itself holds  shares  of  a  non-financial  institution,  so 
I  think  that  special  attention  should  be  devoted  to  that  case,  operating 
either at  the  level  of  credit-Links  or  at  the  level  of  ownership-links. 
Sir Kenneth  Berrill 
The  speaker  said that  the  worry  was  placing  power,  or one  of  the  main  worries, 
but  of  course  the  placing  power  is  not  confined  to  banks.  Big  securities 
houses  have  very  large  placing  power  and  in  theory  one  would  have  the  same 
difficulty of  worrying  about  commercial  ownership  of  large  security houses.  In 
practice,  one  tries  to solve  that  with  very  strict  conduct  of  business  rules 
in  the  placing power,  in  just  as  the  same  way  as  you  were  suggesting  that  you - 38-
might  solve  the  problem  of  lending  to  a  holding  company  by  the  restrictions on 
lending  to any  one  particular area.  I  wonder  if you  would  like  to develop  your 
worries. 
Dott.  Padoa-Schioppa 
I  think  what  you  said  is  very  much  in  line  with  what  I  think  myself;  the 
problem  exists  not  only  between  industry  and  banking,  but  also  between 
industry  and  securities  houses  holding  a  large  placing  power.  If  an 
ownership-link exists,  then  I  think,  as  I  understand  you  do,  that  particular 
provision  should  be  designed  as  to  avoid  the  potential  conflict  of  interest  to 
develop  fully  and  there  may  well  be  rules  of  conduct  that  help  in  this  way, 
but  I  agree  that  conceptually  the  type  of  problem  exists  in  the  same  way  for 
the  two  types of  institutions. 
Dr.  Knetschke 
I  just  have  one  brief  comment  I  would  like  to  make  on  what  Dott. 
Padoa-Schioppa  has  said.  It  is not  so  much  that  the  introductory question  has 
provoked  me  in  any  way;  I  think  if  I  understood  it  correctly  it  simply 
confirms  my  view  that  the  problem  of  conglomerates  in  banks  and  insurance 
companies  is not  perhaps  such  a  serious  problem  as  it may  appear  to be.  But  I 
may  well  have  misunderstood.  One  other  problem  which  I  think  is  going  to 
concern  us  rather  more  is  the  link  with  stock  exchange  supervision;  it seems 
to us  that  maybe  that  should  not  be  so  serious either,  but  the  problem  for  us 
may  well  be  that  in  Germany  we  have  the  universal  banking  system,  as  has 
already  been  said,  as  opposed  to  countries  which  have  a  separation  in  that 
field. 
Mr.  Muller 
I  think  my  question  goes  a  little  bit  on  the  lines  of  the  remark  of  Dr. 
Knetschke,  I  think  I  also  subscribe  to  the  interesting  remark  made  by  Mr. 
Padoa-Schioppa  that  there  is  this  problem  of  the  blurring  of  financial 
services  and  therefore  blurring  of  supervisory  responsibilities.  It  is  my - 39-
conception,  at  least, that  at  the  moment  the  problem  is not  so  much  a  problem 
in the  field of  co-operation  between  the  supervisors of  insurance  and  banking, 
on  one  side,  but  more  perhaps  on  the  co-operation  between  supervisory 
authorities  in  banking,  on  one  side  and  those  responsible  for  the  securities 
business  on  the other  side.  One  wonders  why  should  that  be  ?  Maybe,  and  I 
would  like to have  the  view  of other  speakers  on  this,  one  of  the  reasons  is 
that  for  long  it has  been  a  fundamental  element  in  the  insurance  business  that 
it  should  be  separately  incorporated.  Even  I  think  that  is enshrined  in  the 
Oi recti  ves  of  the  Common  Market,  so  therefore  the  object  of  the  prudential 
regulation  is  legally  in  a  different  angle  from  the  banking  industry  and 
therefore  perhaps  it  is  easier  and  less  problematic  to  co-operate.  In  the 
securities business  more  and  more  people  are  working  from  their  responsibility 
for  the  stability of  the  market,  they  also  realise that  there  is a  fiduciary 
element  in  it  if  you  want,  because  for  the  stability  of  the  system  very 
comparable  questions  have  to  be  looked  at,  such  as  adequacy  of  capital, 
position risk,  etc.  So  then,  if a  bank  is dealing  in  securities, and  it does, 
I  think  in  most  of  the  Member  States  as  we  have  seen,  or  anyway  in  the 
important  Member  States,  you  see  that  the  securities  supervisor  will  come 
close to  the  banking  supervisor,  both  from  the  fiduciary  aspect  and  from  the 
stability of  the  systems  aspect,  because  both  look  to minimisation  of  risks. 
Do  you  have  views  on  how  we  can  avoid  the  kind  of  super-overlap  of 
supervision?  I  would  at  least  subscribe  to  Prof.  Gower's  thesis,  that  we 
should  avoid  making  it  by  looking  at  the  insurance  business  and  saying  let us 
incorporate it separately,  because  that  is the  ultimate  remedy  that  will  end  a 
lot  of  the  efficiencies  for  banks  and  so  therefore  we  should  look  for  other 
solutions,  but  perhaps  our  speaker  can  give  us  some  views  on  this matter. 
Dott.  Padoa-Schioppa 
I  have  more  problems  than  solutions.  If one  could  rethink  things  from  the very 
beginning,  I  think  that  the  modern  equivalent  to  pure  brokers  should  be 
identified again  in  markets  that  can  fully use  existing technologies  and  then 
define the  figure,  the  institution, that  performs  as  a  pure  market  maker  which 
has  no  function  of  handling  savings  entrusted  to  it  by  savers  and  have 
regulation for  that  function,  including  perhaps  separate  incorporation for  it 
and  this  would  belong  to  the  regulation  concering  the  securities  market  in  a 
narrow  sense.  I  would  say  that  any  other  function  that  has  to  do  with - 40-
securities which  are  negotiable,  whether  it  is performed  by  banks  or  by  other 
investors,  belongs  to a  different  ward  where  the  fiduciary  element  is the  key 
and  where  regulation  should  be  aimed  at  re-assuring,  so  to speak,  the  market 
that this fiduciary  element  is well  founded.  As  this  is  not  the  case,  because 
the  two  functions  are  de  facto  performed  by  securities  houses  or  partly  by 
banks  together  with  other  functions,  I  think  that  the  only  answer  today  is 
very  close  co-operation  between  the  authorities  supervising  the  securities 
market  and  the  authorities  supervising  the  banking  business.  The  area  of 
possible overlappings  between  these  two  authorities exists  in most  systems  and 
is  different  from  system  to  system,  just  because  the  national  laws  differ. 
Only  a  kind  of  pragmatic  solution  can  be  found,  not  necessarily  separate 
incorporation,  but  probably  a  certain  degree  of  separation  in  the  accounting 
is  desirable.  The  difficulty  will  inevitably  explode  at  a  Community  level, 
because  it  seems  to  me  that  some  common  basis  of  regulation at  the  Community 
level  is  indispensable.  It  is  in  my  view  not  conceivable  that  there  is  no 
Community  doctrine  whatsoever  for  this  front  that  is  now  the  most  difficult 
one;  this  may  be  the  discussion  that  will  guide  us  to  this  minimum  common 
philosophy. - 41  -
NR.  JOLIVET 
First  of  all  I  would  like  to  say  that  a  meeting  such  as  the  meeting  that  we 
are  having  today  is a  very  important  event,  because  I  think  if you  can  get  all 
these  people  concerned  with  supervision  here  today,  this is something  new  and 
something  which  is very  important.  Secondly,  I  would  just  like to express  my 
thanks  to  the  the  Commission  and  to  Prof.  Schneider  for  the  work  that  they 
have  done.  I  think that  whatever  discussions  we  can  have  and  whatever  thoughts 
we  might  have  are bound  to be  based  on  the  analysis of  what  is going  on  in the 
Community.  The  work  that  is  being  done  on  the  banking  side  and  amongst  the 
insurance  supervisers  and  the  amount  of  research  which  has  been  done  shows 
that  there  is a  great  deal  of  variety throughout  our  Community.  I  think it is 
much  more  diverse  and  much  more  fragmented,  than  I  originally thought  to be 
the  case.  Much  more  so  than  I  could  have  imagined  in  the  past.  So  it  is 
important  to have  this opportunity  to begin  to think  about  the  problems,  it  is 
an  opportunity  for  everyone  to  find  out  what  is  going  on  elsewhere  in  the 
Community  and  it is  an  opportunity  to consider  the difficult  matter of  how  to 
define  a  financial  conglomerate.  This  is very  important,  it is  something  which 
is new  and  it gives  us  a  great  deal  of  food  for  thought.  Obviously,  we  have 
got  to  consider  conglomerates  in  general,  and  more  particularly  financial 
conglomerates,  these  are  questions  which  concern  us  all  in  our  various 
countries,  at  different  levels.  It  is  something  we  are  beginning  to  become 
more  familiar  with  and  we  are  beginning  to  ask  more  questions  about.  I  think 
that  this  is  a  good  opportunity  in  this  Conference  to  recall  these  facts, 
because  it  is  quite  clear  that  if  the  Internal  Market,  particularly  the 
financial  Internal  Market,  is  going  to  run  smoothly,  this  matter  is  of 
primordial  importance.  The  questions  that  we  have  to  ask  here  in  this  forum 
are  perhaps  different  from  the  questions  that  we  might  ask  individually  back 
in our  home  countries,  even  if they  are all  interlinked. 
The  first  thing  I  would  like  to  consider,  and  I  think  it  is  very  much  the 
focal  point  of  our  whole  discussion,  is the  idea  that  financial  conglomerates 
have  become  a  pretty  much  irreversible  phenomenon.  Particularly  if  we  feel 
that this  is something  for  the  future,  it  is not  something  which  involves  us 
today,  but  we  are  taking  here  about  specialisation.  At  the  same  time  we  have 
got  to  consider  another  phenomenon  which  is  the  progressive  predominance  of 
demand  over  supply  in  the  financial  field.  First  of  all  let  me  consider  the - 42-
question  of  specialisation.  Obviously  I  will  be  referring more  specifically to 
insurance  here,  but  specialisation  is  a  phenomenon  which  is  very  easily 
understood,  it is  very  strictly dealt  with  by  the  European  Directives  in this 
field  and  we  can  understand  why.  Insurance  activities,  banking,  securities 
trading these  are all different  things.  In  the  field of  insurance,  it is very 
obvious  that  the  insurance  agent  is  doing  something  very  special,  he  is 
entering  into  very  specific  commitments,  whereas  in  other  fields  you  could 
well  imagine  that  it is the  saver,  for  example,  who  is  running  the  risk,  but 
in  insurance  things  are  different.  Obviously  a  lot  more  specific  rules  are 
necessary to cope  with  this,  for  example,  the existence of  technical  reserves. 
We  can  understand  why  this  is  so  and  we  can  see  that  this  is  very  solidly 
founded,  and  in fact  European  Directives  are  founded  on  this  very  principle. 
Indeed,  a  working  party,  chaired  by  Prof.  Angerer,  is  dealing  with  this 
subject  and  we  can  see  that  at  the  moment  this  is  something  which  is  built  on 
fairly solid foundations. 
When  we  look  at  what  has  happened  in  other  countries,  we  can  see  that  a  Lot 
has  still  to  happen.  Let  me  take  one  subject  which  is  very  much  at  the 
confluence  of  savings  and  insurance,  this  is  the  so-called  "universal  Life 
technique".  We  can  see  that  this  is  something  which  is  beginging  to  find  its 
feet  in  Europe,  but  it is still much  in  the  developing  stages,  therefore  it  is 
fair  to  say  that  specialisation  is  something  which  is still  very  much  up  and 
coming.  Of  course,  if I  can  put  it  like this,  specialisation justifies what  I 
might  call  vertical  control,  vertical  supervision,  that  is  super  vision  of 
insurance  companies  and  since  they  tend  not  to  do  very  much  apart  from 
providing  insurance  then  it  is  quite  justified  to  have  this vertical  type  of 
supervision.  Unfortunately  (if I  may  put  it  like this),  we  are  now  seeing that 
things  are  begining  to get  a  little bit  more  complex,  particularly where  these 
insurance  products  are  being  manfactured  and  also  distributed  and  on  the 
distribution  side,  it  is  very  much  in  the  interest  of  banks  for  example  to 
distribute  insurance  products  and  even  commercial  undertakings  are 
distributing  insurance  products,  this  is  something  which  is  happening  more  and 
more  now,  in earnest.  It  is also  in the  interest  of  the  insurance  companies  to 
distribute  products  other  than  insurance,  for  example  other  financial 
products.  Therefore,  it  is clear that  the  conglomerate  can  meet  a  need  here. 
Distribution  is  something  which  can  involve  a  lot  of  financial  operators and 
the  conglomerate  is one  means  of doing  this  job. - 43-
My  second  point  is  to  stress  that  there  are  certain  matters  which  are 
intrinsic  in  the development  of  conglomerates  and  maybe  these  are  rather  new. 
The  most  important  point  is,  as  I  said  earlier,  that  we  are  faced  with  a 
progressive predominance  of  demand  over  supply,  which  is  very  obvious  in the 
case of  insurance,  at  least  in  countries where  insurance  has  been  developing 
very  rapidly  in  recent  years.  Up  to  now  there  have  not  been  too  many 
difficulties,  for  example  the  insurance  market  had  been  undergoing  a  very 
rapid  development  in  various  countries  and  that  has  meant  that  very  often it 
was  enough  simply  to  manufacture  your  product  and  it  virtually  sold  itself, 
where  the products  were  "bought"  rather  than  sold.  We  are  begining  to see  now 
that that  is no  Longer  the  case,  certainly not  to the  same  extent. 
More  important  these  days  is the  fact  that  the  consumer  of  insurance  products 
should  have  his  needs  met,  so  it  is  the  needs  that  we  have  got  to  consider 
first  and  foremost.  Now  that  idea  converges  with  the  fact  that  people  are  more 
in  favour  of  having  one  single  partner  in  this  field,  particularly  in  the 
field of  assets.  It  is  simply  easier  if  you  can  have  all your  problems  dealt 
with  by  one  single  firm,  questions  of  credit,  insurance,  assets  in general 
terms.  Where  that  need  can  be  met  over  a  lengthy  period of  time,  all the more 
reason  for  having  only  one  place  to  go  to  to  meet  all  your  needs  and 
conglomerates  can  fulfil  this  continuing  need.  This  happens  to  coincide  with 
developments  and  technologies,  these  technologies  are  multipurpose  and  they 
make  it  possible  to  have  quite  a  diversified  form  of  management  which  uses 
specialisation in different  products  but  with  the  same  group  of  customers. 
Of  course,  there  are  plenty  of  other  reasons  militating  in  favour  of 
conglomerates,  particularly financial  ones.  First  of  all,  what  I  might  call 
"synergy"  and  financial  power,  this  is  important,  perhaps  more  important  in 
countries  where  the  markets  are  not  heavily  structured.  In  the  case  of  the 
French  insurance  market,  which  at  the  moment  may  not  have  reached  a  structural 
optimum,  companies  are  relatively smaller  than  they  are  elsewhere  and  in  terms 
of  financial  power,  they  have  to  face  up  to  an  ever  growing  market.  It  is 
something  which  has  to  be  viewed  on  a  European  and  world  scale these  days  and 
this  means  that  they  must  obviously  wait  for  developments  to evolve.  I  do  not 
have  the  answer  to  all the  problems  at  the  moment,  you  can  try  to  diversify 
working  on  the  insurance market  as  your  basis,  the market  that  you  specialise 
in  and  therefore  to  grow  by  means  of  financial  integration,  or  the  other 
option  is  to diversify,  to manage  to  form  financial  conglomerates  which,  in - 44-
particular  but  not  exclusively,  involve  banking  and  insurance.  One  other 
reason  for  developing  conglomerates  is  the  fact  that  banking,  securities and 
insurance  do  not  all  grow  at  the  same  speed,  so  you  can  take  things  as  they 
come,  take  things  in order  and  use  the  various  elements  of  the  conglomerate  to 
cope  with  the most  immediate  needs.  Another  very  important  factor,  which  has 
come  to  light,  is  the  problem  of  distribution  networks.  I  think  that  if you 
look  at  all  the  various  financial  elements  which  are  involved  the  problem  of 
the  distribution  network  has  to  be  seen  as  a  most  important  one.  We  can  see 
how  this  is  important  in  the  banking  field,  where  you  have  got  a  banking 
network,  which  is  perhaps  rather  too  dominant,  and  when  it  comes  to 
distributing  another  product  like  insurance,  this  becomes  a  means  of  making 
your  distribution  network  more  viable,  but  we  are  also  seeing  rather  more 
polivalent  distribution networks  with  all the  problems  which  go  with  that,  in 
particular questions  of  training which  are  very  difficult  ones. 
Some  other  factors,  which  I  believe are  very  important,  arise out  of  the fact 
that  markets  these  days  are  all  interlinked.  The  primary  markets  used  to  be 
very  much  kept  separate  by  rules  and  regulations,  by  authorities  and  by 
supervision.  Now  we  can  see  that  these markets  are  begining  to  interlink a  lot 
more  and  that  is  another  "raison  d'~tre"  of  conglomerates  and  there  are  some 
more  immediate  reasons,  for  example,  deregulation,  which  may  well  serve  as  a 
motive  for  forming  conglomerates.  If  you  have  very  heavy  deregulation  in  a 
number  of  branches,  or  if  you  feel  that  some  of  the  activities  are  being 
transferred at  the moment,  disintermediation  as  we  call  it in  some  countries, 
where  banks  move  over  to  deal  with  securities  for  example,  obviously  this 
causes  difficu-lties,  people  are going  to  want  to  move  over  from  what  they  did 
in the  past  to the  newer  activities. 
Obviously  all  this  is  going  to  involve  very  considerable  and  very  difficult 
adaptations.  So,  how  do  we  react  to all of  this  ?  Do  we  need  to enact  further 
rules  and  regulations,  do  we  need  more  supervision  ?  Well  that  is  a  very 
difficult question  to answer.  I  think,  as  Mr.  Fitchew  has  said,  pragmatism  is 
of  the  essence.  It  is probably  fair  to  say  that  there  are different  sorts of 
problems  facing  conglomerates.  First  of  all  it  is  true  to  say  that 
conglomerates  are  not  all  that  new,  we  had  a  lot  of  them  even  before  the war, 
and  perhaps  that  partly  explains  why  we  are  rather  worried  today  about 
conglomerates.  It  is  clear  that  there are different  scenarios  involved,  I  am 
not  going  to go  through  the  typology  of  what  sort  of  conglomerates  there are, - 45-
as  a  lot  of  work  has  already  been  done  on  that,  so  I  think  we  have  got  to 
stress  some  of  the different  aspects.  When  we  look  at  the  banking  sector,  or 
the  insurance  sector,  I  would  say,  they do  not  in  themselves  obviously  lend 
themselves  to  changing  into  conglomerates.  An  insurance  company  is  by 
definition  involved  in  investing  in  other  undertakings,  and  obviously  it  is 
subject  to prudential  supervision,  which  sets its own  limits, but  you  already 
have  there  an  embryonic  conglomerate  and  with  a  commercial  bank  or  a  universal 
bank  which  deals  with  many  different  fields,  we  know  more  or  less  where  we 
stand.  The  necessary  supervision,  whether  it be  over  banks  or  over  insurance 
companies  or  over  the  financial  world  as  a  whole,  is very  much  in full  working 
order  and  we  do  try to  see  to  it that  it  remains  in  that  position.  As  I  said 
earlier,  the  vertical  supervision  system  is  perhaps  creaking  a  little bit, 
there  are  problems  of  coverage  which  we  have  already  stressed,  but  it may  well 
not  be  all  that  difficult  to  deal  with  these  if  we  have  the  proper 
co-ordination  and  dialogue.  I  think  we  know  what  problems  are  involved  and  I 
think  they  are  not  too  difficult  to  solve.  Things  become  rather  more 
complicated  when  conglomerates  are  organised  on  the  basis  of  financial 
companies,  or  companies  holding  various  portfolios.  Obviously  we  are  not  so 
familiar  with  these  problems,  because  neither  the monetary  authorities,  nor 
insurance  supervisors,  nor  the  stock  exchange  supervision  outfits  are  in 
charge  directly of  this  type  of  phenomenon.  So  there are  new  problems  here  and 
when  the  frontiers  are  opened  up  those  problems  are  going  to  become  more 
acute.  These  holding  companies  which  are  neither  banks  not  insurance 
companies,  they  are  likely  to  develop  further  and  indeed  some  countries  are 
going  to  be  showing  a  particular  interest  in  accomodating  these  holdings,  and 
that  is not  going  to  make  things  any  easier either.  So  we  are going  to have  to 
answer  all  these  questions. 
I  think  that  there  are  two  questions  which  are  of  particular  importance,  and 
perhaps  I  could  dwell  at  some  greater  length  on  these.  One  problem  is that  at 
national  level  we  are  familiar  with  the question  of  group  law  and  if  we  have 
this,  we  have  competition  law  after  all,  in  some  cases  we  have  got  laws  on 
mergers,  although  there  too,  that  causes  a  lot  of  difficulty  across  the 
border.  But  obviously  if  we  had  specific  law  dealing  with  groupings,  then  that 
might  make  things  a  bit  easier.  I  have  deliberately  mentioned  that  example 
because  in  France  we  have  had  a  number  of  public  purchase  operations  which 
involve  the  banking  sector  and  the  insurance  sector  at  the  same  time  and  we 
realise  that  in  dealing  with  that  kind  of  phenomenon  we  are  a  little  bit  in - 46-
the dark  and  whatever  ground  rules  you  use, 
field,  in  the  field  of  insurance,  or 
whether  they  are  in  the  banking 
in  the  field  of  other  financial 
operations,  although  they  are  subject  to  supervision,  they  are  not  always 
suitable  rules.  Sometimes  you  h~ve entities  involved  which  are  neither one  nor 
the other.  They  might  be  holding  companies  of  a  type  which  we  are  not  all that 
familiar  with,  so  we  have  to  think  about  them  at  national  level  and  at 
European  level.  To  some  extent  that  is  an  element  in  replying  to  the question. 
The  other  point  which  I  would  like  to deal  with  specifically, and  personally  I 
think  it  would  be  very  wise  to  think  about  it  at  greater  length  than  we 
intended to do  this afternoon,  that  is prudential  problems.  They  are  of  ever 
increasing  importance  as  you  move  away  from  specialisation.  In  other  words, 
the  less  legal  categorisation  you  have,  the  more  of  a  prudential  difficulty 
you  are  faced  with.  These  matters  have  already  been  sketched  out,  but  there 
are  certain  fields  which  are  of  particular  importance,  protection  of  the 
consumer,  of  savers,  of  insurance  policy  holders.  If  we  have  specific  areas  of 
control,  with  the  result  that  the  free  market  situation cannot  entirely apply, 
this  is  precisely  because  we  need  to  have  proper  consumer  protection,  or 
protection for  savers  and  that  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  we  have  got  to think 
about.  For  example,  if  we  can  use  own  funds  across  the  board,  which  I  do  not 
think  one  should  be  allowed  to  do,  we  would  be  undermining  consumer 
protection.  Another  important  point  in  the  prudential  field  is  clarity, 
transparency,  that  is  absolutely  crucial.  Market  operators  and  savers  must 
both  feel  that  the  situation  is  more  transparent.  The  conglomerate  may  be 
neither  good  nor  bad  in  itself,  but  it  must  nevertheless  be  open,  be 
transparent,  so  I  think  a  great  deal  of  progess  needs  to  be  made  in  the 
putting  together  of  consolidated  funds.  All  that  work  of  course  has  been  put 
on  the  Commission  working  programme,  but  it  is very  important,  that  cannot  be 
stressed too much. 
Finally  I  would  say  that,  in  general  terms,  co-ordination of  supervision  is 
perhaps  even  more  important  than  systematic  harmonisation,  because  systematic 
harmonisation  and  the  inventory to which  I  was  referring at  the start,  all of 
these  things  show  that  it  a  very  complex  field  that  we  are  talking  about.  I 
think  perhaps  co-operation  and  co-ordination  in  supervision  is  likely  to 
enable  us  to make  more  progress  than  anything  else.  So,  very briefly,  Chairman 
that  is  all  I  wanted  to  say  on  this  subject,  it is  quite  clear  that  it  is  a - 47-
very  difficult  and  complex  area  and,  of  course,  when  you  look  at  it  at 
European  level  it  gives  rise  to  difficult  problems  and  I  have  mentioned  some 
of  them. 
There  is one  point  I  would  finally  like to touch  on  and  it concerns  the  system 
of  supervision  by  the  country  of origin.  I  think  that this  is a  good  system, 
but  it  is quite  clear  that  if  financial  conglomerates  are  going  to  make  much 
headway,  it  might  become  necessary  to  sit  down  and  think  about  the  matter 
again  and  see  to  it that  this  country  of  origin  supervision  tallies  with  the 
phenomenon  of  financial  conglomerates.  That  is  something  which,  no  doubt,  we 
will  have  to  think  about  this afternoon. - 48-
o;scuss;on after Mr.  JoL;vet's  speech 
Mr.  Fitchew 
May  I  ask  Mr.  Jolivet  to  expand  a  little bit  on  the  point  you  raised  about 
group  law  and  the  absence  of  group  law.  I  had  the  impression,  and  I  may  not 
have  understood  correctly,  that  you  were  suggesting  that  supervision  of  a 
conglomerate  might  be  easier  with  the  existence  of  a  law  on  groups.  I  was 
rather  struck  by  the  suggestion  in  Prof.  Schneider's  paper,  which  I  thought 
rather  went  in the opposite  sense,  that  if you  have  legislation on  groups  that 
normally  carries with  it  the  notion  that  the  holding  company  of  the  group  has 
full  financial  liability  and  responsibility  for  all  the  different  components 
and  that  in  a  sense  seems  go  in  the  opposite direction of  the  proposition that 
if  you  have  a  banking  subsidiary  which  is  part  of  the  group  or  an  insurance 
subsidiary,  that  it  is  rather  important  to  keep  their  affairs  separate  and 
ensure  that  they  have  their  separate  end  funds  and  that  their  accounts  are 
kept  separately.  I  wondered  if you  would  like  to expand  a  little more  on  this. 
Mr.  Jolivet 
It  is  a  difficult  subject,  I  really  wished  to  underline  that  there  is  a 
connection  between  the  two  phenomena,  the  major  phenomena.  What  one  can  see 
emerging  are  groups  involving  all  sorts  of  different  categories  of  people. 
Concerning  their  legal  status  one  finds  common  law  groups,  banking  groups 
which  come  under  the  banking  law,  there  are  insurance  companies  which  are 
governed  by  insurance  laws,  there are  brokers,  exchange  agents  with  their  own 
set  of  laws  and  basically all  these  groups  could  come  under  the  aegis  of  just 
one  holding  company.  You  might  have  even  more  complex  arrangements  with  mutual 
companies  or  ordinary  companies,  it  is  rather  difficult  to  find  your  way 
through.  When  we  have  a  control  exerted  as  it is on  the basis of  one  company, 
it is  often not  possible  to  see  what  precedes  or  what  comes  after.  Generally 
it is easier to  take  a  look  at  what  precedes  though  even  that  is  difficult  in 
some  cases.  It  is  very difficult  to  separate  the different  areas  of  solvency, 
but  this  is  a  very  vital  issue,  so  there  are  different  approaches  to  the 
problem.  You  can  extend  your  controls  and  have  them  both  before  and  after.  As 
I  said it is a  little easier after, it is not  quite  so  easy  before,  that  is to - 49-
say  going  back  to  the  financial  companies  asking  for  documents,  for 
commitments,  and  so  on.  People  are  not  going  to  like that  system  and  it is 
difficult  to  implement  it.  Sometimes  it  does  not  fit  in  with  national 
traditions  and  customs  nor  even  with  the  proper  functioning  of  supervision, 
and  it  might  even  give  rise  to  a  conflict  between  different  supervisory 
bodies,  which  is  never  a  good  thing.  I  would  say  transparency  is  a  better 
solution.  If you  have  transparency,  this means  that  everybody,  including  the 
public  and  also  the  supervisory bodies,  is going  to be  able  to  locate what  he 
wants  to  locate  and  therefore  make  an  overall  assessment.  I  am  not  saying  that 
there  should  be  group  legislation,  but  what  I  am  saying  is  that  transparency 
is a  good  thing. 
Prof.  Schneider 
I  would  like  to  come  back  to  this  particular  point,  because  as  far  as  I  am 
concerned,  this  is  one  of  the  essential  points  to  which  I  have  devoted  my 
attention.  We  do  not  perhaps  need  a  regulation  which  covers  every  possible 
detail,  but  we  do  need  something  which  is  not  going  to  give  rise  to  protest 
and  allegation;  and  so  supervision  and  the  law  of  the  company,  contract  law, 
criminal  law,  is not  perhaps  going  to  be  completely  consistent,  but  at  least 
it should  not  be  totally  contradictory.  Let  me  give  you  an  example  of  what  I 
mean.  In  company  law  we  have  worked  upon  a  solution  whereby  the  holding 
company  is  responsible  for  the  developments  which  might  occur  within  the 
group,  this  means  that  a  lot  of  information  has  to  be  provided  about  the 
subsidiary.  On  the  other  hand,  you  have  the  secrecy of  banking  operations  and 
the  protection of  certain amount  of data,  that  is to  say  this  is what  happens 
in  the  financial  conglomerate,  if I  could  just  follow  up  this question,  do  we 
think  that  bank  secrecy  would  apply  to the  company,  or  a  concern,  when  you  are 
talking about  relations  between  the  holding  company  and  the  subsidiary  ?  Does 
that  sort  of  confidential  dimension  apply  when  you  are talking about  insurance 
contracts  between  banks  ?  If  you  say  yes  to that  question,  you  say  you  have  to 
protect  this  sort  of  information,  keep  it confidential.  Can  you  really than 
require,  under  supervisory  law,  that  the  holding  company  takes  liability for 
the subsidiary.  There  has  to  be  consolidation which  means  information  is given 
concerning  the  persons  involved  in  the negotiations.  I  wonder  whether  this  is 
being  dealt  with  in  other  branches  of  the  Commission.  I  am  not  going  to 
suggest  that  there  is  an  answer  to  this  question  just  yet,  but  perhaps  this - 50-
afternoon  I  will  come  back  to this  and  point  out  how  many  contradictions  there 
are  at  the  moment  between  the  laws  which  cover  the  different  groups  and  I 
think  that  it is our  task  to  smooth  out  these  legal  contradictions. 
Mr.  Jol ivet 
You  have  a  great  many  contradictions  to  solve  between  competition, 
concentration and  the  specific  law  of  different  companies,  that  is the  sort  of 
thing  one  must  concentrate  upon,  but  the  difficulty  of  the  exercise  is very 
clear,  for  example  look  at  the draft directive on  insurance  accounting.  This 
imposes  consolidation  except  where  you  have  a  portfolio  as  a  holding  company, 
that  is  my  point  and  there  is the difficulty. - 51  -
SIR  KENNETH  BERRILL 
FINANCIAL  CONGLOMERATES  AND  THE  EEC 
EVEN  WITHIN  A SINGLE  COUNTRY,  THERE  ARE  DIFFICULTIES  IN  REGULATING 
FINANCIAL  CONGLOMERATES  EFFECfiVEL Y  AND  EFFICIENTI. Y  ~  lliEIR  ACfiVITIES 
WILL  NEARLY  ALWAYS  FALL  TO  BE  SUPERVISED  BY  A  RANGE  OF  DIFFERFNT 
AlflliORITIES  - WHICH  COULD  BE  A  GOVERNMENT  DEPAR1MENT,  lliE  CEN1RAL  BANK  OF 
THE  COUNTRY  IN  QUESTION,  A  REGULATORY  BODY  CONCERNED  WITH  TIIE  SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY,  AND  PffiHAPS  ONE  OR  t.10RE  OlliER  BODIES:  IN  1liE  UK,  lliE 
SECURITIES  AND  INVE51MENTS  BOARD  (SIB)  WAS  SIT  UP  UNDffi  1HE  FINANCIAL 
SffiVICES  ACf  1986,  AS  I  ~1 SURE  YOU  KNOW,  TO  PROVIDE  A  COMPRE-IENSIVE  AND 
UNIFORM  REGULATORY  REGIME  NOT  JUST  FOR  SECURITIES,  BUT  ALSO  FOR  MOST 
OlliER  FORMS  OF  INVES1MENT  BUSINffiS:  IT  WILL  DO  lliiS  IN  CONJUNCfiON  Willi 
THE  SPECIALIST  REGULATORY  BODIES  IT  RECOGNISES  (INCLUDING  THE  FIVE 
SELF-REGULATING  ORGANISATIONS  AND  NINE  PROFESSIONAL  BODIES)~  THE  SET-UP 
~1AY  SOUND  COMPLICATED,  BUT  IN  ANY  OOUNfRY  NOWADAYS  A  NUMBffi  OF  DIFFBUNf 
REGULATORS  ARE  BOUND  TO  BE  INVOLVED  IN  REGULATING  INVESlMENT  BUSINESS, 
AND  WHffiE  TIHS  IS  THE  CASE,  PROBLBfS  CAN  OCaJR: 
MOST  OBVIOUSLY,  IT  IS  EASY  IN  SUCH  CIRCUMSTANCES  TO  FIND  THAT  SOME  AREAS 
OF  ACfiVITI  ARE  LEFT  UNREGULATED,  LEAVING  DANGEROUS  LACUNAE  BE'IWEEN  1HE 
- . 
DIFFERENT  REGULATORY  REGIMES~  SECONDLY,  IT  IS  CLEARLY  -EXTREMELY 
IMPORTANT  THAT  THFRE  IS  GOOD  ro.t.IDNICATION  BEIWEfN  lliE  VARIOUS 
REGULATORS:  TIIE  FORCE  OF  1HIS  POINT  WAS  HIGHLIGHTED  DURING  EVENTS  LAST 
OCfOBER~  TI-IIRDLY,  STEPS  MUST  BE  TAKEN  TO  ENSURE  TI-IAT  1HE  DIFFERENT  SEfS 
OF  RULES  ARE  NOT  INCOMPATIBLE  Willi EArn  OniFR:  AND  FINALLY,  n-IFRE  IS lliE 
QUESTION  OF  OVBU.AP  AND  POSSIBLE  DUPLICATION~  IN  COUNfRIFS. WI·IIOI  HAVE 
NOT  HISTORICALLY  BEEN  SffiVED  BY  'UNIVEtSAL  BANKS'  1lffi  1RADITIONAL  LINES 
OF  DIMARCATION  IN  INVES1MFNT  BUSINESS  ARE  GRADUALLY  BEING  ffiODED,  Willi 
Q-IANGffi  SUCH  AS  1HE  RAPID  DEVELOPMENT  BY  BANKS_·  INTO  AREAS  1l-IAT  WERE 
PREVIOUSLY  11IE  PRESffiVE  OF  Ollim  KINDS  OF  INVES'IMBIT  BUSINFSS:  IN  lliE 
UK,  FOR  EXAMPLE,  IT_  USED  TO  BE  1HE  CASE  lliAT  MFMB:ffiS  OF  1liE  STOCK 
EXGIANGE  COULD  ACf  ONLY  IN  A  SINGLE  CAPACITI;  BliT  FOLLOWING  1HE  'BIG 
•  --,  •t, - 52-
BANG'  OF  1986  IN  LONDON  TillS  DISTINCfiON  HAS  GONE,  AND  BANKS  HAVE  BEEN 
FREE  TO  TAKE  OVffi  STOCKBROKFRS~  WE  ARE  ALSO  WITNESSING  A  CONSIDFRABLE 
EXPANSION  OF  THE  TRADITIONAL  ROLE  OF  BUILDING  SOCIETIES~ 
IN  TIHS  INCREASINGLY  COMPLEX  ENVIRONMENT,  CO-OPERATION  BE1WEEN  REGULATORS 
IS  ESSENTIAL~  Blff  TillS  DOES  NOT  MEAN  11-IAT  TilE  VARIOUS  REGULATORY  REGIMES 
SHOULD  BE  IDENTICAL~  REGULATORS  IN  'IHE  DIFFERENT  AREAS  HAVE  DIFFERENT 
TRADITIONS  AND  DIFFffiENT  PRIORITIES~  11-IESE  HAVE  BE~ DEVELOPED,  OVFR  A 
VFRY  LONG  PfRIOD  IN  SOME  CASES,  ACCORDING  TO  11-IE  SPECIAL  NEEDS  OF  1HE 
PARTICULAR  MARKErS,  AND  THE  KINDS  OF  PRODUCT,  FOR  WHICH  TIIOSE  AtmiORITIES 
ARE  RESPONSIBLE~  TAKE,  AS  A  CASE  IN  POINT,  1HE  TYPICAL  CONCFRNS  OF 
BANKING  AND  SECURITIES  REGJLATORS~  CENTRAL  BANKS  HAVE  AS  lliEIR  MAIN 
CONCERN  THE  PREVENTION  OF  SYSTEMIC  FAILURE  - NOT  TO  THE  EXCLUSION  OF  ALL 
ELSE,  OF  COURSE,  BUT  AS  THEIR  OvrRRIDING  PRIORITY~  lliiS MEANS  lliAT  THEY 
HAVE  LONG  HAD  DErAILED  RULES  ON  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY,  TOGETHm  Willi  TilE 
POWERS  TO  MONITOR  IT  AND  THE  POWFRS  OF  INTFRVBITION  NECESSARY  FOR  1liiM TO 
STEP  IN  WHEN  A  ffiiSIS  OCCURS  - IF  NECESSARY  Willi  FINANCIAL  SUPPORT~ 
NAWRALLY,  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY  RULES  ARE  ALSO  AN  IMPORTANT  EUMaiT  IN  1HE 
REGULATORY  REGTIME  OF  A  BODY  CHARGED  WITH  SUPERVISING  THE  RETAIL 
INVFS1MFNT  MARKEr  AND/OR  SECURITIES;  Blff  HERE  THEY  FORM  JUST  PART  OF  1HE 
NECESSARY  WHOLE:  - FOR  EXAMPLE,  CONDUCf  OF  BUSINESS  RULES  - PARTIOJLARL Y 
lliOSE  RULES  ABOtrr  HOW  A  FIRM  TREATS  ITS  CLIENTS  - AND  CLIENT  MONEY 
REGULATIONS  ARE  ALSO  ESSENTIAL  FOR  1HE  PROTECfiON  OF  INVESTORS 
THESE  DIFFERENCES  OF  APPROACH  AND  EMPHASIS  ARISE  FROM  THE  ORIGINAL 
DIFFffiENCES  BE1WEEN  1HE  Q)RE  ACTIVITIES  OF  BANKS  AND  INVESlMENT  FIRMS, 
AND  EACH  HAS  ITS  VALIDITY  IN  1HE  CONTEXT  FOR  WHICH  IT  WAS  DEVISED: 
NEVER1HELESS,  BECAUSE  OF  TilE  WAYS  IN  WHIOl  BANKS  IN  PARTIOJLAR  HAVE  IN 
SOME  COUNlRIES  EXTENDED  TI-fEIR  SCOPE  BEYOND  1HEIR  1RADITIONAL  O)RE 
ACTIVITIES,  IT  IS  ESSENTIAL  FOR  1HE  REGULATORY  Alflli)RITIFS  IN  EAOi 
RELEVANT  SPHERE  TO  CO-OPERATE: - 53-
IN  THE  UK,  SIB  AND  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND  HAVE  TRIED  TO  TACKLE  TillS  PROBLfM 
BY  DEVELOPING  ' LEAD  REGULA TOR'  ARR.ANGaffiNTS  TO  COVffi  lliOSE  _AREAS  WHERE 
BANKING  AND  INVES1MENT  BUSINESS  ARE  NO  LONGER  AS  DISTINCf  AS  TiiEY  WERE~ 
1HE  AGREfMENT  REACHED  INVOLVES  1HE  BANK  PffiFORMING  AN01HFR  CALCULATION  IN 
ADDITION  TO  ITS  NORMAL  RISK  ASSEf  ASSESSMFNT,  WHICH  IT  IS  OF  COURSE 
OBLIGED  TO  DO  UNDFR  B~  I~S~  CONCORDAT  ARRANGEMENTS:  TIIIS  ADDITIONAL 
CALCULATION  ENTAILS  TAKING  SIB'S  INVESTMENT  POSITION  RISK  AND 
COUNTERPARTY  RISK  REQUIREMENTS,  TOGETHER  WITH  THE  BANK'S  RISK  ASSET 
REQUIRBIDITS  ON  OTHER  NON- INVES1MENT  ASSETS,  AND  MEASURING  TIIE  RESULT 
AGAINST  TilE  CAPITAL  BASE  OF  1lffi  BANK,  AS  DEFINED  BY  1liE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND: 
IT  WILL  THEN  REPORT  ITS  FINDINGS  TO  SIB:  SIB,  THOUGH,  WILL  BE 
RESPONSIBLE  FOR  ENSURING  mAT  BANKS  OBEY  11IE  SIB  CONDUCT  OF  BUSINESS 
RULES,  TOGETifFR  WITI-1  OrnER  INVESTOR  PROTECTION  REQUIREMENTS,  IN  TIIE 
COURSE  OF  lliEIR  INVFS1MENT  BUSINESS~ 
THE  NEED  FOR  CO-OPERATION  BETWEEN  REGULATORS  IS  AS  GREAT  ON  THE 
INTmNATIONAL  FRONT  AS  ON  11-IE  DOMESTIC;  Bt.IT  OF  COURSE  1HE  ISSUES  HERE  ARE 
EVEN  MORE  COMPLEX~  ALL  1HE  DIFFIOJLTIES  ONE  MEETS  Willi  ON  lliE  DOMESTIC 
FRONT  APPLY,  AND  1HESE  ARE  SUPPLH-ffiNTED  BY  VARIOUS  O'IHFR  FACfORS~  TO 
BEGIN  Willi,  TIIERE  ARE  OFTrN  LEGAL  RESTRICfiONS  ON  Tiffi  PASSING  OF 
INFORMATION  TO  A  FOREIGN  REGULATOR  - PARTICULARLY  WHERE  mAT  FORE!~ 
REQJLATOR  IS  TECHNICALLY  REGJLATING  A  DIFFffiENT  AREA  OF  INVESTMENT 
BUSINESS~  lliiS  ISSUE  IS  ALREADY  BEING  EXPLORED  AT  AN  INTfR-GOVFIDMENTAL 
LEVEL  BY  TilE  WILTON  PARK  GROUP,  BUT  11-IffiE  ARE  INEVITABLY  OONSTRAINTS  ON 
TilE  SPEED  Willi  Wl·IIQI  PROGRffiS  CAN  BE  AQUEVED:  IMPORTANT  POLITICAL  AND 
MORAL  ())NSIDffiATIONS  ARE  INVOLVED,  AS  WELL  AS  TECHNICAL  ONES;  AND  IN  ANY 
CASE,  CHANGES  IN  PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  TAKE  SCME  YEARS  TO  GET  ONTO  1HE 
STATiffE  BOOK~  AN01HER  COMPLICATING  FACfOR  ON  WE  INTmNATIONAL  SCENE  IS 
lliAT  DIFFmENT  muNTRIES  WILL  OFfEN  HAVE  DIFFERENT  REGUI..AlORY  PRIORITIES 
AND  TRADITIONS;  FURTI-IF.RMORE,  1lffiY  WILL  BE  AT  DIFFFRBIT  STAGES  IN 
IMPLIMENTING  1lffiiR  PARTICULAR  REGIMES:  UNIFORMITY  IS  NOT  NECESSARY  FOR 
CO-OPERATION,  BUT  REASONABLY  EQUIVAUNT  STANDARDS  OF  INVESTOR -PROTECfiON 
ARE~  WE  AT  SIB  ARE  ACTIVELY  CONSIDffiiNG  HOW  TRANSITIONAL  ARRANGEMENTS 
COULD  HELP  TO  COPE  WITH  lliESE  EXTRA  LEVELS  OF  COMPLEXITY  ON  1liE 
INTffiNATIONAL  FRONT~ - 54-
IN  1HE  EEC  CONTEXT,  1HE  MOVE  TOWARDS  CO-OPffiATION  AND  HARMONISATION  IS 
ALREADY  UNDER  WEIGH,  B1If  TIIffiE  IS  STILL  FURTIIFR  TO  GO  BEFORE_  1992,  WHEN 
INVES1MENT  BUSINFSSES  WILL  BE  ABLE  TO  OPffiATE  WITH  HOME  STATE 
Alfll-IORISATION  11-IROUGHOlff  TilE  COMMJNITY  ON  A  SERVICES  OR  ESTABLISHMENT 
BASIS.  TH.ffiE  IS  CONSIDffiABLE  MffiiT  IN  1liE  HOME  STATE  REQJLATOR  REMAINING 
RESPONSIBLE  FOR  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY  ISSUES:  HOWEVER,  A  BUSINESS  WHICH 
CHOOSES  TO  OPERATE  IN  A  COUNlRY  OTHER  TIIAN  ITS  HOME  STATE  SHOULD  BE 
REQUIRED  TO  FOLLOW  THE  CONDUCT  OF  BUSINESS  RULES  OF  TilE  FOREIGN  STATE  IN 
WHICH  IT  IS  OPERATING  COMPLIANCE  IN  11-HS  AREA  CAN  BE  MONITORED  MORE 
EFFECfiVEL Y BY  11-fE  HOST  STATE  THAN  BY  THE  HOME  STATE,  AND  IT WOULD  IN  ANY 
CASE  BE  IMPOSSIBLY  (l)NFUSING  FOR  AN  INVESTOR  TO  HAVE  HIS  OR  HER  RElATIONS 
WITH  ELEVEN  DIFFffiENT  INVES1MENT  BUSINESSES  GOVERNED  BY  ELEVEN  DIFFERENT 
SETS  OF  RULES:  GIVEN  1HIS  DIVIDED  RESPONSIBILITY,  Willi  lliE  HeME  STATE 
GIVING  AUTHORISATION  AND  MONITORING  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY,  AND  THE  HOST  STATE 
APPLYING  ITS  CONDUCf  OF  BUS I NESS  RULES  TO  A  COMPANY  WHIQI  IT  HAS  NOT 
AlffiiORISED,  MY  EARLiffi  POINT  ABOliT  lliE NECESSITY  FOR  AN  ADEQUATE  LEVEL  OF 
CO-OPERATION  AND  EXGIANGE  OF  INFORMATION  BEIWEFN  COUNTRIES  APPLIES  WITI-1 
ALL  THE  MORE  FORCE:  1HE  SUCCESS  OF  1HE  INTffiNAL  MARKET  IN  INVES1MENT 
BUSINESS  DEPENDS  ON  OUR  WORKING  TOGETIIER  TO  AGIIEVE  nus: 
THE  UK'S  RECENT  FINANCIAL  SFRVICES  ACf  IS  IN  PROCESS  OF  BEING  IMPLIMfNTED 
TIUS  YEAR~  AGAINST  TI-IIS  REQUIRI:MBIT,  DRAFf  MB-iORANDA  OF  UNDFRSTANDING 
ARE  ALREADY  BEING  DRAWN  UP  BEIWEEN  SIB  AND  OVFRSEAS  BANKING  SUPffiVISORS, 
PROPOSING  TIIAT  AN  APPROAGI  SIMILAR  TO  11-IAT  DEVISED  FOR  UK  INOORPORATED 
BANKS  COULD  BE  ADOPTED  FOR  0\TffiSEAS  BANKS  WITH  BRANQIES  IN  mE  UK~  OUR 
AIM  IS  TO  DISAPPLY  OUR  FINANCIAL  RESOURCES  RULES  AND  CERTAIN  OTIIFR 
RElATED  RULES  WHmE  1HE  OVffiSEAS  BANKING  SUPERVISOR  IS  WILLING  10  SHARE 
INFORMATION  WITH  US;  WE  WOULD  mEN  ASK  TI-IAT  H<ME  SUPFRVISOR  TO  MONITOR 
TI-lE  FINANCIAL  POSITION  OF  mE BANK  IN  QUESTION  NOT  AGAINST  OUR  RULffi,  BtiT 
AGAINST  HIS  OWN  RULES,  ON  OUR  BEW...F ~  1HIS  ARRANGrMHIT,  <Dfl>LEX  AS  IT 
MAY  SOUND,  AQ-IIEVES  lliE- NECESSARY  LEVEL  OF  SUPffiVISION  WITIIOliT 
TRESPASSING  ON  1HE  TfRRITORIAL  RIGHI'S  OF  lliE  FOREIGN  STATE  IN  QUESTION~ 
IT  ALSO  ALLOWS  FOR  THE  FACf  lliAT  BRANGIES  OF  BANKS  DO  NOT  HAVE •. 
- 55  -
BANK  REGULATORS  DO  NOT  NORMALLY  PLACE 
111E  SAME  WEIGIIT  ON  THE  AVAILABILITY  OF  LIQUID  CAPITAL  AS  00  SECURITIES 
REGULATORS~  NEITHfR  DO  TilEY  ALWAYS  TAKE  ACCOUNT  OF  1lfE  WIDE  RANGE  OF 
INSTRUMENTS  AND  OR  RISKS  WHIQ-1  ARE  INHFRENT  IN  INTERNATIONAL  SECURITIES 
DEALING  AND  POSITION  TAKING~  DESPITE  SUQI  DIFFffiFNCES  IN  APPROACH,  IT 
SEEMS  LIKELY  THAT  SECURITIES  REGULATORS  WILL  IN  TIME  FIND  THAT,  IN  COMMON 
WITI-1  BANKING  REGULATORS,  11IEY  TOO  NEED  SOME  KIND  OF  CONSOLIDATED 
SUPffiVISORY  POWfRS  IN  ORDffi  TO  CARRY  OUT  THEIR  DUTIES  TO  BEST  EFFECf  -
ESPECIALLY  IN  11fE  AREA  OF  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY~  11-IERE  CAN  BE  NO  OOUBT  THAT 
IN  1HIS  FIELD  1HE  OVffiSEAS  OPFRATIONS  OF  BRANOIES  OF  FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMmATffi  WILL  REQUIRE  CO-OPFRATION  BE1WEB-J  HOME  AND  HOST  COUNTRY 
REGULATORS~  BUT  WHAT  OF  OVffiSEAS  SUBSIDIARIES?  CAN  1HESE  BE  1REATED 
fNTIRELY  BY  TilE  HOST  COUNIRY  ON  TIIE  GROUNDS  1HAT  TilEY  ARE  SEPARATE  LEGAL 
FNTITIES  Willi  TIIEIR  OWN  DEDICATED  CAPITAL  WHIGI  CAN  BE  SEPARATE.. Y 
MONITORED?  IN  A  LEGAL  SENSE  TillS  IS  CERTAINLY  WE  CASE:  IN  PRACfiCAL 
TffiMS  PROBABLY  NOT~  IF  A SUBSIDIARY  GETS  INTO  FINANCIAL  DIFFIOJLTIFS  CAN 
THE  HOLDING  <DMPANY  IGNORE  TilE  PROBLFM?  WILL  NOT  lliE  FAIUJRE  OF  lliE 
SUBSIDIARY  IMPACT  ON  THE  CONGLOMERATE'S  OPERATIONS  WORLD-WIDE?  DOES  NOT 
TilE  HOME  COUNfRY  SUPFRVISOR  WISH  TO  BE  INFORMEJ,  IF  ONLY  INFORMALLY  BY 
TELEPHONE,  OF  POSSIBLE  CHANGES  TO  1HE  SUBSIDIARY?  SIMILARLY,  IF  lliE 
CONGLOMFRATE  IS  FACING  PROBLFMS,  IT  MAY  WITIIDRAW  LIQUID  CAPITAL  FRCM  TilE 
SUBSIDIARY  AT  SHORT  NOTICE;  AND  ONCE  AGAIN  THE  SUPERVISOR  OF  1liE 
SUBSIDIARY  WOULD  BE  GRATEAJL  FOR  INFORMAL  WARNINGS  FR.Gi  1HE  SUPfRVISOR  OF 
TilE  HOLDING  COMPANY.  (I  STRESS  1HE  WORD  "INFORMAL"  BECAUSE  AT  TIMES  OF 
CRISIS  IT  IS  11-IE  INFORMAL  PffiSONAL  KNOWLEDGE  1HAT  SUPFRVISORS  HAVE  OF 
EAQI  Olliffi  INTERNATIONALLY,  lliAT  PFRMITS  n-IAT  RAPID  USE  OF  1HE  TELEPHONE 
WHICH  IS  SO  ESSBITIAL:)  INTIRNATIONAL  00-0PmATION  IN  AREAS  SUQI  AS  1HE 
CAPITAL  ADEQUACY  OF  FINANC~  CONGLOMERATES  WILL  BE  AN  EXCEEDINGLY 
VAWABLE  FIRST  STEP  TOWARDS  1HE  GREATER  LEVEL  OF  HARMONISATION  lliAT 
REGULATORS  TiiE  WORLD  OVffi  WILL  NEED  TO  AIM  FOR  IN  lliE  RITURE~ - 56-
INDEPENDENT  FINANCIAL  RESOURCES:  TI-IEIR  RESOURCES  ARE  lliOSE  OF  THE 
OVERSEAS  COMPANY,  AND  TI-IAT  COMPANY  IS  ALREADY  ABIDING  BY  1lffi  REGULATIONS 
OF  ITS  OWN  CENTRAL  BANIC  SO,  LET  ME  S1RESS  AGAIN  lliE 1WO  MOST  IMPORTANT 
POINTS  ABOtiT  SIB'S  POSITION  ON  TI·HS  SUBJECT~  FIRST,  11-IE  PROPOSALS  DO  NOT 
REPRESENT  ANY  ATTBiPT  BY  TilE  UK  TO  INTffiFFRE  IN  THE  RELATIONS  BElWEFN  AN 
OVFRSEAS  BANK  BRANCH  AND  ITS  HOME  STATE  REGULATOR:  ON  THE  CON1RARY,  WE 
ARE  HOPING  TO  AVOID  A SI1UATION  WHERE  BANKS  SUBJECf  TO  HOME  STATE  CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY  RULES  PROVIDING  PROPFR  PROTECTION  FOR  UK  INVESTORS  ARE  REQUIRED 
EITHER  TO  COMPLY  Willi  A  SECOND  SET  OF  FINANCIAL  RESOURCES  RULES,  OR  TO 
SUBSIDIARISE  THEIR  UK  OPERATIONS~  SECONDLY,  THE  PRINCIPLE  ON  WHICH  THESE 
PROPOSALS  HAVE  BEEN  DEVELOPED  ARE  PRECISELY  lliOSE  OF  THE  REVISED  BASLE 
CONCORDAT  AND  ALSO  OF  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  LEGISLATION  - NAME.. Y,  HOME  STATE 
AUTHORISATION  FOR  BANKS  OPERATING  ANYWHERE  IN  THE  EEC: 
THERE  IS  A  FUR11IfR  POINT  WHIQ-1  WE  HAVE  BEEN  LED  TO  REFLECT  ON  FOLLOWING 
OUR  CONSIDfRATION  OF  THE  POSITION  OF  BRANCHES  OF  FOREIGN  BANKS~ 
SECURITIES  REGULATORS  TEND  TO  OP:ffiATE  ON  1HE  BASIS  OF  1liE  INDIVIDUALLY 
INCORPORATED  COMPANY,  OR  OPERATING  UNIT:  INDEED,  IT  IS  ONE  OF  1HE  MAIN 
FEA1URES  OF  1liE  UK  FINANCIAL  SFRVICES  ACf  THAT  THER.E  IS  NO  SUQI  TiliNG  AS 
GROUP  AUTIIORISATION:  EArn  REQJLATED  FNTITI  MUST  HAVE  SUFFICirNf  CAPITAL 
TO  MEET  ITS  LIABILITIES  TO  CUSTOMfRS,  AND  MUST  ABIDE  BY  lliE  OONDUCf  OF 
BUSINESS  RULES~  AND  BECAUSE  1HFRE  IS  NO  CONSOLIDATED  SUPFRVISION,  THERE 
IS  VERY  LITTLE  RISK  ANALYSIS  OF  CONGLOMERATES~  IN  OTHER  WORDS, 
SECURITIES  REQJI.ATORS  HAVE  AT  THE  MCM.FNT  ONLY  SCANTY  INFORMATION  ON  1HE 
S1RENG1H  OR  OTIIERWISE  OF  CONGLOMffiATES;  BOlli  DCMfSTICALLY  AND 
INTFRNATIONALLY  ~ 
BY  CONTRAST,  BANKING  REQJLATORS  00  USUALLY  REGULATE  ALL  BANK  HOLDING 
COMPANIES,  AND  UNDERTAKE  CONSOLIDATED  SUPFRVISION  OF  THE  B'ITIRE  BANKING 
GROUP'S  COMPANIES~  TIIIS  PERMITS  mE  REGULATOR  TO  GAIN  AN  OVFRALL  PICTIJRE 
WITI-IOUT  RELINQUISHING  lliE  NECESSARY  DETAILED  APPRAISAL  OF  SEPARATE.. Y 
INCORPORATED  COMPANIES  WITIJIN  TilE  GROUP  - TIIOUGH  IT  HAS  TO  BE  SAID  mAT - 57-
Suolnary  of U.S.  based  connected applicants who  have applied 
for authorisation under the Financial Services Act 
Branches of:-
- u.s.  banks 
- U.S.  non-banks 
U.K.  Subs  of:-
- u.s.  banks 
- U.S.  non-banks 
Other non-U.S.  branches 
TOTAL 
16 
so 
66 
44 
67 
177 
93 
13 
38 
51 
38  . 
53 
142 
40 
AFBD 
2 
3 
5 
2 
11 
18 
36 
00.0 
1 
9 
10 
4 
3 
17 
17 - 58-
o;scussion after s;r Kenneth  Berr;LL's speech 
Mr.  Cooke 
If  we  all  take  the  view,  perhaps  a  little  bit  contrary  to  Prof.  Gower's 
introductory  suggestion,  that  co-operation  rather  than  uniformity  is  the 
essential  process  which  at  least  begins  down  the  road  towards  an  integration 
of  the  financial  services  sector,  then  there  remains  the  problem  on  the 
passing of  information.  This  is  an  area  where,  for  banking  regulators,  at 
least  over  the  last  decade,  arrangements  have  been  made  in  most  countries, 
usually  by  the  enactment  of  primary  legislation,  which  ensures  that  banking 
regulators,  dealing  with  their  colleagues  in  other  countries,  have  the 
possibility,  within  the  law  operating  in  their  own  countries,  to  pass 
information  relating  to  institutions which  operate accross  national  frontiers 
without  constraint,  where  this  is necessary  for  supervisory purposes.  It seems 
to  me  one  of  the  big  problems  in  this  whole  area  of  financial  conglomerates 
and  the  whole  area  of  co-operatation  between  supervisors,  cross-national 
frontiers  in particularly,  but  also to  some  degree  within national  frontiers, 
is this question of  what  the  law  allows,  as  far  as  the  passing of  information 
in concerned.  If  we  believe that  the  financial  conglomerates  are  here  to stay 
and  that  there  is  an  increasing  integration  of  insurance,  securities  and 
banking  business  in  these  large  international  conglomerates,  then  the question 
needs  to  be  posed.  Is it  necessary  for  the  law  in  each  national  centre,  to 
provide  for  the  free  exchange  of  information,  not  only  between  banking 
regulators  to  those  regulating  banks  in  other  countries,  but  between 
securities  regulators,  conceivably  insurance  regulators,  and  banking 
regulators  to  their  colleagues  in  each  of  those  three  disciplines  as  it  were 
in other countries  ?  Can  the  co-operative approach  be  fully effective,  if at 
least  that  particular element  of  national  law  is not  to  some  degree  modified  ? 
Sir  Kenneth  Berrill 
I  feel  that  the  law  must  allow,  desirably the  law  would  allow,  pure  discretion 
to  the  regulators  to  talk  about  what  they  wish  between  each  other  both 
domestically  and  internationally;  that  may  be  difficult  to  achieve.  As  a 
second  best,  you  could  imagine  the  law  allowing  certain classes of  information 
of  a  more  general  kind  being  passed  back  and  forth,  which  did  not  necesarily - 59-
involve  commercially  sensitive data  about  lending  to any  particular  borrower. 
An  ideally  complete  discretion,  with  as  a  second  best, discretion to exchange 
information  affecting  the  overall  financial  position  of  any  conglomerate 
operating  in the  market. 
Prof.  Gower 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  Mr.  Cooke  has  apparently  thought  I  was  advocating 
harmonisation,  I  was  not  advocating it at all;  I  was  merely  saying  that that 
is  what  the  Treaty,  as  amended  by  the  recent  Single  European  Act,  says  is 
going  to happen  by  the  end  of  1992.  All  I  was  saying  is,  that  if in fact  one 
is going  effectively to  harmonise  then,  in  my  view,  in  particular areas,  the 
harmonisation  has  got  to  amount  as  far  as  possible  to  unification,  otherwise 
insuperable difficulties would  be  caused.  Certainly,  if the  whole  thing  could 
be  left  to collaboration up  to 1992  and  beyond,  I  would  not  quarrel  with  that 
for  a  moment,  but  it  is  not  what  you  chaps  have  said you  are going  to do  ! 
Mr.  Peter  Cooke 
I  tried  to  use  the  word  "suggestion"  or  perhaps  I  might  have  better  used  the 
word  "proposition";  I  entirely accept  what  you  are  saying.  I  still think  that 
the  process  of  collaboration  as  opposed  to  the  process  of  unification,  does 
pose  this  very  particular  problem,  which  actually needs  to be  addressed,  if 
collaboration  is  going  to  be  an  effective  route  and  it  is  a  very  important 
problem  for  a  number  of  countries. 
Prof.  Gower 
I  just  do  not  think  you  can  have  the  needed  collaboration  if the  bankers  are 
going  to  insist  upon  reserving  banking  secrecy. - 60-
Mr.  Padoa-Schioppa 
I  agree  with  the  answer  which  Sir  Kenneth  Berrill  gave  to  Mr.  Cooke's 
question.  I  think  that  bank  supervisors  should  remain  responsible  for  the 
confidentiality  of  the  information  they  have.  They  should  be  given  the 
discretion  to  use  such  information  when  this  is  considered  to  be  part  of  the 
necessary  process  of  co-operation  with  other  supervisors,  including 
supervisors  of  say  the  securities  business.  An  automatic  access  for 
information would  be  a  satisfactory answer  to the  problem.  The  real  danger  is 
that  if confidentiality  is  not  kept,  information  in  a  way  disappears.  The 
access  to  information  that  bank  supervisors  have  is  very  closely  related  to 
the confidentiality being  preserved.  This  is  why  they  should  have  discretion. 
Mr.  Jolivet 
On  secrecy  between  the different  people  in  the  financial  sector generally this 
runs  fairly  smoothly,  but  the  big  problems  arises  when  you  start talking  about 
taxation.  Mr.  Cooke  is  quite  right  to  raise  these  legal  issues,  one  should 
indeed  look  at  this  question,  but  also  I  think  it  is  a  question  of  degree 
between  for  example  issuing  a  solvency  certificate  and  other  things.  The 
telephone  is quite practical  in  some  cases,  but  it is a  real  problem;  look  at 
insurance,  for  example,  what  is  going  to  happen  when  it  becomes  possible  to 
provide  services  throughout  the  Community  if  a  Japanese  company  sets  up  in 
France,  with  the  right  sorts  of  requirements  and  characteristics  and  if  it 
operates properly  in  France,  but  perhaps  badly  in  other  Community  countries  ? 
Suppose  they  go  in  for  dumping,  though  of  course  financial  dumping  is  rather 
difficult  to define,  under  those  circumstances,  I  would  invite them  to  revise 
their position, but  of  course  the  legal  issue  remains. 
Mr.  Muller 
I  would  just  subscri~e to  the  answer  of  Mr.  Padoa-Schioppa,  vis-a-vis banking 
secrecy  I  think  ways  should  be  found  so  that  the  discretionary  powers  of  the 
banking  supervisors  are  used  to  convey  information  to  other  prudential 
supervisors.  I  think  that  is  very  important,  that  there  is  some  kind  of  a 
cLause  and  I  think  that  the  law  must  be  changed.  It  should  be  only  for - 61  -
prudential  reasons  and  it  can  be  done,  and  I  think  we  all must  be  aware  that 
often  we  pass  on  information  received  ourselves  by  colleagues  from  third 
Member  States  and  in  that  case  we  could  only  do  that  with  the  consent  of  our 
colleague  in the third Member  State.  Finally,  I  would  just  say  to Sir Kenneth 
that  I  have  appreciated  very  much  his  intervention,  because  there  have  been 
some  worries  also  in our  country  and  may  I  say  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  this 
intervention  was  phrased  gave  us  a  lot  of  reassurance  that  we  should  be  able 
to  solve  the  co-operation  problem  and  I  think  that  is  one  of  the  merits  of 
such  a  session. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
May  I  just  make  two  final  comments.  First  on  the  question  of  exchange  of 
information.  I  deduce  from  the  interventions  made  on  the  floor  from  the 
central  bank  supervisors,  that  there  is a  wish  on  the  part  of  the  central  bank 
supervisors  to  retain  control  over  the  "aracana  imperia"  but  that  they  are 
willing  to  share  some  of  the  arcana  where  the  need  arises.  In  fact  the 
solution that  was  suggested  on  the  floor,  that  is, that  the  supervisors  should 
be  given  the  discretion  to  share  their  information  with  supervisors  of  the 
other  financial  markets,  where  the  need  arises,  is  precisely  the  solution 
which  has  been  proposed  in  the  Second  Banking  Coordination  Directive.  That 
does  presuppose,  however,  that  the  supervisors  of  each  of  the  three markets 
will  have  to  be  ready  to  use  that discretion,  when  necessary.  I  would  like to 
make  one  final  comment  arising out  of  the morning•s  discussion,  because  there 
is perhaps  some  misunderstanding  of  what  the  Commission  means  by  "home  country 
control".  First  of  all,  by  "home  country  control"  we  certainly do  not  regard 
that  as  in  any  sense  contradictory  to  the  need  for  very  close  collaboration 
and  co-operation  between  supervisors  and  I  would  very  stongly  endorse 
everything  that  has  been  said  in  the  last  two  interventions  on  that  subject. 
Second,  although  we  may  sometimes  give  this  impression,  we  in  the  Commission 
certainly  do  not  believe  that  "home  country  control"  can  apply  to  all 
supervisory  rules  or all the  aspects  of  supervision that  may  be  necessary.  We 
are  clear  in  our  own  minds  that  "home  country  control"  should  apply  to  the 
process  of  authorisation,  the  process  of  determining  fitness  and  properness 
and  also  to  the  application  of  capital  adequacy  rules,  because  I  think  that 
everything  that  has  been  said  in  the  last  few  minutes  implies  that  anything 
other  than  "home  country  control"  for  capital  adquacy  is  probably  unworkable - 62-
in  the  long  run.  At  the  other  extreme,  we  also  feel  very  clear  that 
advertising  and  marketing  rules  should  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  host 
country  authorities,  in particular  for  investment  business,  but  I  think  that 
what  we  are  increasingly  begining  to  feel  is  that  there  is  a  grey  area  in 
between,  where  we  are  not  quite  sure  what  the  right  answer  is.  Two  examples 
for  that  include  one  that  was  quoted  by  Prof.  Gower,  earlier  this morning, 
namely  the  question  of  separation  of  clients'  funds,  whether  that  should  be 
supervised  by  the  home  country  or  the  host  country.  The  other  rather parallel 
area  is  the  question  of  compensation  or  guarantee  of  funds  and  possibly  a 
different  answer  may  be  required,  depending  on  whether  the business  is being 
done  by  a  branch  or  whether  it is being  done  accross  frontiers,  but  this  is an 
aspect  which  I  think  we  in  the  Commission  would  be  interested to have  explored 
in  the discussions this afternoon  and  tomorrow. - 63-
PROF.  DR.  U.  SCHNEIDER 
I  have  the  difficult  task  of  summarizing  the  arguments  put  forward  here  today 
and  the  results  of  my  own  studies.  I  hope  you  will  forgive  me  if  I  fail  to 
deal  adequately  with  any  important  point. 
I  propose,  firstly  to  analyse  the  new  developments  in  financial  markets. 
Secondly,  I  intend  to  examine  what  new  problems  are  emerging  and  whether 
current  law  is  capable  of  meeting  the  new  challenges.  Thirdly,  I  propose  to 
turn to considerations of  a  legal  policy nature. 
I 
First  of  all,  it  should  be  stressed once  again  that  in  all  Member  States  of 
the  European  Community  the  financial  market  is divided  up  into  various  market 
segments  through  the  law  relating  to  supervision,  the  law  governing 
organisations of  financial  institutions  <e.g.  savings  bank  legislation and  the 
law  governing  mutual  insurance  associations>,  stock  exchange  regulations, 
capital  market  legislation  and  tax  law.  Differences  exist,  however,  in  the 
classification of  individual  financial  services,  for  example  in  the definition 
of  financial  services  requiring  authorization  and  those  not  requiring 
authorization and  in  the  allocation of  particular financial  services to one  or 
other market  segment. 
This  different  demarcation  of  market  segments  has  two  main  implications  for 
credit  institutions.  Firstly,  the  concept  of  banking  business  and  thus  also 
the scope  of  the  law  relating  to banking  supervision  and  the  responsibilities 
of  the  bank  supervisory authorities differ from  one  country  to the  next. 
This  means  that  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  for  example,  securities 
business  <i.e.  the purchase  and  sale of  securities  for  the  account  of  others> 
also  ranks  as  banking  business.  The  Federal  Banking  Supervisory  Office 
therefore  deals  also  with  cases  of  abuse  in  securities  dealing  and  a 
securities  house  in  crisis  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  would  be  a 
banking  crisis.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  by  contrast, securities business  is not - 64-
banking  business;  transactions  in securities are  therefore not  subject  to the 
law  relating to  banking  supervision,  and  this had  led,  amongst  other things, 
to  the  establishment  of  separate  supervisory  legislations.  To  sum  up  :  in 
those  countries  in  which  certain financial  services are  not  covered  by  banking 
supervision but  used  to  be  free  of  supervision,  new  supervisory  systems  have 
developed  alongside  banking  supervision  <e.g.  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Netherlands). 
Secondly,  supervisory  legislation  in  the  individual  Member  States  in  some 
cases  permits  the  market  participants  concerned,  in  particular  credit 
institutions,  to  operate  only  in  part  of  the  market.  Other  Member  States 
impose  no  such  limitations  or  only  to  a  restricted  degree.  The  1984  French 
Banking  Act,  for  example,  contains  numerous  business  restrictions  on  credit 
institutions,  whereas  credit  institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
are  also  permitted to engage  in  non-banking  business.  A feature  common  to all 
Member  States  is  the  division,  in  the  law  relating  to  supervision,  between 
enterprises which  are  engaged  in  banking  business  and  those  which  are engaged 
in  insurance business. 
The  frontiers  which  have  hitherto existed between  the  separate  markets  are  now 
increasingly  being  removed,  firstly  because  national  legal  systems  are  easing 
business  restrictions and,  secondly,  because  of  changes  in practice,  that  is 
to  say  : 
firstly,  the  attempt  to  combine  different  financial  services  contractually 
(e.g.  savings  linked  with  insurance  protection>; 
- secondly,  the  widening  of  the  range  of  operations  <e.g.  the  marketing  of 
insurance  services  by  credit  institutions>.  These  developments  are  not 
pursued  further  below; 
thirdly,  new  organizational  forms,  in  particular  the  fusing  of different 
financial  institutions  into groups  <e.g.  financial  conglomerates>.  In  most 
Member  States  there  are  participatory  and  group  links  between  financial 
institutions which  ·offer different  financial  services  and  which  are  subject 
to different  supervisory  legislation  <e.g.  in  Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Denmark,  France,  Greece,  the  United  Kingdom,  Italy,  the - 65-
Netherlands  and  Spain)  or  between  financial  institutions  and  non-financial 
institutions,  i.e.  industrial  and  commercial  enterprises  <e.g.  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy>. 
It must  be  borne  in  mind  here that  the  term  "financial  conglomerate"  differs 
in  meaning  from  one  Member  State  to  another.  In  some  countries  with  a 
specialist  banking  system,  groups  comprising  deposit-taking institutions and 
investment  banks  are  referred  to  as  "financial  conglomerates",  while  in 
other  countries  with  an  all-purpose  banking  system  the  term  is  used 
primarily  to  denote  groups  made  up  of  credit  institutions  and  insurance 
companies; 
- fourthly,  the  penetration of  new  market  participants  into financial  markets 
through  subsidiary  companies  <e.g.  commercial  groups  with  banking 
subsidiaries>; 
- finally,  the growing  importance  of  financial  subgroups  of  conglomerates. 
II 
The  growing  number  of  financial  conglomerates,  of  manufacturing,  commercial 
and  services  groups  with  financial  institutions  and  of  mixed  groups  with 
financial  subgroups  is  regarded  in  some  Member  States  as  a  new  challenge  in 
the field  of  supervision,  which  has  led  to  intensive  legal  policy discussion 
<e.g.  in  Denmark,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy).  In  other  Member  States, 
discussion of  the  supervisory  implications  has  not  yet  begun  in  earnest  <e.g. 
in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Spain). 
It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  creation  of  financial  conglomerates  and  the 
incorporation  of  financial  institutions  into  mixed  groups  pose  many  problems 
in such  fields  as  regulatory policy,  competition  law,  supervisory  legislation, 
contract  law  and  data  protection  law. - 66-
There  is  first  of  all  the  basic  regulatory  and  competition  law  question  of 
whether  further  concentration  in financial  markets  is appropriate.  The  aim  of 
the  Dutch  "structural  policy"  is to find  an  answer  to  just this problem. 
The  same  questions  are  frequently  analysed  and  dealt  with  at  different  legal 
levels  in  Member  States.  Typical  conflicts of  interest  thus occur  as  a  result 
of  simultaneous  activity in  such  fields  as  banking,  investment,  the  sale and 
purchase  of  securities,  stock  exchange  i ntermedi at ion  and  organization  of 
investment  companies  and  advice  on  and  the  marketing  of  insurance  services. 
Particular  mention  shall  be  made  of  the  inappropriate  use  of  information  and 
conflicting contractual obligations. 
National  legal  systems  react  differently to these  conflicts of  interest,  that 
is to  say  through  supervisory  contractual  and  criminal  legislation and  through 
voluntary  codes  of  conduct.  What  seems  to  me  to  be  a  somewhat  oppresive  trend 
in  this  connection  is  the  growing  criminalization  of  breaches  of  behavioural 
obligations. 
Differences  emerge  primarily  in  terms  of  legal  consequences.  Typical  legal 
consequences  in  the  field  of  supervisory  legislation  (for  example,  activity 
restrictions,  bans  on  participations,  etc.>  prevent  conflicts of  interest  from 
arising.  Typical  contractual  provisions  and  legal  consequences  are  disclosure 
obligations,  special  interest-safeguarding  obligations  and  rights  of 
termination,  claims  for  damanges,  etc. 
In  analysing  national  supervisory  legislation,  a  distinction  has  to  be  made 
between  the  formation  of  groups  and  prudential obligations  and  the  supervision 
of  the groups  concerned. 
National  supervisory  laws  react differently to  the  formation  of  groups 
- In  some  cases,  national  supervisory  legislation  is  restricted  to 
notification obligations  <e.g.  the  law  relating  to bank  supervision  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of Germany). - 67-
- In  some  cases,  there  are  supervisory  restrict  ions  of  varying  severity  on 
the formation  of  subsidiary  companies,  on  the acquisition of  holdings  and  on 
the creation of  groups  by  financial  institutions  <e.g.  in  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France  and  Italy>. 
- In  some  cases,  there  are  supervisory  restrictions  of  varying  severity  on 
the acquisition of  shares  in financial  institutions  <e.g.  in  Belgium  and  the 
United  Kingdom>. 
The  supervision  of  financial  institutions  within  groups  is  carried  out 
differently under  the  various  national  supervisory  laws.  In  no  Member  State, 
however,  is  the  group  the  subject  of  supervision.  In  no  country  is  there 
"group  supervision"  where,  for  example,  financial  services  are  supplied  by 
only one  company  within a  group. 
There  is  also  no  uniform  comprehensive  supervisory  legislation  in  any  Member 
State  where  different  financial  services  are  supplied  by  individual 
enterprises within  a  group.  Nor  is there  any  uniform  supervisory authority  in 
any  Member  State  for  such  cases.  Only  in  Denmark  were  bank  and  insurance 
supervisory  authorities  merged  to  form  a  single  authority  on  1  January  1988. 
In  many  cases,  obligations  of  confidentiality  even  militate  against 
cooperation  between  supervisory authorities  <e.g.  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  to  some  extent, also  in  Italy>. 
Even  within  a  group,  the  basic  focus  of  attention  is  simply  the  individual 
group  enterprise.  It is subject  to the  relevant  type  of  supervision  regardless 
of  the areas  in which  the other enterprises within  the  group  are active.  There 
are  three  basic  ways  in  which  the  prudential  supervision  of  financial 
institutions belonging  to groups  is carried out  : 
- In  some  cases, 
and  financial 
only  individual  participation- and  group-induced  management 
effects  on  the  legally  independent  group  enterprise  are 
considered.  Supervision  is  carried  out  on  a  consolidated  basis  <mosaic 
solution>.  No  account  is  taken,  however,  of  events  affecting  other 
affiliates  or  group  enterprises.  The  other  group  enterprises  are  not 
included  in the  supervison  <e.g.  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in  the 
case  of  banking  supervision  and  in  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  in  the 
case  of  insurance  supervision>. - 68-
- In  some  cases,  an  attempt  is  made  to  safeguard  the  entrepreneurial 
independence  of  a  group  institution  from  the  other  group  entreprises 
(autonomy  solution>  <e.g.  in  Belgium  in  the  case  of  banking  supervision and 
in the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in the  case  of  insurance  supervision>. 
- In  some  cases,  attempts  are  made  to  treat  the  group  as  a  unit  and  to 
include the  other group  enterprises  in  the  supervision  exercise  in  order  to 
be  able  to take  account  of  them  when  dealing  with  the financial  institution 
belonging  to the  group  (single unit  solution)  <e.g.  in the  United  Kingdom  in 
the case  of  banking  supervision>. 
It is  clear  from  close  analysis  that  supervisory  legislation  is  not  adequate 
to  cope  with  the  new  forms  of  group  construction  in  the  financial  field.  A 
number  of  problems  have  arisen,  including: 
- gaps  in supervision; 
- contradictory demands  of  different  supervisory  laws; 
- multiple  requirements  imposed  by  supervisory  legislation; 
- multiple  responsibilities  imposed  by  supervisory  legislation; 
- serious  evaluation  inconsistencies. 
I  intend  to cite only  a  few  examples  in  support  of  this distressing diagnosis: 
a)  First  example  group  formation  bans  where  group  formation  bans  exist, 
they  are  in  some  cases  restricted  to  downstream  group  formation  and 
neglect  the  upstream  tyep,  i.e. the  holding  company  solution  (e.g.  Belgum 
and  Denmark>. 
b)  Second  example  :  notification  requirements  :  such  requirements,  for 
example  those  relating  to  holdings  in  a  credit  institution,  are  in  some 
cases  restricted  to  direct  participations  <e.g.  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany),  with  the  result  that,  in  a  multi-tier  group,  changes  in  the 
parent  company's  participation  situation  do  not  need  to  be  notified; 
alternatively,  they  may  be  restricted  to  holdings  in  the  ascending  or • 
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descending  line  in  the multi-tier group  (e.g.  United  Kingdom>.  There  is no 
guarantee,  however,  that  information will  be  supplied  concerning  merely 
indirect  holdings  in  foreign  companies  and  concerning  fellow  group  members 
Ce.g.  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom).  As  a  result,  the  supervisory 
authorities  may  be  denied  an  overall  view  of  the building up  of multi-tier 
cross-frontier  groups  Ce.g. 
Gemeinwirtschaft/  Volksfurorge; 
cross-frontier group  situations. 
Ambrosiano;  Neue  Heimat/Bank  fur 
Rumasa).  This  applies  particularly  to 
c)  Third  example  :  limited  consolidation  :  in  a  financial  conglomerate  the 
limited consolidation  of  large  loans  means  that  loans  which  may  no  longer 
be  granted  by  a  credit  institution may  be  granted  by  an  insurance  company 
belonging  to the  same  group. 
d)  Fourth  example  reorganization  and  winding-up  procedures  these 
procedures  also  vary  widely  between  different  financial  institutions  in 
crisis.  They  are  dependent  on  what  financial  services  are  offered.  The 
crisis  and  insolvency  are  frequently  not  restricted  to  the  individual 
group  enterprise  but  cover  the  group  of  financial  institutions  or  the 
financial  group  as  a  whole.  The  supervisory  authorities•  powers  of 
intervention,  however,  cover  only  the  individual  group  enterprise and  not 
the  group  as  a  whole.  The  freezing  of  payments  thus  applies  only  to the 
institution  in  question  and  not  to  subsidiary,  parent  or  fellow  group 
companies.  Even  the  proposal  of  31  December  1985  for  a  Community  Directive 
on  the  reorganization  and  winding-up  of  credit  institutions  is  restricted 
to  improving  cooperation  between  bank  supervisory authorities.  No  account 
is  taken  of  the  need  to  improve  cooperation  between  bank  and  insurance 
supervisory  authorities.  Ideas  also  differ  among  individual  financial 
institutions  on  the  objectives  of  the  procedures  (whether  the  aim  should 
be  reorganization,  i.e. to  safeguard the existence of  the  institution, or 
winding-up,  i.e.  to protect  creditors>,  on  procedural  matters  (whether 
there  should  be  a  free  hand  in  reorganizing  the  institution or  whether  the 
reorganization  should  be  organized  by  the  State>,  on  the  necessity  for 
funds  to be  established to provide  subsidiary creditor protection, etc.  In 
Spain,  for  example,  a  special  C"Comisi6n  Liquidadora  de  Entidades 
Aseguradoros">,  whereas  no  such  authority  exists for  credit  institutions 
in crisis. - 70-
e)  Fifth example  :  secrecy  requirements.  Although  a  financial  conglomerate 
constitutes  one  enterprise  for  commercial  purposes,  there  are  in  some 
Member  States  secrecy  barriers  between  the  supervisory  authorities 
responsible  for  overseeing  individual  group  enterprises.  Only 
international  cooperation  (for  example,  between  bank  supervisory 
authorities)  is  safeguarded;  cooperation  between  bank  and  insurance 
supervisory authorities  is not  provided  for. 
Examples  of  multiple  requirements  and  responsibilities  imposed  by  supervisory 
legislation are  found  in  the  case  of  an  independent  enterprise  in countries  in 
which  the  supervisory  systems  are not  interlinked  <e.g.  United  Kingdom>  and  in 
the  case  of  groups  which  provide  different  financial  services.  There  is  no 
multiple  requirement  where  risks  increase  as  a  result  of  a  group  situation. 
The  supervision  of  enterprises  making  up  financial  conglomerates  involves  a 
clash  between  the different  standard solutions.  This  applies at  national  level 
where  individual  supervisory  laws  approach  group  supervision  in  different 
ways.  It  applies  all  the  more  at  international  level  (i.e.  for  such 
multinational  financial  conglomerates  as  Citicorp,  Assicurazioni  Generali  or 
the  Aachen-Munchener  Group>,  where  there  is the  further  problem  of differences 
between  national  group  liability  and  group  risk  rules.  While  an  individual 
group  enterprise  is subject  to the  relevant  national  group  supervision  law  of 
the  country  in  which  it  has  its  head  office,  the  differing  requirements 
imposed  on  the  various  group  enterprises  lead  to  further  supervisory 
evaluation  contradictions  for  example,  in  the  case  of  a  German  insurance 
company  with  a  subsidiary  credit  institution  in  the  United  Kingdom,  United 
Kingdom  bank  supervisory  legislation presumes  parent  company  responsibility in 
the  event  of  a  crisis.  The  German  insurance  supervisory  authority,  by 
contrast,  is empowered  to prohibit  continuance  of  the  holding  under  Article 82 
of  the  Insurance  Supervision  Law.  And  a  further  instance  parent 
company  responsibility  for  subsidiary  companies  is  appropriate only  where  the 
parent  company  is  in  a  position  to  influence  the  management  of  the  subsidiary 
company.  However,  this  is  ruled out,  for  example,  by  Belgian  bank  supervisory 
law. 
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What  conclusions  are  to be  drawn  from  all of this  ? 
The  harmonization  of  supervisory  legislation  in  the  European  Community  has 
hitherto  been  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  sub-markets.  Bank  supervisory 
legislation,  insurance  company  supervisory  legislation,  etc.,  are  being 
harmonized.  Member  States  remain  responsible  for  supervising  those  group 
enterprises which  have  their  head  offices  in their  respective  countries.  The 
consolidation  Directive  of  13  June  1983  covers  only  the  supervision  of 
individual  group  credit  institutions  on  a  consolidated  basis.  It  could 
therefore  be  concluded  that  the  harmonization  programme  adopts  the  "mosaic 
solution".  The  emergence  of  financial  conglomerates  has  not  yet  been  matched 
in the harmonization  process.  The  arguments  set out  in the  Commission's  second 
working  paper  of  April  1987  on  financial  conglomerates  CXV/49/87-EN>  are 
therefore particularly welcome  in this context. 
The  Baste  Concordat  of  May  1983  organizes,  with  respect  to  international 
financial  groups,  cooperation  between  national  bank  supervisory  authorities 
(particularly  on  the  basis  of  reciprocal  information>;  responsibilities  are 
laid  down  and  basic  criteria  for  supervision  are  set  out.  National  bank 
supervisory  laws  are  to that  extent  relaxing  the  secrecy  requirements  imposed 
on  bank  supervisory authorities  <e.g.  in the  United  Kingdom).  However,  there 
is  no  overall  agreement  which  provides  for  international  cooperation  between 
national  bank  supervisory authorities, capital market  supervisory authorities, 
national  insurance  company  supervisory  authorities  and  other  supervisory 
authorities in  respect  of  financial  institutions, with  particular  reference  to 
financial  conglomerates,  and  which  guarantees  reciprocal  information,  lays 
down  responsibilities, etc. 
An  appraisal  of  the  incorporation  of  financial  institutions  into 
manufacturing,  commercial  and  services groups  and  of  financial  conglomerates 
requires  : 
- an  appraisal  of  the general  risks  run  by  the  institutions  in question,  with 
particular  regard  for  the group  situation; 
- an  appraisal  of  the  typical  risks arising from  the grouping  process;  and 
an  overall  view  of  all  relevant  areas  of  law  - namely,  supervisory 
legislation,  group  law,  balance-sheet  law,  competition  law  and  tax  law  - and 
of public  expectations. - 72-
These  risks are  analysed  in detail  in  my  study. 
Consideration  should  then  be  given  to  adjusting  the  structural  norms  and 
behavioural  requirements  ~f credit  institutions,  as  laid down  by  supervisory 
legislation,  to  the  group  situation.  This  also  covers  the  coordination  of 
consolidation  requirements  in the financial  group. 
The  basic  principles underlying  the "mosaic  solution",  the "autonomy  solution" 
and  the  "single  unit  solution"  must  be  fused  together.  Where  supervisory 
legislation  premits  the  creation  of  centralized  groups,  including 
function-switching,  and  where  it permits or  requires  letters of  comfort,  the 
supervision must  cover all group  enterprises.  If the  supervision  is not  to be 
extended  to all group  enterprises,  the  formation  of  centralized groups  must  be 
ruled out. 
It is necessary to ensure  that 
- subsidiary  financial  institutions  are  responsible  for  their  own  business 
decisions; 
- financial  institutions  belonging  to  groups  and  conglomerates  are 
independent  in terms  of their  financial  and  liability situations  where  they 
are  not  operating  in  the  same  market  segment  (limits on  intra-group  lending 
and  guarantees, etc.>; 
- account  is  taken  of  all  important  matters  affecting  the  other  group 
enterprises  where  they  may  have  an  impact  on  the  group  financial 
institution; 
- account  is  taken  of  all  significant  group-induced  financial  effects 
<telescope effect,  transmission effect,  etc.)  by  means  of  supervision on  a 
consolidated basis; 
- supervisory authorities  have  comprehensive  information on  the participation 
and  group  situations,  the  legal  structure of  the  group  and  the organization 
of  the group's management. 
Where  the  financial  institution  is  a  participating  and/or  controlling  member 
of the  qroup  (holding  company),  consideration must  also be  given  to  : - 73-
- whether  creditors'  expectations  that  it  will  be  responsible  for  its 
subsidiaries'  liabilities apply  only  to subsidiaries which  are  active  in the 
same  business  sphere  and/or  under  the  same  name  or  apply  to  all 
subsidiaries;  if  the  hypothesis  is  one  of  such  dependent  relationship, 
consideration  would  have  to  be  given  to  permitting  only  such  vertical 
subgroups  which  comprise  financial  institutions  offering  the  same  kind  of 
financial  services  (principle of vertical  category separation); 
- how  the  own  capital  and  liquidity  endowment  of  the  individual  group 
financial  institution should  appear;  consideration would  have  to be  given  to 
the adoption  of  a  principle of decentralized capital endowment; 
- whether  and  to  what  extent  hiving-off  operations  and  asset-switching  for 
the  benefit  of  group  companies  should  be  permitted,  especially  where  these 
are active  in other  business  spheres,  since  they  run  different  risks  and  the 
problem  of structural  lower  priority arises; 
-whether  and  to  what  extent  supervisory  legislation  can  be  circumvented 
through  certain  transactions  being  "parked"  with  other  group  enterprises 
<e.g.  commodity  futures  trading,  which  is  not  permitted  for  the 
participating credit  institution, with  subsidiary companies,  etc.); 
- whether  and  to  what .extent  controlled  group  enterprises can  be  compelled  to 
comply  with  group-related obligations. 
It is also necessary  to ensure  that  : 
- reoganization  and  winding-up  procedures  are  adapted  to the  group  situation, 
that  the  supervisory authorities'  powers  of  intervention are adjusted  to the 
group  situation  and  that  supervisory  laws  <bank  supervisory  legislation, 
insurance  company  supervisory  law,  etc.)  are  interlinked  within  individual 
Member  States.  A balance  must  be  achieved  between  the  interests  of 
depositors, policyholders,  investor, etc.  which  requires that  : 
- supervisory  legislation is harmonized  and  dovetailed at  Community  level; 
international  cooperation  between  the  various  national  supervisory 
authorities is arranged. - 74-
Discussion panel, chaired by Prof.  Schneider 
Prof.  Schneider 
The  first  point  that  was  touched  on  this morning,  concerned  the  changes  in  the 
partial  or  sub-sectoral  markets  by  overlapping  distribution  of  financial 
services  and  secondly,  as  a  result  of  the  emergence  of  different  forms  of 
financial  conglomerates.  It was  only on  some  occasions that  is was  not  just  a 
question  of  the  bank  securities  houses  and  securities  companies  growing 
together,  but  we  must  also  concern  ourselves with  the fact  that  we  do  have  new 
market  participants these  days,  banks,  insurance  companies  as  subsidiaries of 
trading undertakings.  In  other  words,  they  are  subservient  to someone  else or 
they  are  a  company  as  part  of  a  group.  Thirdly,  we  are  also  concerning 
ourselves  with  banks  and  insurance  companies  which  are  subsidiaries  in  a 
conglomerate  undertaking,  such  as  British-American  Tobacco,  in other  words  a 
very  multifaceted  conglomerate.  This  morning,  the  Chairman  sketched  out  the 
various  jobs  that  we  have  to  do  here,  we  are  dealing  here  with  challenges to 
our  Legal  systems.  There  is  the  question  of  supervisory  law  following  the 
various  sub-sectoral  markets  and  we  will  have  to  consider  which  are  the  new 
risks which  arise.  Just  the  question  of  where  to draw  the  Line  in  determining 
what  sort  of  conglomerate  we  are  talking about  and  what  sort  of  new  jobs  have 
to  be  done  in  terms  of  on-going  supervision.  What  about  managing  crisis  in 
financial  conglomerates,  but  that  is  something  which,  up  to now,  has  more  or 
tess  been  focused  on  the  crisis  in  credit  institutions.  What  is  the position 
of the  various bodies  in  the  financial  conglomerates  ?  I  must  concede  that  I 
was  personally  rather  surprised to hear  the stress that  people  were  putting on 
the  problems  which  might  arise  from  the  multiplicity  of  supervisory 
authorities.  I  could  well  imagine  that  we  might  wish  to  pick  out  some 
questions  that  have  arisen  in  the  discussions  which  up  to  now  have  not  been 
dealt  with  sufficiently.  There  is the question  of  home  country  supervision  and 
host  country  supervision,  may  be  we  should  take that  one  a  little bit further, 
I  suggest  that  when  we  get  to  the  next  stage  of  our  discussions  we  ought  to 
consider  the question of  multinational  financial  conglomerates.  Up  to now  to a 
very  Large  extent  the questions  have  only  been  raised  in the national  context, 
but  I  think  it  is  important  to  remember  that  we  do  have  multinational 
financial  conglomerates  and  very  often  the  parent  company  is  situated  in the 
United  States or  in  Japan.  Perhaps  we  ought  to  ask  ourselves will  this  lead  to 
even  further  and  more  far  reaching  challenges;  perhaps  this  is the  wrong  place - 75-
to  discuss  this  kind  of  problem.  We  will  have  to  go  into  the  question  of 
institutionalising  international  co-operation  on  supervision.  I  have  simply 
sketched out  the  subjects  we  want  to discuss  here,  but  the  next  thing  I  would 
like  to  do  is  ask  all  of  you  whether  there  are  any  questions  which  you  find 
particularly urgent  in  connection  with  the matters  which  we  discussed. 
Name  unknown  (German  speaker) 
Mr.  Jolivet  was  saying  that  in  France  financial  conglomerates  have  become 
increasingly more  important  and  he  said  that  this  has  given  rise  to  problems. 
I  would  be  very  grateful  if  he  could  tell  me  how  exactly  these  financial 
conglomerates  he  refers  to  are structured,  how  they  are  made  up  and  maybe  he 
could  just  touch  on  a  few  more  specific  problems  by  way  of  illustration,  so 
that  we  can  find  out  exactly  where  the  problem  lies.  We  heard  a  lot  of  theory 
expressed  this  morning,  but  I  think  we  need  to  look  at  a  few  practical 
examples,  so  that  we  can  determine  exactly where  the  problems  lie. 
Mr.  Jolivet 
That  is  a  little bit  of  a  complicated  question,  if  it  requires  a  particular 
example  to  be  quoted,  but  quite  apart  from  the  operations  carried  out  by 
financial  conglomerates  it  seems  to  me  that  Belgium  is  an  ideal  centre  for 
financial  conglomerates.  A lot  of  phenomena  are  appearing  in  many  countries, 
traditionally  the  financial  companies,  or  what  we  call  the  "soci~t~s 
financieres",  have  been  involved  in this  kind  of  thing,  that  is to  say  holding 
companies  which  hold  industrial  equity  as  a  priority,  but  also  banking  and 
insurance participations.  When  we  were  preparing our  banking  law  in  France,  we 
had  to  address  the  problems,  and  in  fact  what  we  did  was  to  recognise  that 
there  was  a  problem  with  the  financial  companies,  in  so  far  as  the  banking  law 
was  involved  and  we  required  certain points of  information  to be  provided,  but 
I  think  it is fair  to  say  that  the  matter  was  not  taken  to the bitter end.  In 
insurance,  I  suppose  you  could  say  that  things  are  similar.  There  has  just 
been  a  great  deal  of 'discussion  in  Paris  recently about  the  Compagnie  du  Midi, 
which  is  a  financial  holding  and  underneath  it  it  has  groups  of  insurance 
companies  and  recently  it  is  also  an  agency  which  has  bought  up  insurance 
broking  companies  and  so  on.  These  are  all  part  of  the  landscape  these days - 76-
and  I  would  say  that  they  tend  to  be  rather  welcome.  In  so  far  as  we  are 
talking  about  mainly  financial  operations,  this  is  without  too  many 
difficulties,  because  the  systems  I  was  describing  this  morning  involves  a 
vertical  supervision for  each  individual  undertaking  and  that  itself is  in the 
form  of,  or  is associated  with  specialisation,  so  that  it more  or  less  works. 
But  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  problem  of  more  across  the  board,  horizontal 
supervision,  is  becoming  ever  more  necessary  with  a  view  to  supervising 
operations  and  protecting  the  consumer.  These  holdings  tend  to  be 
predominantly  financial  in  nature,  but  if  they  worked  a  little  bit 
differently,  we  would  have  to  ask  ourselves,  looking  at  each  i ndi vidual 
entity,  what  was  happening  at  the  top of  the  pyramid,  in other  words,  who  was 
taking  the decisions  and  how  financial  policy  was  pursued,  what  are  they  doing 
about  questions  of  solvency,  all  that  would  have  to be  examined.  I  must  say 
that  at  the  moment  we  are  doing  the  best  we  can  with  this  financial  vertical 
system  and  we  will  have  to think  about  doing  things  a  little bit differently. 
Name  unknown  (German  speaker) 
If  I  understand  you  correctly,  this  means  that  developments  which  arise  in 
other  undertakings  in  the  conglomerate  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
supervision,  is that  correct  ?  Secondly,  can  I  ask  you,  are  attempts  being 
made  to quantify these  developments,  these  phenomena,  so  as  to try to develop 
rules  accordingly  ? 
Mr.  Jol ivet 
For  the  moment  we  do  not  have  any  specific  rules  on  this matter,  we  are  simply 
trying  to  observe  what  is  happening  to  consider  the  problem.  The  need  for 
coverage  and  consolidation  is  important  as  well,  the  idea  being  that  once  you 
have  got  a  clear  transparent  situation,  clear  information  provided,  then 
everyone  benefits  from  that. - 77-
Name  unknown  <German  speaker> 
Mr.  Jolivet  said, if I  understood  him  correctly, that  he  felt that  an  exchange 
of  information  between  supervisory authorities,  secrecy  of  banking  operations 
could  be  ruled out,  if there  was  a  question of  tax  secrecy  involved.  As  far  as 
we  are  concerned  in Germany,  the  two  are  certainly not  linked  up,  they  may  be 
in  France,  I  do  not  know. 
Mr.  Jol ivet 
I  did  not  say  that  it  was  a  problem  that  we  could  leave  out  of  question  or 
exclude.  I  think  Mr.  Cooke  raised  an  excellent  question;  we  do  have  extreme 
legal  difficulties,  because  generally  speaking,  these  matters  are  almost  of 
constitutional  importance,  and  sometimes  therefore very  difficult.  The  main 
problems  in  fact  arise  in  connection  with  third  countries  in  the  context  of 
reciprocal  action  and  in  the  insurance  field,  of  course,  we  also  have 
difficulties.  There  are  extremely  serious  problems  of  a  formal  nature,  but 
within the  Community  at  large,  there  is  an  open  dialogue  going  on,  and  I  think 
if  we  do  want  an  increase  in  co-operation  amongst  supervisory authorities than 
we  really  have  got  to  come  to  grips  with  this  problem  of  confidentiality, 
which  exists  in  the  insurance  field as  well.  For  example,  the  confidentiality 
for  the  various  commissions  which  follow  stock  exchange  operations;  so  I  think 
this  is  certainly one  whole  area which  we  must  call attention to. 
Mr.  Zavvos 
In  some  Member  States banks  hold  participations,  have  got  subsidiaries  in the 
insurance  company,  and  they  follow  the practice that  when  a  client goes  to get 
a  loan  from  a  bank,  he  is  kindly  advised that  he  should  be  insured  with  the 
insurance  companies  that  constitute  subsidiaries  of  its  group.  Some  of  the 
Member  States  have  institutionalised  this  pr·actice  by  means  of  law  or  other 
circulars  and  the  question  is  the  following.  The  Commission  has  taken 
decisions,  condemning  this  practice,  by  virtue  of  competition  laws  and  by 
virtue  of  the  Treaty  right  of  establishment  and  supply  of  services,  but  the 
dilemma  is  that  in  a  period  when  the  despecialisation,  disintermediation  and 
all  the  synergies  are  a  common  phenomenon,  banks  and  insurance  companies - 78-
should  collaborate  and  co-operate  to  a  great  extent,  so  what  should  be  the 
position  of  supervisors  for  such  a  case  ?  From  one  side  you  have  clear 
infringement  of  competition  law,  but  from  the  other  side  you  have  got  the 
phenomenon  that  these  companies  should  co-operate  amongst  themselves  and  that 
is the  real  situation  in  the  Community. 
Dr.  Angerer 
If  banks  give  credit  to  a  customer  and  require  this  credit  to  be  covered  by 
insurance,  that  is a  perfectly  legitimate concern  on  the  part  of  the  bank.  If 
the bank  requires  this  risk to  be  covered,  to be  insured by  the  subsidiary,  I 
think that  is also  legitimate.  I  do  not  see  that  that  infringes  competition 
conditions  in  any  way;  they  are  legally  two  separate  institutions,  but  the 
customer  is  free  to  choose  which  bank  and  which  conditions  he  is going  to opt 
for. 
Prof.  Schneider 
We  have  got  to  look  at  the  same  question  from  the  point  of view  of  supervisory 
law,  but  also  from  the  point  of  view  of  contract  law  and  from  the  point  of 
view  of  competition  conditions.  I  am  sure that  Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen  will  have  a 
position to adopt  on  that. 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobseh 
I  totally agree  with  Dr.  Angerer.  Before  you  can  enter with  a  monopolies  act 
it must  really be  extraordinary grave,  because  of  course,  a  group  may  impose 
some  conditions;  otherwise  you  can  go  to another  bank.  My  question  concerns 
group  law,  because  the  very  first  meeting  I  ever  attended  in  Brussels  was  a 
meeting  to  consult  new  Member  States,  in the  epoch  of  Denmark,  Norway,  Ireland 
and  the U.K.,  because  of  the  near  standing  proposal  of  the  Commission  to the 
Council  of  the group taw  directive.  The  Commission  said then  it wanted  to hear 
the  new  Member  States before  presenting  the  draft  Directive  to the  Council,  I 
think it  was  in  March  1971.  As  we  all  know  this  important  Directive  has  not 
seen  the  light of  the day  since.  I  would  not  say  that  I  would  agree  to every - 79-
bit of  what  the  Commission  would  propose  to us,  but  nevertheless,  I  think that 
many  of us  feel  that  we  ought,  at  any  rate,  to  know  what  the  Commission  thinks 
before  we  can  think.  After  so  many  years  it is a  fair demand  to the  Commission 
that  it  tells  us  what  it  thinks  on  group  law,  because  many  things  are  so 
dependent  on  it.  The  problem  of  home  office control  depends  to  some  extend  on 
it.  I  have  seen  in  the  insurance  law  field the question being  treated somewhat 
like a  holy  principle  by  the  British or  the  Dutch,  but  what  is  the  meaning  of 
it.  Part  of  the  meaning  is  hidden  in  group  law  which  is  as  important  as  most 
other matters.  What  does  the  Commission  think  about  group  law,  because  I  think 
it is so  very  important,  because  there  is another  question which  we  mentioned. 
Multinational  companies  and  some  of  them  are  really  multinational,  should  be 
dealt  with  by  group  law.  There  are  some  multinationals  which  are  just outside 
the  Community  but  that  is a  fact  of  life.  What  are  we  to do  about  it  ?  We  are 
to  do  something  with  it,  we  have  proposals  before  our  Parliament  for  the 
moment,  from  time  to  time  people  ask  what  do  the  Communities  think. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
I  cannot  tell  you  what  the  Commission,  as  an  institution,  thinks  on  this 
matter  and  perhaps  Mr.  Gleichmann,  who  is  the  author  of  the  draft  that  you 
consulted  on  at  an  earlier  stage,  will  forgive  me  if  I  speak  rather  frankly 
about  it.  We  have  said  in the  White  Paper  on  the  Internal  Market  that  we  were 
going  to put  forward  a  proposal  on  group  law  during  the  course  of  1988,  before 
the  end  of  this  year.  I  am  not  sure  that  we  will  do  that  at  this  stage, 
because  we  are  still  considering  how  to  proceed  on  this  issue.  I  myself  was 
not  entirely  happy  with  the  text  of  the  proposal  that  was  circulated  at  an 
earlier stage,  which  presented  companies,  not  just  in  the  financial  sectors, 
but  companies  in  the  economy  more  generally,  with  two  very  constraining 
choices,  they  could  either  opt  for  group  status,  which  involved  taking  on 
certain very  strict obligations  in  return  for  which  they  would  have  the  legal 
right  to  manage  their  entreprises  as  a  single  group,  the  alternative  was  to 
stay  as  they  were,  not ·opting  for  group  form,  but  nevertheless  to  accept 
fairly  stringent  reporting  requirements,  in  relation  to  the  operation  of 
subsidiaries.  I  was  not  convinced  that  that  is  in  line  with  the  current 
climate  of  deregulation,  making  life  simpler,  so  far  as  possible  for  the 
company  sector.  I  think it is unlikely that  we  will  want  to  come  forward  with 
the proposal  in  the  form  that  it was  circulated earlier on.  What  we  are  doing - 80-
at  the  moment,  because  we  are  conscious that  there  is  a  problem  here  in  the 
diversity  of  practice  in  different  Member  States,  is  to  have  a  survey 
undertaken  by  outside  contractors  to  bring  up  to  date  our  information  about 
the  way  in  which  jurisprudence  in different  Member  States on  the  group  problem 
has  been  developing.  We  want  to decide  where  to go  from  there  when  we  have  the 
result  from  that  survey.  I  think  that  from  the  point  of  view  of  this 
Conference,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  work  on  financial  conglomerates,  it 
is probably  best  to set  the  company  law  aspects  of  the  treatment  of  groups  on 
one  side  and  to  concentrate  on  how  to  ensure  transparency  and  cooperation 
among  the  supervisors. 
Mr.  Biron 
Are  you  restricting your  information  to the draft  9th  Directive;  are  there  not 
other possible approaches  ?  Might  we  not  consider  that  in  some  cases  the  7th 
Directive  on  Consolidated  Accounts  might  deal  with  law  on  groupings  in  some 
way  ?  What  about  relations  between  affiliated  companies,  at  European  and 
international  level,  do  they  not  constitute  some  sort  of  law  on  groupings. 
Would  that  approach  be  not  more  fruitful  than  perhaps  trying  to go  too far,  be 
too ambitious  and  try to  solve  everthing via  the  9th  Directive  ? 
Mr.  Fitchew 
In  answer  to  your  question  about  consolidation,  that  is  an  approach  which  we 
are  pursuing  in  the  banking  sector.  At  the  last  meeting  of  the  Banking 
Advisory  Committee,  we  had  a  first  discussion  on  the  question of  whether  we 
should  not  try  to  extend  the  approach  set  out  in  the  Banking  Consolidation 
Directive,  and  to extend  consolidated treatment.  For  example,  to extend  it to 
cases where  a  banking  group,  in the  sense  of  a  group  which  contains  banking  in 
it,  but  was  headed  by  a  non-bank,  whether  consolidation  should  not  apply  in 
that  case  as  well.  We  are  in the  process of setting up  a  working  party to try 
to deal  with  that  and  other  questions  which  arise on  the  banking  consolidation 
directive.  I  think· the  question  does  arise  whether  we  may  not  consider  a 
consolidated  approach  in  the  insurance  sector  as  well,  but  at  the  moment  we 
are pursuing it primarily  in  the  banking  sector. - 81  -
Mr.  Clarotti 
Experience  has  shown,  bit  by  bit,  as  we  move  to  harmonising  the  different 
aspects  of  banking  regulation,  that  the  main  directive  which  has  a  certain 
value,  this  concerns  surveillance  on  a  consolidated basis.  This  directive no 
longer  quite  fits  the  bill  when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  all  the  problems 
relating to  Community  surveillance  systems,  solvency  issues,  delimitation of 
major  risks, etc.  So  in fact  we  are going  to set  up  a  working  group  to see  how 
it is  going  to  be  possible  to extend  the  scope  of  consolidated  supervision  and 
see  how  we  can,  if not  eliminate  at  least,  attenuate  the  differences  which 
have  so  far  existed  in  the  way  in  which  the  different  authorities  have 
approached  the  question  of  supervision.  Mr.  Biron  has  said of  course  that  the 
group  is very  important,  since  we  need  to  have  a  general  solution;  this  may 
not  be  possible  in  the  short  term,  but  at  least  we  can  make  progress  moving 
towards  specific  goals.  That  is  what  we  are  trying  to  do,  at  least  in  the 
banking  sector. 
Name  unknown  (French  speaker) 
I  think  there  are  provisions  in  directives  which  are  now  in  the  pipeline  and 
which  are  going  to  mean  that  we  can  advance  very  quickly.  I  am  thinking  in 
particular  of  the  Directive  on  stock  transactions  for  companies  which  are 
listed on  the  stock  exchange;  every  time  a  given  threshold  is exceeded,  public 
declarations  have  to  be  made  to  the authorities,  which  supervise  these  stock 
exchange  activities.  Then  there  is the  Second  Banking  Directive,  art.  9  in 
particular,  where  supervisory authorities  may  identify  the main  shareholders, 
we  have  that  law  in  France  too.  The  third text,  which  is really only  at  the 
drawing-board  stage,  makes  it possible  to define initial misconduct.  This  is 
the sort  of  provision which  is going  to help  us  to make  rapid progress. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
Mr.  Padoa-Schioppa  drew  a  distinction  for  the  purposes  of  analysis  between 
market  makers  on  the  one  hand  and  intermediaries  who  had  a  fiduciary 
relationship  with  the  clients,  who  were  placing  the  client's  money  on  the 
other.  He  suggested  that  there  should  be  different  sets  of  rules  and - 82-
conceivably even  different  supervisors  for  market  makers  on  the  one  hand  and 
for  the  second  category  of  those  in  a  fiduciary  relationship  with  their 
clients  on  the  other.  I  would  like  to  ask  the  panel  two  supplementary 
questions  arising  out  of  that.  The  first  is  how  far  would  thei find  that  a 
useful  distinction  in  drawing  up  supervisory  rules  in  their  own  area  of 
responsibility.  The  second  question  is  :  the  concept  of  the market  maker.  Our 
impression  in  the  Commission  is  that  the  market  maker  in  the  pure 
anglo-american  sense  of  the  term,  does  not  exist  in  very  many  Member  States, 
maybe  at  most  one  or  two.  If one  takes  the  area  of  stock  exchanges,  quite a 
Lot  of  stock  exchanges  operate  on  an  auction  basis  rather than  through  market 
markers.  I  would  like to ask  the  panel  how  far  they  feel  that  the  same  sets of 
rules  can  be  applied  to  stock  exchanges,  which  on  the  one  hand  work  through 
the  market  maker  system  and  on  the  other  hand  those  stock  exchanges  which 
operate  on  an  auction  basis  in  which  there  are  no  market  makers  involved, 
where  there  may  indeed  be  prohibit ions  on  dealers  in  the  market  from  having 
net  open  position going  beyond  certain fairly  restricted  limits.  What  kind  of 
problems  does  that  pose  for  us  in  our  attempts  to  harmonise  ?  What  are  the 
implications  for  home  country  control  of  people  who  are  carrying  out  the 
market  making  function,  if  there  are  these  kinds  of  differences  between 
different  markets  ? 
Sir Kenneth  Berrill 
There  clearly  is  a  difference  between  somebody  who  is  operating  on  his  own 
account  and  somebody  who  is  operating  in  a  fiducary  way  for  a  client.  One 
finds  in  today•s  conglomerates  that  inside  the  conglomerate  you  have  both 
functions.  If that  is the  situation you  have  to have  very  careful  rules  to  see 
that  the  two  functions  are  not  brought  into  conflict.  I  don•t  myself  see  a 
very  strong  case  for  having  two  completely  separate  supervisors  to  carry out 
these  two  functions.  But  when  it  comes  to  the  question  of  the  form  of  the 
market,  I  think  you  have  to  look  a  little  wider  than  the  various  ways  of 
conducting  a  securities  market.  If  you  take  a  commodity  market  or  financial 
futures  markets  - zero  sum  markets -,  virtually everybody  there  is  acting  on 
his  own  account,  not  everybody  but  a  lot  of  them;  you  will  find  the  same 
problem  in many  countries  in  the  way  in  which  the prices  of  unit  trusts,  for 
example,  are  determined.  That  is  to  say  the  manager  of  the  unit  trust  is 
operating on  his  own  account  sometimes  and  you  have  a  problem  of  the  interest - 83-
of  the  manager  of  the  unit  trust or  mutual  fund  as  against  the  owners  of  the 
units.  So  my  answer  is  yes,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  the  problem  of  the 
conflict  between  the  person  dealing  on  his  own  account,  how  you  define  the 
market  maker  is a  separate  issue,  but  once  somebody  is dealing  to  some  extent 
on  his  own  book,  on  his  own  account,  you  then  have  the  problem  of  the 
relationship  of  that  function,  somewhere  else  in  the  conglomerate  he  is 
probably  acting  as  an  agent  in  a  fiduciary  relationship to clients. 
Prof.  Schneider 
Last  year  I  have  been  most  busy  with  English  law  and  it  came  as  a  tremendous 
surprise  to  me,  to  see  that  where  there  is a  conflict  between  interests this 
can  come  under  insurance  supervision  rules,  rather  than  contract  law.  The 
mechanism  of  contract  law  would  imply  that  where  there  is  a  given  conflict  of 
interests  then  the  contract  in  null  and  void.  Where  there  is  a  conflict  of 
interest  this  can  be  solved  by  insurance  supervision  leading  to  prohibition, 
criminal  proceedings,  etc.  Would  one  therefore  draw  the  conclusion  that 
contract  law  does  not  cover  this area  ? 
Sir Kenneth  Berrill 
Prof.  Gower  is a  commercial  lawyer  and  I  am  certainly not  a  lawyer.  I  don't 
know  that  our  contract  law  is that  clear,  I  would  not  wish  to  rely  as  my  only 
defence  on  the  fact  that  I  would  have  to  go  to  the  court  and  have  the  contract 
rendered  void.  There  are  many  ways  every  day  in practice,  in  which  if you  do 
not  scrupulously  obey  the  interest  of  your  client,  you  can  in  fact 
disadvantage  your  client  in  a  way  in  which  one  would  rely  on  having  the 
contract  upset,  but  I  would  like Prof.  Gower  to  respond. 
Prof.  Gower 
When  you  say  contract  law,  I  think  we  English  we  would  say  there  is  a 
principle,  not  exactly a  contractual principle, but  a  principle of  the  law  of 
equity,  which  says  that  if you  are  acting  as  somebody's  agent  or  trustee  you 
must  not  put  yourself  in  a  position  in  which  your  interests conflict,  or  may - 84-
possibly conflict, with  his.  The  trouble  is that  although  that  is the  law,  the 
whole  of  the  securities  industry  has  been  disregarding  this  principle  for 
years  and  nobody,  or  very  rarely,  have  they  been  taken  to court  about  it. This 
is  the  problem  that  in  our  country,  providing  a  civil  remedy  to  small 
individuals as  opposed  to very  wealthy  corporations,  particularly if they  are 
American  and  therefore  like  litigation,  is  completely  useless,  because 
although  there  may  be  a  remedy  a)  they do  not  know  they  have  got  it and  b) 
if  they  are  told  they  have  got  it  they  have  not  got  the  money  to  bring  an 
action  in  the  court.  The  answer  is  certainly  the  fact  that  there  may  be  a 
civil  remedy  under  existing  law,  is  not  a  sufficient  protection  a)  because 
people  do  not  realise that  this  is  the  law  and  b)  because,  when  it is drawn  to 
their  attention,  they  probably  disregard  it  in  a  way  and  c)  because  most 
people  cannot  afford,  in  our  country,  to  bring  an  action  to  enforce  it. 
Therefore,  we  have  taken  the  view  that  one  has  got  to have  clearer  specific 
rules  laid  down  as  a  matter  of  professional  duty  and  that  is  what  the 
Securities and  Investment  Board  is trying  to  do  and  here,  as  Sir  Kenneth  has 
said, it has  drawn  a  distinction between  those  people  who  are acting purely  as 
agents  for  others  and  those  who  are  acting  on  their  own  account  as  market 
makers,  but  has  provided  rules  which  extend  to  some  extent  the  fiduciary 
principle  even  to  people  when  they  are  acting  on  their  own  behalf.  It  goes 
half  way  towards  that,  on  the  basis  that  if  people  are  acting  sometimes  as 
agents  and  sometimes  as  principals,  then  they  really  cannot  get  away  with  that 
without  fully  disclosing  and  getting  consent  once  they  have  started  to  act  as 
agents. 
Dr.  Lanciotti 
I  can  always  try to place  an  authentic  interpretation on  the distinction which 
was  drawn  this  morning.  I  do  not  think  that  the  speaker  was  thinking  of  the 
technical  implications  which  Mr.  Fitchew  mentioned  in  the  second  question.  I 
think  that  the  difference  is  more  one  of  approach;  by  this  I  mean  where  you 
have  placing power  and  delegation the  problems  which  arise are  very  similar to 
those of  a  banking  agent.  Dr.  Padoa-Schioppa  has  concluded  that  the  type  of 
supervision which  is appropriate  to  this  form  of  agency  work  is  very  similar 
to those appropriate  for  a  banking  agent,  comprising  not  only  the  basic  Laws 
which  apply  to  all  operators  on  the  market,  rules  of  conduct,  solvency - 85-
requirements,  and  so  on,  and  in  addition  to  this  a  form  of  supervision 
involving  to  a  great  extent  an  assessment  of  the  assets of  the  agent,  as  is 
done  in  the  case  of  the banks. 
Prof.  Schneider 
Perhaps  we  can  turn our  attention to these  individual  matters,  that  is to say 
the  relationship  between  the  host  country  and  the  country  of  origin  and  also 
the  significance  of  the  multinational  dimension,  particularly where  the  head 
authority  is  in a  non-European  country. 
Sir Kenneth  Berrill 
I  think  I  start  from  having  to  remember  what  are  the  realities of  the markets 
in  which  we  operate  in  the  UK  and  which  I  suspect  will  become  increasingly 
true of  other  European  markets.  The  first  reality  is that  most  of  the  retail 
market  is  dominated  by  domestic  firms.  I  know  that  that  will  change,  but  I 
think it will  change  only  slowly.  There  are  not  many  foreign  European,  or  any 
part  of  the  world,  conglomerates  which  are effectively,  as  it were,  operating 
in  retail  markets.  That  is  being  a  little  bit  eroded  in  that  some  of  our 
securities  houses  have  been  purchased  by  EEC  banks  - that  will  make  a  small 
hole,  but  nearly all our  life-insurance and  unit  trusts are domestic.  When  you 
turn  to  the  wholesale  markets,  the  very  reverse  is true.  They  are only  to a 
minority extent  the  province  of  UK  firms.  That  is  to say  more  than  half will 
be  in  the  hands  of  overseas  conglomerates,  including  banks.  That  is true if 
you  go  down  through  the  different  sizes  of  markets  from  foreign  exchange, 
Eurobonds,  through  swaps  securities  and  commodity  futures  markets.  Most  of 
those  international  conglomerates,  which  play  such  a  big part  in the  wholesale 
markets,  are  not  EEC  companies,  or  conglomerates.  So  you  have  the  inter-EEC 
problem,  but  superimposed  on  that,  you  have  an  almost  larger  cross-border 
supervision  conglomerate  accounting  and  relations  with  overseas  supervisors 
type of  problem.  I  think  we  should  bear  that  in  mind  and  it will  be  surprising 
to me  if 1992  made  a  ~reat deal  of difference to that,  for  a  while  anyway.  We 
have  to  recognise  that  the  cross~border  services  in  wholesale  markets  tend  to 
be  extremely  international.  When  you  come  to  the  question  of  which  kind  of 
issues  should  be  looked  after  according  to  the  rules of  the  home  country  and - 86-
which  according  to  the  host  country,  I  have  said  that  I  think  that  all  the 
capital  adequacy  rules  are  best  looked  after on  the  basis of the  home  country. 
The  more  you  move  into  business,  conduct  of  business  systems,  the  more 
difficult  it  is  to  imagine  more  than  one  set  of  conduct  of  business  rules  in 
one  market.  First  of  all at  the most  elementary  level,  you  can  only  have  on 
set  of  rules  inside  a  given  market,  they  have  to  be  the  local  rules  and 
everybody  wishing  to do  business  on  those  markets  has  to  operate  locally  and 
that  would  go  down  all  through  the  way  in  which  they  are  market  makers, 
agents,  bookkeeping  systems,  etc.  When  it comes  to the  firms  dealing  with  each 
other  on  a  local  basis,  company  to  company,  they  must  be  clear  what  the 
relationships are  and  they  must  be  the  local  rules.  I  cannot  imagine  trying to 
run  a  market  on  any  other basis.  When  you  come  to the question of  dealing  with 
the public,  then  things  are  not  so  clear-cut.  One  of  the  most  sensitive  issues 
is  any  kind  of  a  compensation  scheme,  that  it to  say  when  ordinary  members  of 
the  public  do  business  with  a  firm  which  is active  in  the  local  market,  what 
can  they  assume  if the  firms  goes  bankrupt.  If  there  is  a  situation  in  which 
it is  highly  uncertain,  where  it  depends  on  which  is  the  home  EC  country  and 
one  gets  100  %,  one  gets  nothing,  etcetera there will  be  problems.  It  will  be 
alright  in  theory,  but  the  first  time  there  is  a  real  crash  there  will  be 
political difficulties  in  explaining  just  why  this  is  so.  When  it  comes  to the 
keeping  of  the clients'  money  separate  and  whether  he  is  entitled to  interest 
on  it,  that  is  the  heart  of  the matter,  because  there  is a  lot  of  money  at 
stake  on  whether  there  is  interest  on  your  balances.  If  I  have  a  positive 
balance  and  you  have  a  negative  balance,  can  the  firm  take  my  money  and 
finance  you  with  it without  my  permission  ?  One  can  go  through  a  lot  of  these. 
When  we  get  to the  problems  which  were  being  discussed  just  a  moment  ago  about 
contract  law  and  agency  law,  the  extent  to  which,  if  somebody  is  acting  as 
your  agent  he  really must  act  entirely  in  your  interests,  but  what  happens  if 
he  breaks  it  ?  What  are  the  disciplinary  powers  ?  If  you  have  very  weak 
disciplinary  powers  in  one  country  and  quite  strong  ones  in  another,  the 
extreme  case  being  where  if you  break  the  rules  the  contract  is not  valid, you 
can  see that  I  am  doubtful  about  how  the  system  will  work  if there  are  inside 
your  own  market,  as  it  were,  many  variations,  basically  in  the  terms  and 
defenses  under  which  the general  public  or even  professionals deal  with  people 
in  the market  place,  depending  on  which  country  is their  home  EEC  country. - 87-
Mr.  Jolivet 
I  certainly  would  not  wish  to  add  anything  to what  Sir  Kenneth  has  said.  Two 
types  of  supervision,  one  on  top  of  the  other,  might  solve  a  number  of 
problems.  For  example,  first  of  all  supervising  in  the  country  of  origin 
checks  on  operators  in  a  vertical  axis  and  the  main  objective  here  is  the 
proof  of  solvency.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  host  country  you  would  have  a 
horizontal  supervision of operations,  as  opposed  to operators.  The  supervision 
of  operations,  where  this  takes  place,  is  geared  above  all  to  consumer 
protection,  or  the  protection of  the  saver,  which  means  that  you  can  solve  a 
great  many  problems  where  you  do  not  necessarily  have  very  high  solvency 
protection,  for  example,  advice  on  investment,  the  problem  of  the 
distribution,  etc.  We  started to talk  about  that  this morning;  if you  combine 
those  two  systems,  you  have  quite  a  good  structure to deal  with  conglomerates. 
I  should  be  interested to  know  what  people  think  about  this. 
Dr.  Lanciotti 
I  would  just  like to  say  a  word  about  something  which  was  implicit  in  what  Dr. 
Padoa-Schioppa  said  this  morning.  This  is  also  influenced  by  a  comment  made 
this  morning  by  Sir  Kenneth  Berri ll  on  the  problem  of  the  diversity  of 
operators existing  in  the  UK,  for  example.  Here  I  am  bearing  in  mind  a  country 
which  is  still  working  on  its  legislation  in  the  field  of  share  activities. 
When  you  set  up  regulation  in  our  countries,  what  you  want  to do  is organise 
the market  and  supervise operators  in  the field,  so  one  should  aim  to simplify 
the powers  that  are  used,  this  will  be  of  a  great  advantage  in  international 
relations  which  have  to  be  dealt  with  over  and  above  controls  within  the 
country  of origin.  That  I  think  is very  important  to  bear  in mind,  controls  in 
the  country  of  origin  would  not  be  enough  to  guarantee  a  competent 
international  supervision,  there  would  have  to  be  a  number  of  understandings 
and  international  co-operation of  an  institutionalised form,  such  co-operation 
will  be  much  more  simple  and  much  more  efficient  if  our  own  domestic 
regulations  are  simple. - 88-
Mr.  Muller 
Just  one  remark,  on  the  interplay between  home  and  host  country  supervision. 
We  all  agree  the  Baste  line  that  the  parent  supervisor  should  in  capital 
adequacy  measures  be  playing first  fiddle.  The  Belgian  Banking  Commission  and 
the  Nederlandsche  Bank  are  on  the  eve  of  a  very  interesting exercise where  we 
no  longer  know,  with  the  Societe Generate  and  Amrobank  who  is the  home  country 
supervisor - and  we  don't  want  to  know,  we  are both  !  They  are both  equal  and 
both  responsible. 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
What  do  third countries  think  of  this  problem  ?  I  was  invited to the  Swedish 
Institute of  Insurance  and  they  said this  :  it  is very  simple,  we  have  now  the 
Swiss  agreement  on  insurance,  and  all  others  will  have  the  same  kind  of 
agreement.  This  is what  they  think,  but  we  know  it will  be  discreetly buried. 
The  third countries  think  that  they  will  get  an  agreement  with  us. 
Prof.  Schneider 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen  has  just  been  calling on  us  to  examine  exactly where  is the 
right  place  to  think  about  and  discuss  the  question  of  financial 
conglomerates.  That  is  a  question  which  I  raised myself  earlier and  when  I  do 
it again  it  is  in  a  rather  hesitant  way.  I  think  we  have  all  noted  that  in 
practice developments  are  taking  place  at  a  different  rate  and  in  a  different 
way.  First  of all,  we  must  consider  the question  of overlapping distribution, 
but  we  must  also  remember  that  groups  and  conglomerates  are  now  emerging  which 
involve  banks,  insurance  companies  and  securities  houses  on  the  one  hand 
acting  together,  and  on  the  other  hand  banks,  insurance  companies  and 
securities houses  which  have  become  parts of  a  larger  conglomerate.  Thirdly  we 
have  noted  that  these  groups  and  groupings  have  certain  multinational 
features,  we  have  seen  them  in  the  area  of  multinationals  but  it  it  fair  to 
note  that  this  tendency  is  on  the  increase.  We  then  also  considered  what 
challenges  are  posed,  in  terms  of  supervisory  law  and  we  considered  the 
possibi t ity of  solving  these  problems  in  terms  of  contract  law.  I  think  my - 89-
judgment  of  the  situation would  be  rather different,  at  least  with  respect  to 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  I  think  there  we  have  had  excellent 
results  in  considering a  solution  by  contract  law  and  I  put  this  in  the  form 
of a  question.  Are  we  not  perhaps  running  the  risk of  pushing  supervisory  law 
too far,  of  extending  it too  much.  In  that  way,  we  would  be  depriving those 
immediately  concerned  of  the opportunity to  look  after their own  interests.  It 
emerged  very  clearly  this  morning  that  supervisory  law  pursues  different 
objectives,  in  other  words  banking  supervisory  law  was  pursuing  objectives 
which  are  different  from  those  of  insurance  supervisory  law  and  that  is 
different  from  the  objectives  of  the  supervisors  of  the  capital  markets. 
However,  since  different  undertakings  will  be  coming  together  in  financial 
conglomerates,  we  are  going  to  have  to  consider  the  question  of  whether  this 
will  give  rise  to  new  risks  and  how  can  this  on-going  supervision  be 
coordinated  and  institutionalised.  How  can  co-operation  amongst  supervisory 
authorities,  which  works  very  well  in  the  field of  banks,  once  we  are  looking 
at  this on  an  international  plane,  how  is it going  to  work  at  that  level  ?  We 
then  attempted  to  pin-point  the  main  areas  of  difficulty,  there  are  certain 
individual  Member  States  which  do  not  see  the  problem  of  financial 
conglomerates  as  a  legal  problem,  as  a  new  challenge,  and  there  are  other 
Member  States  which  are  discussing  the  problem  already  in  the  field  of  the 
formation  of  financial  conglomerates,  they  are  considering  what  conditions 
should  apply  to  the  acquisition  and  the  question  to what  extent  banks  may  be 
taken  over  by  non-banks,  insurance  companies  or  the  subsidiaries  thereof.  I 
feel  that  that  is very  much  a  question of  importance  in  Italy whereas  in  other 
Member  States,  which  have  different  historical  backgrounds,  that  is  not  so 
much  of  a  problem.  How  can  we  make  sure that  we  get  the  right  information  on 
the structure of  these  conglomerates,  let  us  not  forget  that  for  the  moment  we 
do  not  know  which  undertakings  belong  to the  conglomerate  Banco-Ambrosiano.  It 
is purely a  question of  information  on  the  structure of  the  groupings.  Have  we 
had  the  necessary  obligation  to  notify  in  the  past,  the  information  on  the 
structure of  groupings  ?  How  are  we  going  to organise on-going  supervision of 
financial  conglomerates  ?  And  that  in turn gives  rise to the  question  :  is it 
possible  to  single  out  certain  component  parts  of  the  financial  conglomerate 
and  examine  them  individually or  is that  an  absurd  thing  to  do  ?  Do  we  have  to 
view  the  conglomerate  as  an  economic  entity,  although  at  the  same  time  we 
would  have  to take  account  of  developments  in  other parts of the  conglomerate. - 90-
In  our  individual  banking  supervisory  laws,  and  in  our  insurance  supervisory 
laws,  we  have  rules  and  regulations designed  to manage  crisis,  but  so  far  we 
do  not  have  anything  to  cope  with  crises  throughout  conglomerates,  even  the 
deposit  guarantee  systems  refer only  to  individual  companies.  To  what  extent 
can  we  see  these  deposit  guarantee  systems  as  appropriate to  the  conglomerate 
as  a  whole.  Finally,  there  is the question of  co-operation  amongst  the  various 
supervisory authorities.  To  what  extent  the  need  for  secrecy  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  need  for  information.  At  national  level  within  the  banking 
supervisory  authority,  but  also  at  international  level  where  perhaps  the 
Belgian  supervisory  authorities  need  to  know  was  has  happened  in  the  past  in 
an  insurance  company  in  Belgium  and  they  need  to  inform  say  banking 
supervisory authorities  in  Denmark.  Is that  the  essence,  or  must  we  remember 
that  there  is  also  the  need  for  secrecy  ?  The  question  of  notification arises 
as  well,  these  question  have  all  been  raised  and  in  subsequent  statements  I 
think  we  will  have  to  take  them  rather  further. - 91  -
PART  2:  QUESTIONS  RELATING  TO  THE  SUPERVISION  OF  CONGLOMERATES 
Capital  adequacy  and  consolidated  supervision; 
despecialisation and  autonomy  in different  market  segments; 
conflicts  of  interest,  intra-group  transactions, etc. 92-- 93-
PROF.  H.  BIRON 
PRUDENTIAL  SUPERVISION  AND  FINANCIAL  CONGLONERATES 
The  purpose  of this  report  is  to  examine  the  problems  raised  for  prudential 
supervision  by  the  formation  and  operation  of  financial  conglomerates.  It 
goes  without  saying  that  the  views  expressed  will  be  of a  personal  nature. 
INTRODUCTION 
The  concept  of "financial  conglomerate"  is not  a  straightforward one.  Before 
attempting  a  definition,  I  should  like  to  place  it  alongside  a  similar 
concept,  i.e.  that  of  the  banking  group.  The  last  few  decades  have  seen  a 
multiplication,  diversification and  increasing  sophistication of  traditional 
banking  activities.  Several  developments  have  played  a  key  role  in  this.  : 
the  internationalisation  of  banking  activity  and  the  globalisation  of 
financial  markets,  the  rapid  growth  in  the  volume  of  transactions  between  the 
banks  themselves  and  technological  changes. 
The  result  has  been  the  emergence  of  banking  groups  which  intervene 
worldwide,  raise  and  reinvest  funds  in  their  own  currency  and  in  the  major 
international  currencies,  operate  permanently  on  exchange  markets,  buy  and 
sell various  types  of  commercial  paper  and  securities and  hold  them  on  their 
own  account,  take  considerable geographical  risks  and  continually  invent  new 
financial  techniques.  In  addition,  these  groups  are  closely  linked  to each 
other  through  the  interbank  markets  and  the  extent  to  which  they  transfer 
funds  between  themselves. 
How  should  we  evaluate  the  phenomenon  of  conglomerates  alongside  banking 
groups  as  such  ?  What  distinctive characteristics do  they  offer which  justify 
our  discussing them  at  this symposium  ?  I  see  two  such  characteristics.  The 
first  is  that  conglomerates  operate  beyond  the  traditional  functions  of - 94-
banking  activity.  The  second  is that  the  companies  making  up  a  conglomerate 
may  fall  under  the  supervision  of either  banking  or  non-banking  authorities, 
and  that  some  of  them  may  escape  any  form  of  supervision. 
However,  the  distinction between  banking  groups  and  financial  conglomerates 
must  be  seen  as  subtle.  The  growth  of  banking  activity  and  the  rise  of 
conglomerates  correspond  to  the  same  economic  logic.  The  spontaneous 
development  of  banking  operations  is  transgressing  the  boundaries  drawn  by 
law  or  the  supervisory  authorities  between  banking  and  non-banking 
activities,  in  the  same  way  as  it  is  ignoring  national  frontiers.  The 
problems  raised  by  conglomerates  are, therefore,  very  similar to those  raised 
by  banking  groups  and  have  the  same  origins,  i.e.  the  cohabitation  of 
companies  subject  to  different  laws  and  supervisory  authorities  or  even 
escaping  any  form  of  supervision,  the  need  to  reconcile  group  synergism  with 
the autonomy  of its  constituent parts,  and  the  risk of  problems  in one  part 
of  the group  spreading to the others. 
The  traditional  boundaries  of  banking  activity are unclear  and  a  wide  variety 
of definitions  exist.  The  authors  of  the  Second  Banking  Directive  drew  up  a 
list  of  "business  which  is  integral  to  banking  and  shall  be  included  within 
the  scope  of  mutual  recognition".  This  list  covers  business  involving 
securities  and  excludes  insurance.  This  leads  the  banking  supervisor  to 
conclude  that  the  problem  raised  by  financial  conglomerates,  as  entities 
distinct from  banking  groups  as  such,  is first  and  foremost  the  cohabitation 
of  banks  and  insurance  companies. 
Any  study  of  financial  conglomerates  comes  up  against  an  initial  problem  for 
which  no  completely  satisfactory  solution can  be  found.  There  is  no  precise 
definition of  the  term  "conglomerate",  and  in  practice  it is  used  to mean  a 
wide  variety  of  structures.  For  the  purposes  of  this  report,  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  prudential  supervision,  we  can  distinguish  four  types  of 
conglomerates.  We  will  make  the  following  two  distinctions 
<a>  Between  integrated  conglomerates  having  a  central  management  which 
determines  strategy  and  general  objectives  and  conglomerates  in  which 
looser  links exist  between  the  constituent  companies; - 95  -
(b)  Between  conglomerates  which  limit  their  activities  to  the  financial 
sector  and  those which  go  beyond  that  sector. 
Our  four  types  of  conglomerate  are  therefore 
- Integrated mixed  conglomerates; 
- Non-integrated  mixed  conglomerates; 
- Integrated financial  conglomerates,  and 
- Non-integrated  financial  conglomerates. 
It goes  without  saying  that  the situation is much  more  complex  in  reality and 
that,  in  practice,  it  is  often  difficult  to  be  consistent  in  placing 
conglomerates  into one  or other of  these  categories.  It is also  clear that  we 
will  disregard  conglomerates  not  involved  in  any  financial  activities  and 
which  are  probably  in  the  majority. 
Principles of  action  for  prudential  supervision 
1  B  k
.  (1)  •  an  1ng  ,  like  insurance,  plays  a  central  role  in  the  economy. 
Consequently,  it  is  subject  to prudential  supervision  and  a  detailed set 
of  rules.  The  constraints  which  result  must,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
flexible  and  adapted  to changes  within  companies  and  on  markets.  They  do, 
however,  correspond  to  real  life.  A significant deregulation of  banking 
activities  is  not  possible,  particularly  in the  difficult  circumstances 
which  we  face.  Banking  stability is  a  matter  of  public  concern  and  must 
be  protected. 
<1>  This  term  refers  here  to  all  credit  institutions,  without  making  any 
distinction between  banks  in the strict sense,  savings  banks  and  public 
credit  institutions. - 96-
2.  This  being  said,  banking  supervisors must  remain  as  close  as  possible to 
economic  reality.  Their  action  must  be  flexible  and  pragmatic.  The 
diversification  of  banking  activity  and  the  formation  of  financial 
conglomerates  are  irreversible  phenomena  which  reflect  the  normal  growth 
of  companies  operating  in  the market  economy.  The  same  phenomenon  can  be 
seen  in  all  other  sectors  of  economic  and  social  activity.  Any 
out-of-hand  situations  and  excesses  must  be  prevented,  but  no  attempt 
should  be  made  to  halt  the  development,  which  would  in  any  case  be 
impossible.  Flexibility  also  demands  that  certain  types  of  the 
conglomerates  referred  to  above  be  dealt  with  according  to  their  own 
characteristics. 
A.  Mixed  conglomerates 
The  impermeability  of  the  boundary  between  financial  and  other  economic 
activities should,  in our  opinion,  be  maintained.  This  is obvious  in  the 
case  of  integrated  conglomerates  managed  by  a  single  body  responsible  for 
all activities  and  in  which  the  principal  company  usually  holds  all  the 
subsidiaries'  capital.  A bank  should  not  form  part  of  an  integrated group 
in  which  certain components  carry on  non-financial  activities.  It should 
be  neither  the  parent  company  nor  one  of  its  subsidiaries  or 
sub-subsidiaries.  If  such  a  situation  nevertheless  arises,  the  bank 
should  be  withdrawn  from  the  group. 
The  approach  may  be  more  flexible  in  the  case  of  a  non-integrated 
conglomerate.  It  is difficult to  imagine  how  a  bank  could  be  at  the  head 
of  such  a  group  and  assume  responsibility for  it,  but  it could  form  part 
of  it if a  number  of  precautions  were  taken.  The  requirements  which  must 
be  formulated  by  the  supervisory  authority  will  relate  in  particular  to 
the  following  aspects  <1> 
<1>  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  supervisory  authorities  will  have  to 
treat  each  case  on  its merits.  It  is  difficult  in  this  field  to  issue 
general  rules  applicable  to all  cases. - 97-
- The  shareholding  structure 
Banks  (and  insurance  companies)  should  continue  to  have  direct  access  to 
sources  of  risk  finance  outside the  conglomerate.  Therefore,  the  latter 
should  not  be  the  bank •  s  sole  shareholder.  The  bank  must  be  free  to 
determine  its  own  financial  strategy,  reserve  policy  for  strengthening 
its solvency  and  profit distribution policy  for  maintaining  access  to the 
market.  Structures  should  be  avoided  in  which  a  bank  might  be  prevented 
from  increasing  its  capital  by  calling  on  the  market  or  placing  its 
profits  in  reserve  owing  to  developments  in  other  units  making  up  the 
conglomerate. 
- The  composition  of  the  board  of  directors  must  reflect  this  situation. 
Representatives  of  the  conglomerate  must  not  be  in the majority. 
-Management  must  be  made  up  of  full-time  officials offering  the  required 
independence. 
-In its relations with  the economic  and  social  environment,  the bank  must 
appear  to  be  an  autonomous  unit;  it  cannot  present  itself  as  the 
group's  bank  and  it  is  preferable  that  it  should  not  carry the group's 
name;  in  terms  of  accounting  law,  the  links  between  the  bank  and  the 
other  members  of  the  conglomerate  should  correspond  to  the  relations 
which  exist  between  companies  linked  by  participating  interest  rather 
than  those  between  combined  companies;  the  bank  should  remain  at  arm's 
length  from  the  other  members  of  the  conglomerate,  and  relations 
between  them  should  be  closely examined  by  the  supervisory  body  and  the 
auditor,  and  be  made  accordingly;  the  supervisory  authority  must 
interveneimmediately if  there  is  the  least  sign of  confusion  (1)  The 
conclusion  of  "protocols" on  the  Belgian  model  between  the  supervisory 
body,  the  bank  and  its main  shareholders  might  be  a  useful  instrument 
for  this  purpose. 
<1>  Cf.  Section  23B  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  which  "prohibits any  bank  or 
non-bank  affiliate  from  taking  any  action  (including  advertising)  that 
would  suggest  the  bank  is  responsible  for  any  obligation  of  the 
affiliate". - 98-
B.  Financial  conglomerates 
In  arr1v1ng  at  conglomerates  of  a  purely financial  nature,  we  are getting to 
the  core  of  the  problem.  Examination  of  the  problems  raised  will  therefore 
require  a  more  detailed analysis. 
Ca)  Financial  conglomerates  are,  in principle, admissible. 
Cb>  The  existence  of  such  conglomerates  raises  a  number  of  difficulties. 
These  are  very  much  akin  to those  raised  by  banking  groups  proper,  and 
the solutions  which  may  be  envisaged  are  similar. 
<c>  However  difficult  it  is  to  define  the  terms  "bank"  or  "banking 
activities",  it  is  all  the  more  so  to  pinpoint  the  meaning  of 
"financial  activity".  Conglomerates  may  comprise  local  or  foreign 
banks,  savings  banks,  specialised  companies  carrying  on  activities 
likely  to  be  carried  on  by  banks  themselves,  companies  whose 
activities  are  based  on  trading  in  securities,  insurance  companies, 
property  companies  and  service  companies.  It  is  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  set out  general  rules  applicable to  such  a  mixed  bag. 
One  has  no  choice  but  to make  further  distinctions. 
The  cohabitation of  banks,  savings  banks,  other  credit  institutions 
and  specialised  companies  carrying  on  activities  which  might  be 
carried on  by  the  credit  institutions  themselves  is  the  leat  of  our 
problems. 
- Trading  in  securities,  in  all its  various  forms  <underwriting  and 
investment,  dealing,  purchase  and  sale on  behalf of  third  parties 
and  on  own  account  is part,  in  our  opinion,  of  traditional banking 
activities.  As  stated, it will  appear  in the  list of  "business  which 
is  integral  to  banking"  to  be  drawn  up  by  the  Commission.  It  is 
therefore  admissible,  provided  two  conditions  are  met.  The 
supervisory  authority  must  try  to  limit  the  risks  likely  to  arise 
from  such  activity,  as  it  does  in  the  fields  of  credit,  exchange 
rates  and  interest  rates. - 99-
It does  not  seem  appropriate  that  banks  should,  de  jure or de  facto, 
be  the  dominant  partners of  non-financial  companies.  The  mixed  bank 
is admissible  only  if the  bank  limits  its participating interests  in 
the  financial  sector  and,  moreover,  restricts  its  holdings  to 
investment  shares. 
- Insurance  activities  pose  a  particular  problem.  The  affinities 
between  banking  and  insurance  are obvious,  particularly at  the  level 
of  mobilizing  savings  and  offering  guarantees.  Nevertheless,  they 
are  different  activities  governed  by  different  laws  and  subject  to 
different  supervisory  bodies.  Cohabitation  between  banks  and 
insurance  companies  is  admissible  but  it  must  be  carefully 
controlled  and  be  subject  to  detailed  agreements  between  the 
respective  supervisory authorities. 
~1
•  Non-Integrated  financial  conglomerates 
The  distinction between  integrated conglomerates  also applies  to groups  of 
a  purely financial  nature.  Both  forms  are  admissible.  One  might  at  first 
sight,  think  that  supervisors  would  prefer  non-integrated  conglomerates 
since  these  make  it  easier  to  keep  banks  and  insurance  companies  apart. 
However,  this does  not  seem  to be  the  case.  The  integrated group  is a  more 
simple  structure enabling the  responsibilities and  risks to be  more  easliy 
identified  and  any  necessary  corrections  to  be  made.  The  non-integrated 
conglomerate  has  the  merit  of  flexibility.  The  link  which  exists between 
its various  parts  is ambiguous,  however,  and  it is  liable  to  be  dealt  with 
differently depending  on  the  circumstances.  The  risk of  contagion  is more 
difficult to pinpoint,  and  the  management  and  control  of  the  group  is hard 
to  fathom.  Consequently,  the  precautions  referred  to  above  for 
non-integrated mixed  conglomerates  also apply  here  <cf.  pp.  6-8>. 
~- Integrated financial  conglomerates 
In  order  to be  admissible,  the  integrated financial  conglomerate  must  meet 
a  set  of  conditions. - 100-
<a>  It  must  be  subject  to  a  consolidated  supervision  of  its  entire 
structure.  It  would  be  unacceptable  for  one  of  its  components  to 
escape  supervision.  It would  be  even  more  so  for  the principal  company 
not  be  to  subject  to  appropriate  supervision.  If  the  company  at  the 
head  of  the  group  is  a  bank  or  insurance  company,  the  banking  or 
insurance  supervisory  authority,  whichever  is  appropriate,  will  be 
responsible  for  supervision.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  the  principal 
company  must  somehow  be  placed  under  supervision,  either  by 
appropriate  legislation  or  by  the  conclusion  of  a  gentleman's 
agreement.  If this does  not  happen,  the structure must  be  revised  in 
such  a  way  as  to  become  acceptable to the supervisory authorities. 
(b)  When  banks  and  insurance  companies  are  part  of  the  same  group, 
procedures  for  the  cooperation  necessary  between  the  respective 
supervisory authorities should  be  established.  Concentrating  supervion 
within  one  body  would  have  obvious  advantages.  In  practice,  it does 
not  seem  likely to  be  possible  for  the  time  being.  If  such  a  single 
body  is  not  created,  however,  cooperation  must  be  organised between 
existing  institutions.  In  particular,  the  approach  of  the  two  bodies 
should  be  based  on  a  number  of  common  principles,  which  is  not  at 
present  always  the  case. 
It will  not  be  easy  to  set  up  such  cooperation  because  the  two  types 
of  bodies  have  very  different historical  backgrounds.  It will  be  even 
more  difficult if the bodies  are  situated  in different  countries.  The 
European  Commission  might  play  a  useful  role  in  this  field  by  trying 
to develop  principles  for  cooperation.  To  be  effective,  however,  this 
presupposes  a  minimum  harmonisation  of  laws  and  regulations  applicable 
in the  two  sectors.  To  take  just one  example,  the  solvency of  a  bank 
and  an  insurance  company  are  supervised  according  to  different 
methods.  How  should  bank  ratios  and  solvency  margins  be  integrated 
into a  consolidated  approach  ?  Should  they  simply  be  added  together  ? 
Should  they  gradually be  reprocessed,  but  if so  how  ?  The  problem  is 
not  insoluble,  but  the  solution will  not  be  easy  to find.  I  fear that, 
at  present,  dialogue  between  the various banking  authorities  is easier 
than  it  is  between  a  banking  authority  and  the  insurance  supervisory 
authority  in  the  same  country.  Until  such  harmonisation  is  achieved, 
pragmatic  solutions will  have  to be  adopted  and  emphasis  placed on  the 
autonomy  of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  group  and  the  respective 
responsibilities of the existing supervisory bodies. • 
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This  pragmatic  approach  might  involve  the  following  aspects  : 
- representatives of  the  two  bodies  should  meet  at  regular  intervals 
and  be  able  to  exchange  information  without  adhering  to 
professional  secrecy; 
- auditing should  be  carried out  by  the same  auditors; 
- the  principle  of  "home  country  control"  could  be  applied  in 
relations  between  the  banking  and  insurance  supervisory  bodies. 
Depending  on  whether  the  principal  company  is  a  bank  or  an 
insurance  company,  responsibility  for  consolidated  supervision 
would  fall  either  to  the  banking  supervisor  or  to  the  insurance 
supervisory body; 
the  situation  of  conglomerates  compr1s1ng  banks  and  insurance 
companies  should  be  examined  jointly  by  representatives  of  both 
bodies  at  regular  intervals. 
The  difficulties of  integrated  supervision 
The  consolidated  supervision  of  a  conglomerate  raises  two  closely  linked 
questions  : 
- what  degree  of  integration is admissible  ? 
- to  what  ·extent  does  consolidated  supervision  dispense  with  supervision  by 
the  various  individual  bodies  which  exist,  and,  in  particular,  to  what 
extent  must  it  be  ensured  at  both  consolidated  and  non-consolidated  level 
that  legal  statutory obligations  are  complied  with. 
These  two  questions  are clearly not  new.  They  also arise with  banking  groups 
made  up  of  several  banks  or  credit  institutions,  whether  or  not  situated  in 
the same  country. 
Here  we  are  faced  with  a  basic  problem  of  company  law  and  group  law.  The 
diversification  of  assets  and  liabilities  resulting  from  the  creation  of 
different  legal  entities,  is subject  to compliance  with  a  number  of  rules of 
substance  and  form.  Where  the  interested parties  <shareholders,  creditors, 
staff members,  public  authorities)  are  the  same  in  the various  companies  of 
the group,  it is enough  to observe the  rules  laid  down  by  commercial  law.  The 
situation is made  more  complicated  as  soon  as  this  identity of  interest  is no - 102-
longer  shared.  The  central  management  of the  group  will  have  to  take  account 
not  only  of  the  interest of  the group  and  the  principal  company  but  also the 
interests of  the  various  parts associated at  the  level  of  subsidiaries. 
Banking  groups  and  financial  conglomerates  will  more  often  than  not  have 
considerable  interests at  the  level of subsidiaries.  In  particular,  and  this 
must  be  a  prime  consideration  for  bank  and  insurance  company  supervisors,  the 
various  banks  and  insurance  companies  have,  by  definition,  separate 
creditors.  However~ it is precisely these creditors which  the  supervisors are 
supposed  to  protect on  the basis  of precise  legal  and  statutory constraints. 
Some  of  these  creditors enjoy  legal  privileges.  The  banking  supervisor  cannot 
allow  a  bank  to be  drained of all  substance  or  jeopardized  for  the benefit  of 
other  banks  or  insurance  companies. 
This  does  not  mean  the negation of  a  group  policy,  which  would  in  any  case  be 
meaningless.  The  conglomerate  or group  will  be  able  to be  managed  as  a  unit. 
A  group  policy  is  usually  beneficial  for  all  parties  concerned.  The 
profitability and  solvency  of  the  constituent  parts depends  on  the  financial 
equilibrium  of  the  whole.  If  one  of  the  companies  within  the  group  is  in 
trouble,  it  is normal  and  necessary  for  the  other  companies  of  the  group  to 
come  to its rescue.  However,  the group's managers  will  have  to  take  account 
of  the  various  interests  at  play  and  ensure  that  the  flow  of  transactions 
between  the  constituent  parts  is  balanced  with  regard  to  each  of  them.  The 
role  of  s~pervisors (including  auditors>  will  be  to  ensure  that  this  is done 
properly.  Several  consequences  ensue. 
The  first  is  that  the  integration  of  the  group  should  never  result  in 
confusion of assets,  liabilities and  results.  The  personalisation of  assets 
and  liabilities  and  the  resultant  limitation  of  responsibility  presupposes 
observance of  the  ground  rules.  Detailed  procedures  will  have  to  be  devised 
to determine  the  rights  and  obligations of  the various parties  concerned,  the 
status  of  transactions  carried  out  within  the  group  and  the  method  of 
identifying to which  of  the various entities assets,  liabilities, profits and 
losses  are  attributable.  Clarity,  publicity  and  accuracy  are  major 
requirements  in this area. 
The  second  consequence  is  that  certain  basic  rules  of  good  management, 
relating  to  the  activity  of  a  ·bank  or  insurance  company,  will  have  to  be 
observed  at  both  consolidated and  non-consolidated  level.  In  particular, each 
bank  and  each  insurance  company  will  have  to maintain,  at its own  level,  an 
adequate  degree  of profitability  and  solvency.  This  requirement  can  only  be 
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dispensed  with  in  the  case  of  entities  without  minority  holdings  or  where 
precise,  unquestionable  and  published  rules exist  setting up  complete  legal 
solidarity between  the various  companies.  Moreover,  it will  be  necessary  in 
each  case  to examine  whether  these  rules  are  compatible  with  the  legal  status 
of the  companies  concerned. 
The  economic  and  functional  approach,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  legal 
approach,  on  the  other,  lead  at  this  level  to  different  conclusions.  The 
economic  reality  is  that  groups  and  conglomerates  do  exist.  Examining  the 
financial  situation  of  the  various  individual  companies  has  only  limited 
significance.  In  many  cases,  companies  can  develop  only under  the shelter and 
protection of  groups.  The  transfers  which  occur  within  the  group,  even  if 
they  are.  open  to  criticism  from  the  point  of  view  of  one  of  the  group's 
companies  may  still  prove  beneficial  for  the  group  as  a  whole.  Effective 
managerial  responsibilities are defined at  group  level.  It may  therefore  seem 
unnecessary  and  annoying  to  subject  the  group  and  its  constituent  companies 
to  two  superimposed  levels of  supervision,  i.e.  the first  at  consolidated and 
the  second  at  company  level. 
The  legal  reality  is  different  however.  In  the  majority  of  countries  <with 
the  exception  of  Ger·many),  the  law  does  not  recognise  groups  as  such. 
Attempts  to  issue  a  9th  Directive on  groups  of  companies  have  not  yet  come  to 
fruition.  Our  law  makes  provision  solely  for  companies  having  a  distinct 
legal  personality.  Supervisors  must  take  account  of  this  legal  fact  of  life. 
As  is  often  the  case  already,  they  will  have  to  tread  the  difficult  path 
between  accepting  the  state  of  affairs  <i.e.  the  existence  of  groups  and 
conglomerates>  and  recognizing  the  legal  structures  <i.e.  various  legal 
persons)  which  exist,  and  this will  never  be  an  ideal  situation. 
The  various  types  of  transactions  involving  securities  call  for  fewer 
observations.  Such  transactions  may  be  carried out  by  the  banks  themselves. 
If they are  carried out  through  the  intermediary of  subsidiaries,  these must 
be  subject  to the  same  supervision  as  the parent  company  itself. 
A particular  problem  might  arise  if  the  company  specialising  in  the  trading 
of securities  is situated  upstream  of  the bank  and  constitutes  the principal 
company  of  the  group.  If  the  said  company  is  itself  subject  to  prudential 
control  similar  to  that  applicable  to  banks,  the  overall  structure  should 
receive  the  same  treatment  as  advocated  for  groups  of  banks  and  insurance 
companies.  If this does  not  happen,  the banking  supervisor must  either extend 
his supervision upstream  or see to it that the structure is modified. - 104-
Financial  conglomerates  do  not  necessarily  limit  their activities to banking, 
insurance  and  trading  in  securities.  Without  wishing  to  mention  all  the 
possibilities,  we  should  like to  indicate three developments  at  the frontier 
of  financial  activities. 
(a)  Transactions  involving  immovable  assets.  These  extend  from  the management 
of  housing  stock  and  the  financing  of  projects  to  buying  and  selling on 
own  account  and  property  development  projects.  They  form  a  particularly 
important  part of the business of  insurance  companies.  It is not  obvious 
that  immovable  assets  should  be  treated  differently to  financial  assets, 
and  the  boundary  between  them  is  not  always  impermeable.  We  do  however 
believe  that  activities  of  this  nature  should  continue  to  be  limited  in 
integrated  conglomerates  comprising  a  bank. 
(b)  Transactions  involving  raw  materials  for  own  account  or  on  behalf  of 
others.  We  feel  that  transactions on  own  account  and  statements  (except 
on  gold  ?)  should  be  prohibited. 
(c)  The  exploitation,  in  various  forms,  of  the  experience  accumulated  by 
banks  in  the  fields  of  telecommunications  and  information  technology.  The 
latter  field  is  likely  to  be  the  one  in  which  the  most  spectacular 
developments  can  be  expected  in the  long  term. 
Transactions  involving  securities  also  come  under  the  supervision  of  the 
stock  exch~nge authorities or public  bodies  which,  based  on  the model  of  the 
SEC,  the  COB  or  the  Commission  Bancaire  Belge,  are  responsible  for 
supervising  public  issue  of  securities  and  the  quality  of  financial 
information.  More  often  than  not,  the  scope  and  procedures  of  the  supervision 
offered  by  such  institutions  are  different  to  those  of  prudential 
supervision.  Close  cooperation  should  however  be  set  up  between  banking 
authorities and  those authorities  responsible  for  policing financial  markets. 
In  particular,  it  should  be  possible  to  exchange  operations  and  information 
without  restrictions.  Several  considerations  favour  such  cooperation  :  the 
growing  role  of  banks  on  financial  markets,  the  fact  that  the  boundaries 
between  credit  institutions and  the  financial  assets they  create,  on  the one 
hand,  and  the  said markets,  on  the other, are  becoming  increasingly unclear, 
and  the  concern  to  avoid  certain  types  of  activity  being  subject  to  two 
superimposed  forms  of  prudential  supervision.  This  latter question  is  linked 
to  the  coordination  necessary  at  international  level  between  the  various 
authorities  responsible  for  supervising financial  markets,  a  problem  which  is 
being  studied  at  present  by  several  bodies.  The  Commission  might  usefully 
make  recommendations  in this area  to. 
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My  fQnf!~~i2n~ are the  following: 
1.  The  diversification  of  banking  activities  and  the  formation  of  financial 
conglomerates  are  irreversible  phenomena.  Supervisors  must  allow  this 
development  and  find  a  suitable  framework  for  it.  The  impermeability  of 
the  boundary  between  financial  and  non-financial  activities  must  be 
maintained. 
2.  The  problems  raised  by  financial  conglomerates  are  comparable  to  those 
raised  by  banking  groups  <or  groups  of  insurance  companies>  and  they 
require  the  same  types  of  solutions. 
3.  Activities  involving  securities form  part of  the traditional  functions  of 
banks.  A  close  cooperation  should  be  set  up  between  the  stock  market 
authorities,  the financial  markets  supervisory authorities and  the banking 
and  insurance  supervisory bodies. 
4.  The  main  problem  raised  by  the  cohabitation  of  banks  and  insurance 
companies  within  conglomerates  is  related  to  the  existence  of  different 
laws,  regulations  and  supervisory  organisations.  Harmonisation  and 
approximation  seem  indispensible  in  the  field.  In  contrast,  neither the 
nature  of  their  activities  nor  the  risks  they  assume  are  fundamentally 
incompatible.  Consolidated  supervision is vital and  seems,  in principle, 
to  be  feasible. 
5.  An  integrated  management  of  banking  groups  and  financial  conglomerates 
does  not  give  rise to any  major  objections  from  a  technical point  of  view. 
In  as  far  as  the various  companies  which  make  up  the group  have  different 
shareholders  or  creditors,  and  in  view  of  the  existence  of  contrasting 
laws  on  the protection of  depositors  and  insured persons,  these  companies 
must  enjoy  a  sufficient degree  of autonomy. 
6.  The  extraordinary  development  of  financial  activities  and  markets  seen  in 
recent  years  is  a  source  of  both  wonder  and  aprehension.  It  therefore 
seems  that  the central  banks  should  be  involved  in  the  proposed  alignment 
between  the  supervisory authorities.  The  massive  scale and  complexity  of 
financial  flows  makes  it  vital  for  us  to  be  prepared  for  any  crisis 
scenarios.  We  must  hope  that  such  scenarios  never  occur.  If  they  do, 
however,  only  the  central  banks  will  be  able  to  intervene  with  the 
required effectiveness. - 106-
Discussions after Prof.  Biron's speech 
Mr.  Halpin 
Did  Prof.  Biron  say  that  in  the  case  of  a  mixed  conglomerate,  it  will  be 
conceivable  that  the  overall  conglomerate  could  be  in  difficulty,  but  the 
bank,  which  will  be  a  small  part  of  it,  will  be  perceived  as  not  being  in 
difficulty  ? 
Prof.  Biron 
In  a  conglomerate,  which  was  subjected to one  central direction,  it would  not 
be  conceivable  and  it would  not  be  a  good  construction that  a  bank  would  be  an 
integral  part  of  such  a  conglomerate.  But  in  a  conglomerate  which  is  rather 
loose  it  might  be  conceivable  that  a  bank,  if  it  is  subjected  to  the  proper 
precautions,  could  be  insulated  from  the  good  and  the  bad  fortunes  of  the 
conglomerate. 
Speaker  unknown  (French  speaking) 
I  do  not  think  anybody  ever  thought  that  it  will  be  possible  to  harmonise 
something  for  the  banks  and  the  insurance  companies.  As  we  said this morning, 
it  would  however,  be  of  great  interest  if  contacts  could  be  established 
between  the  supervisory authorities,  in order  to  inform  themselves  about  these 
coefficients or  margins,  which  in  any  case  act  as  alarm  bells  in the  case  of  a 
conglomerate  involving  banks  and  insurance.  It should  make  perfect  sense  for 
such  contacts  to  be  established and  for  these  coeficients or  margins  to avoid 
contamination  where  there  is bankrupty  or the  risk of  collapse,  either  in the 
bank  or  in  insurance  companies.  It  has  been  well  understood  that  nobody  has 
been  thinking  of  changing  the  methods  which  have  been  set  up  to  deal  with 
solvency,  nobody  wants  to  place  this  on  the  altar  of  harmonisation.  It  is 
impossible,  nobody  would  think  of  doing  that.  One  can  always  use  the  same 
methods  just  as  long  as  there  is  a  link  between  the  different  supervisory 
authorities.  What  qo  you  do  when  you  turn  up  at  a  savings  bank,  or  an 
insurance  company,  which  has  a  banking  subsidiary,  how  are  you  going  to 
estimate a  consolidated solvency,  that  is the  real difficulty.  I  do  not  know 
how  to  solve that  problem.  We  have  cases  of this,  you  have  several  insurance 
companies  with  subsidiaries which  are  savings  banks  and  what  do  you  do  then  ? - 107 -
PROF.  DR.  AUGUST  ANGERER 
PROBLEMS  RELATING  TO  THE  SUPERVISION  OF  INSURANCE  CORPANIES  FORMING  PART  OF 
FINANCIAL  CONGLOMERATES 
Introduction  :  Financial  conglomerates  are  defined  as  the  grouping  together 
under  common  management  of  companies  or  parts  of  companies  which  supply 
different  financial  services.  Insurance  business  supervision  is  involved  where 
the  financial  services  include  insurance  products. 
This  paper  discusses  from  a  German  viewpoint 
the  conditions  under  which  insurance services  may  be  supplied; 
- the  role  which  insurance  companies  belonging  to a  financial  conglomerate  may 
play; 
- the  requirements  which  must  be  laid  down  by  the authorities  responsible  for 
supervising  insurance  companies;  and 
the extent  to which  action  on  regulatory measures  is needed. 
I. The  pursuit of  insurance business 
1.  The  pursuit  of  insurance  business  is  reserved  for  insurance  companies.  All 
Community  Member  States  make  the  taking  up  of  the  business  of  direct 
insurance  subject  to  official  authorization  <1>  Companies  not  duly 
authorized  are  therefore  not  entitled  to  engage  in  insurance  business  of 
any. kind. 
While  the  concept  of  insurance  business  is  not  defined  for  Communit 
purposes,  the  annexe  to the  Directive  coordinating the  legislation relatin 
to  life  and  non-life  insurance  lists  the various  classes of  insurance,  s - 108-
that  some  guidance  is  available.  Those  in  the  industry  would  probably 
agree  that  insurance  involves  in  essence  the  systematic  underwriting  of 
risks  for  payment. 
In  addition  to the  underwriting of  risks,  insurance  business  involves  the 
investment  of  those  parts  of  premiums  which  are  necessary  to  cover  the 
later payment  of  claims  and  also the  investment  of  own  resources.  Insurance 
companies  therefore  invest  capital.  They  operate  in  a  similar  manner  to 
banks  without  becoming  banks.  For  example,  they  grant  mortgages  and  loans 
to  firms  in  all  areas  of  the  economy,  and  in  particular  to  banks.  They 
invest  capital  in securities  - shares,  bonds  and  fund  units  - and  dispose 
of  them  again.  They  acquire  holdings. 
Insurance  companies  are  permitted  to  engage  in  investment  activities  only 
to the  extent  that  such  activities stem  from  their  insurance  business.  They 
are  therefore  prohibited  from  borrowing  in  order  to  re-invest  those 
resources  at  higher  interest  rates. 
2.  Insurance  companies  in  the  European  Community  specialize  in  the  pursuit  of 
insurance business.  They  may  offer only  insurance  products  for  sale  and  may 
engage  in  other  business  only  to  the  extent  that  such  business  arises 
directly  from  insurance  activities  ' 2'.  There  is  sometimes  doubt  as  to 
whether  a  product  qualifies  as  an  insurance  activity. 
In  recent  times,  in  particular,  products  have  been  developed  which  are 
difficult  to  classify.  The  question  of  whether  an  operation  is  directly 
connected  with  insurance  has  to  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  economic 
criteria.  Market  practices and  historical developments  play  a  key  role  in 
this.  There  are  still  varying  views  on  both  these  questions  within  the 
Community.  A  working  party  set  up  by  the  authorities  responsible  for 
overseeing  insurance  activities  is currently  considering the  subject.  Its 
findings  are  not  yet  avai table.  Among  the  many  facets  of  a  financial 
conglomerate,  the _following  are of  particular  interest  : - 109-
- products described as  "Universal  Life"  products; 
- fund-linked  life assurance; 
-the arranging  of  financial  services  which  the  insurance  company  itself 
does  not  provide;  and 
holdings  in  companies  which  are  not  engaged  in  insurance business. 
The  term  "Universal  Life"  is  used  to  denote  a  special  link-up  between 
savings  and  insurance  protection.  There  is as  yet  little experience  of  this 
in  the  Community.  "Universal  Life''  products  are  to  be  classified  as 
insurance  products  only  if  a  risk  is  borne  and  free  access  to  the  assets 
saved  Ci.e.  repayment  during  the  lifetime of  the  contract)  is  ruled out. 
The  principle  underlying  fund-linked  life  assurance  is  that  the  savings 
portions of  premiums  are  channelled  to  a  fund  and  invested  in  securities. 
The  level  of  the  indemnification  is  based  on  the  current  value  of  the  fund 
units.  The  investment  risk  is therefore borne  by  the  insured.  Fund-Linked 
life assurance  is  recognized  as  an  insurance  product. 
The  arrangement  of  financial  services  for  other  companies  clearly  does  not 
qualify  as  insurance  business.  However,  certain  activities  are  closely 
linked  to  such  services.  For  example,  it  has  been  the  practice  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  for  decades  for  insurance  companies  to  arrange 
contracts  for  other  insurance  companies  in  classes  of  insurance  which  they 
themselves  are not  permitted to offer.  This  must  be  in the  interests of  the 
insured party.  Similarly, building society business  is  so  closely  linked  to 
life  assurance  that  such  operations  may  also  be  arranged  by  insurance 
companies.  However,  there  is, generally speaking,  no  link  between  insurance 
business  and  bank  services.  Insurance  companies  may  not  arrange  such 
services  themselves. 
A  question  of  key  importance  is  whether  insurance  companies  engage  in 
non-insurance activities when  they  acquire  holdings  in the  share  capital  of 
firms  engaged  in other  business  fields.  Were  the answer  to this question to 
be  in  the  affirmative,  insurance  companies  could  acquire  holdings  in 
insurance  companies  but  not  in other  financial  institutions. - 110 -
Their  role  in the  financial  conglomerate  would  thus  be  very  restricted. 
However,  the  question  must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  A company  which 
acquires  an  interest  in  another  company  - even  to  the  extent  of  wholly 
owning  it - does  not  yet  pursue  the  business  of  that  company.  Management 
function,  responsibility  and  business  risk all  remain  with  the management 
of the  company  in which  the  interest  is held.  The  shareholder  merely  makes 
capital  available  and  is  naturally  interested  in  overseeing  the  use  to 
which  it is put.  In  being  represented on  the  company's  controlling bodies, 
the  shareholder  is thus  exercising that desire to oversee  events.  However, 
it is  in  no  way  pursuing  the business  of  the  company  in  which  the  interest 
is  held. 
The  legal  situation  must  be  assessed  differently  where,  under  a 
company-interlinking  contract,  the  insurance  company  acquiring  the  interest 
gains  more  extensive  rights  in  the  company  in  which  the  interest  is  held 
and  is able  to  influence its management.  In  that  way,  key  elements  of  the 
management  of  the  business  are  transferred to the  controlling company.  That 
company  is then  also ultimately  responsible  for  the business of  the  company 
in  which  the  interest  is  held  '3' 
3.  The  security  of  an  insurance  company  should  be  enhanced  by  its 
specialization  in  insurance  business  and  related  operations.  It  is  the 
business  of  insurance  companies  to underwrite  the  risks  run  by  others.  They 
should  therefore  be  spared alien  risks. 
A high  degree  of  security  for  life  assurance  business  is  achieved  through 
its separation  from  non-life  insurance business.  Life  assurance  companies 
may  not  provide  any  classes of  insurance  other  than  life assurance.  Losses 
which  may  arise as  a  result  of  the  hazardous  nature  of  indemnity  insurance 
do  not  affect  life assurance  companies. 
Only  certain  forms  of  enterprise  are  permitted  to  engage  in  insurance 
business.  A requirement  common  to them  all  is that  the capital  intended  for 
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the  shareholders'  capital.  Moreover,  full  disclosure  requirements  are 
imposed  on  companies.  This  also helps  to provide  the  necessary  security  for 
insurance  companies. 
Finally,  insurance  companies  must  at  all  times  maintain  a  given  minimum 
solvency  margin.  This  is  continually  monitored  by  the  authorities 
responsible  for  supervising  insurance  companies.  This  margin  is  available 
for  use  where,  contrary to statistical expectations,  an  insurance  company 
incurs  unusual  losses or  there  is  a  catastrophic  fall  in  the  value  of  its 
investments.  The  solvency  margin  should  largely  cushion  an  insurance 
company  against  the  risk of  bankruptcy. 
Specialization,  business  category  separation,  prescribed  legal  forms  of 
enterprise  and  minimum  solvency  margins  - these  are  all  requirements 
imposed  on  insurance  companies.  As  these  requirements  are  coordinated  at 
Community  level,  they  must  be  observed  by  all  insurance  companies  which 
have  their head  offices  in  a  Community  Member  State. 
II. The  role of insurance  co.panies  in financial  conglo.erates 
The  main  roles  of  insurance  companies  in  financial  conglomerates  are  as 
- the  partners of  other financial  institutions; 
- the parent  or  subsidiary  company  of  other  financial  institutions;  and 
- the  subsidiary  of  a  holding  company  which  also  controls  other  financial 
institutions. 
This  presents  the  following  problems  for  the  supervision  of  insurance 
business: 
1.  Where  insurance  companies  and  other  financial  institutions  cooperate  with 
the  aim  of  marketing  their  partners'  products  together  with  their  own 
products,  the  financial  and  organizational  independence  of  the  individual 
companies  is fully  maintained.  The  reciprocal  agreement  relate only  to the 
joint  marketing.  Whereas  banks  - at  any  rate  in  the  Federal  Republic  of - 112 -
Germany  - may  arrange  insurance,  it  is not  permitted,  as  already pointed 
out,  for  insurance  companies  to arrange  bank  services.  If they  were  to do 
so,  they  would  be  guilty  of  infringing  the  rule  on  not  engaging  in 
non-insurance  business.  Where  it goes  beyond  the  mere  supply  of  addresses 
therefore,  cooperation  is  permissible  only  if  the  partners  market  their 
products  via  a  joint  intermediary  company.  An  insurance  company  is  not 
prohibited  from  acquiring a  holding  in  such  a  company.  It  is crucial  that 
the  intermediary  company  should  bear  the  risk  of  acting  as  intermediary, 
and  in  particular  assume  liability  in  the  event  of  faulty  advice  being 
given. 
2.  Insurance  companies  may  acquire  holdings  in  banks  and  banks  may  acquire 
holdings  in  insurance  companies.  Either  is  permissible  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany. 
From  a  supervisory  viewpoint,  the  identity  of  an  insurance  company's 
shareholders  is  irrelevant.  Under  German  law,  the board  of  managers  is also 
responsible  for  the  management  of  the  company's  business.  It  is  responsible 
for  ensuring  that  supervisory  legislation  is  complied  with.  This  also 
applies  to arrangements  conferring control  on  the parent  company.  They  are 
not  permissible  where  they  go  beyond  the  framework  imposed  by  supervisory 
legislation.  A bank  with  an  interest  in  an  insurance  company  - even  a  100  % 
holding  - could  not  give  instructions  to  the  board  of  managers.  The 
authorities  responsible  for  superv1s1ng  insurance  companies  would  refuse  to 
approve  any  company-interlinking  contract  between  an  insurance  company  and 
its parent  company  under  which  the  right  to  give  instructions,  insofar as 
it conflicted  with  supervisory  legislation,  was  not  duly  restricted. 
Holdings  acquired  by  insurance  companies  in  other  financial  institutions 
constitute  capital  investments.  As  already  pointed  out,  an  insurance 
company  does  not  engage  in  the  business of  the  company  in which  an  interest 
is held  by  virtue of that  interest.  Under  German  supervisory  law,  however, 
it  is  not  possible  to  acquire  holdings  from  the  assets  which  must  be 
available  to meet  obligations arising  from  insurance  contracts.  This  means 
that  holdings  cannot  be  financed  with  technical  reserves  only  with  own 
capital  and  other borrowed  capital. - 113  -
Where  an  insurance  company  has  a  holding  in  another  insurance  company,  it 
must  meet  the  solvency  requirements  without  taking  account  of that  holding. 
In furnishing  proof  of  its solvency,  such  holdings  must  be  disregarded.  The 
insurance  company's  solvency  would  be  impaired  if  the  own  capital  required 
for  that  were  to be  partly or fully passed  on  as  a  result  of  the  holding to 
the  other  insurance  company  to  safeguard  its  solvency.  In  order  to avoid 
the so-called telescope effect,  the  German  supervisory authorities  require 
insurance  companies  to  finance  holdings  in  other  insurance  companies  by 
means  of  additional  own  capital. 
While  it  is  in  principle  permissible  for  insurance  companies  to  acquire 
holdings  in  banks  and  other  financial  institutions,  such  acquisitions 
cannot  always  be  accepted  without  questioning.  The  insurance  company's 
capital  investments  must  be  especially secure.  Holdings  in other  companies 
are  not  only  an  investment  risk;  they also entail  a  liability risk.  If the 
financial  institution  encounters  payment  difficulties,  the  insurance 
company  must  write off  the  holding.  To  that  extent,  the  risk  is  limited and 
foreseeable.  Because  of  the  extent  of  the  holding  and  the  presumed 
influence  on  the  company  in  which  the  interest  is  held,  however,  the 
insurance  company  may  incur  further  financial  obligations  which  it  cannot 
escape.  These  are  of  an  ethical  rather  than  of  a  legal  nature.  The  parent 
company  is  expected  to  be  responsible  for  its  subsidiary.  In  order  to 
protect  its reputation  and  not  be  discredited,  the  insurance  company  may  be 
compelled  to  provide  further  injections of  capital. 
This  ethical  liability risk  is  hardly quantifiable  in  advance.  As  soon  as  a 
holding  in  a  financial  institution is acquired,  therefore,  the authorities 
responsible  for  supervising  insurance  companies  examine  whether,  when 
measured  against  the  total  amount  of  capital  investments,  such  a  holding 
may  constitute a  risk  for  the  insurance  company.  If it were  to decide  that 
such  a  danger  did exist,  it would  have  to prohibit  the  holding. 
The  acquisition  of  a  holding  must  be  notified  to  the  supervisory 
authorities.  A holding  in this sense  means  a  share of more  than  10  X of  the 
nominal  capital  of  ~he company  in  which  the  interest  is held.  Any  increase 
in the  holding  must  also be  notified to the authorities. - 114  -
3.  Insurance  companies  may  be  subsidiaries  in  a  financial  conglomerate  which 
is controlled by  a  holding  company.  As  the question  of  the  ownership  of  an 
insurance  company  is  immaterial  for  supervisory  purposes,  there  are  no 
objections  to  the  holding  company  solution.  The  responsibility  of  the 
insurance  company's  board  of  managers  for  complying  with  supervisory 
legislation  remains  unaffected.  The  holding  company  is  prohibited  from 
giving  instructions  in this  area.  The  interests of  policyholders might  be 
jeopardized  if  an  insurance  company  were  to  invest  excessively  in  other 
financial  institutions belonging  to the group.  This  is prevented,  however, 
by  the  investment  rules  laid  down  in  the  supervisory  legislation.  Under 
German  law,  capital  investments  must  be  appropriately mixed  and  spread.  The 
authorities  responsible  for  supervising  insurance  companies  do  not 
therefore  permit  insurance  companies  to  invest  excessively  in  another 
company  belonging  to the  same  group. 
1.  The  purpose  of  a  financial  conglomerate  is  to offer  a  package  of  financial 
services  of  different  kinds.  The  services  are  supplied  by  different 
companies  in  the  conglomerate.  Insurance  services  may  be  supplied  only  by 
insurance  companies.  Each  producer  is  responsible  for  its own  product.  Even 
where  the  customer  is  confronted  with  only  one  supplier,  he  must  be  able  to 
know  which  supply  has  been  provided  by  which  company,  since  that  is  the 
only  way  in  which  he  can  make  his  decision  to  purchase  correctly  and  can 
assert  his  rights  against  the  company  responsible.  The  authorities 
responsible  for  supervising  insurance  companies  regard this transparency  in 
the  supply  of  insurance  services  as  essential. 
2.  With  the  joint  supply  of different  financial  services,  there  is a  tendency 
for  products  to be  coupled  with  each  other.  the  condition  may  be  laid  down 
that  a  customer  can  receive  a  service  only  if  he  at  the  same  time  enters 
into  a  contract  for  another  service.  Where  one  of  the  services  supplied 
involves  insurance,  the  German  insurance  supervisory  authorities  permit 
coupling  only  if the  rights of  the  person  insured are  otherwise  adequately 
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3.  The  interests  of  policyholders  have  also  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
collection and  transmission  Qf  data.  Under  German  law,  personal  data other 
than  such  generally accessible  information  as  names  and  addresses,  may  be 
stored and  passed  on  only  if the  customer  is  in agreement.  Such  agreement 
is given  to  an  insurance  company  in  the  case  of  life  and  health  insurance 
to  enable  the  necessary  health  examination  to  be  carried  out.  The 
transmission of  such  data  to other  companies  in  the financial  conglomerate 
is not  permitted under  any  circumstances. 
4.  As  already  pointed out,  insurance  companies  must  ensure,  when  making  their 
capital  investments,  that  the  principle of  mixing  and  spreading  investments 
is  observed.  They  may  therefore  not  invest  more  within  the  financial 
conglomerate  than  in  outside  companies.  This  is  continually  monitored  by 
the authorities  responsible  for  supervising  insurance  companies.  They  are 
provided  with  sufficient  information  through  periodic  returns  on  the 
composition of  capital  investments  and  continuous  returns  on  new  investment 
acquisitions. 
In  this  way,  the  "danger  of  infection"  is  largely  warded  off.  An  example 
from  the  past  provides  proof  of  this assertion.  When,  a  few  years  ago,  a 
bank  became  insolvent,  the  insurance  companies  belonging  to  the  same 
financial  conglomerate  were  only  slightly  affected.  Their  financial 
position  was  fully  safeguarded.  The  insurance  companies  had  not  invested 
more  in the  bank  than  they  were  accustomed  to do  in outside  institutions. 
The  losses  incurred  were  thus  limited  and  did  not  jeopardize  the  insurance 
companies. 
IV.  Need  for act;on on  regulatory aeasures  ? 
1.  The  question  has  been  posed  as  to  whether  insurance  companies  should 
continue  to be  restricted to  insurance business  and  whether  other  companies 
should  be  excluded  from  that  field.  The  answer  to that  question  can  only  be 
affirmative.  Insurance  companies  supply  products  of  a  particular  kind.  Such 
products  are  legally  circumscribed;  they  require  a  high  degree  of - 116 -
confidence  and  transparency.  It  is  technically  difficult  to  shape  them. 
Special  knowledge  is  required  which  is  available  only  in  specialist 
companies.  Insurance  involves  the  systematic  underwriting of  risks.  These 
must  always  be  visible  and  containable.  If  a  company  were  to  engage  in 
business  in  addition to  insurance,  deficits arising  from  the  non-insurance 
activities  could  have  an  impact  on  the  insurance  business.  Policyholders' 
claims  could  then  be  jeopardized.  This  must  at all events  be  prevented. 
2.  If  insurance  companies  remain  what  they  are,  there  is  no  reason  to alter 
the supervisory  arrangements  for  them.  All  insurance  companies,  with  the 
exception of  the  very  small,  are  subject  to supervision.  Only  a  very  few 
have  so  far  been  incorporated  into financial  conglomerates.  It would  not  be 
appropriate  to  create  a  new  supervisory  system  on  their  account  alone. 
Specialist  supervision  of  insurance  companies  is  essential  if  the  current 
level  of  consumer  protection  is to be  maintained. 
The  expert  knowledge  and  experience  necessary  for  this  can  be  found  only  in 
an  authority  specializing  in  such  matters.  If  that  authority  had  to 
supervise other  financial  institutions as  well,  the specialist  knowledge  of 
the  insurance  sector would  probably  diminish.  I  am  therefore opposed  to the 
setting  up  of  a  "super"  authority  which  would  be  responsible  for 
supervising all  institutions  in  a  financial  conglomerate. 
This  does  not  mean  that  "Chinese  walls"  should  be  erected  between  the 
separate  supervisory  authorities.  Cooperation  between  the  various 
supervisory authorities  is absolutely essential, both  on  a  day-to-day basis 
and  especially  in  the  event  of  a  crisis.  A joint  financial  council  could 
achieve  this  by  providing  a  forum  for  the  exchange  of  experience,  the 
notification  of  measures  taken  and  possibly  discussion  of  a  coordinated 
approach.  For  that  to  happen,  individual  authorities  would  have  to  be 
relieved  of  their  obligation  to  maintain  confidentiality,  as  has  already 
happened  in  the  case  of  cooperation  between  supervisory  authorities  in  the 
insurance  field  in the  Community. - 117 -
3.  Supervision  of  the  solvency  of  an  insurance  company  must  be  carried  out 
independently  of  the  company's  involvement  in a  financial  conglomerate.  The 
bases  for  calculating  the  necessary  capital  resources  of  the  individual 
financial  institutions  are  completely  different.  The  bases  for  measuring 
own  capital  also  differ.  It  is  therefore  not  clear  what  benefits  rules 
governing  the overall  solvency  of  a  financial  conglomerate  would  bring. 
For  the  same  reason,  there  is  also  no  need  for  a  consolidated  accounting 
operation  covering  the  financial  conglomerate  and  going  beyond  the  rules 
already  laid down  concerning  group  accounts. 
4.  I  do  not  consider  there  to  be  an  acute  need  for  action  to  be  taken  on 
regulatory measures  in  the  field of  insurance  supervision.  It seems  to  me 
to  be  more  appropriate  not  to  impede  developments  in  the  market  in 
financial  services  through  government  measures.  Where  deficiencies  appear, 
specific measures  can  be  taken  to deal  with  them.  Means  can  always  be  found 
to  do  what  is  really  essential.  Should  gaps  appear  in  the  supervisory 
system,  they  can  quickly  be  filled  in  an  appropriate  manner. - 118  -
Notes 
1 >  First  Council  Directive  of  24  July  1973  on  the  coordination  of  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  the  taking-up  and 
pursuit  of  the  business  of  direct  insurance  other  than  life  assurance  -
first non-life  insurance  Directive - Article 6; 
First  Council  Directive  of  5  March  1979  on  the  coordination  of  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  the  taking-up  and 
pursuit  of  the business of  life assurance  - first  life assurance  Directive 
- Article 6. 
2>  First  non-life  insurance  Directive,  Article  8<1><b>; 
First  life assurance  Directive,  Article  8C1><b>. 
3)  See  August  Angerer,  "Beteiligungen  im  Vermogen  von  VU",  EfV  1983,  p.  134 - 119-
M.  LE  PORTZ 
FINANCIAL  CONGLOMERATES  AND  SECURITIES  MARKETS 
The  ever  increasing  importance  of  financial  conglomerates,  and  particularly. 
the  international  ones,  is  a  very  important  feature  of the  present  structure 
of  financial  markets  and  it particularly applies to the  securities  industry.  I 
would  like  to  look  at  that  aspect  now.  Perhaps  I  could  just  recall  recent 
developments  and  then  look  at  some  theoretical  solutions,  at  least  to  the 
problems  which  exist  for  the  securities  industry  as  a  result  of  these  recent 
developments  and  then  I  will  finish  with  the  international  dimension  and 
particularly the  European  one. 
I.  THE  HISTORICAL  CONTEXT 
One  particular feature  of  the securities  industry  is the extension of activity 
ofw  firms  to  cover  new  areas.  As  we  know  in  a  lot  of  European  countries, 
particularly the  Latin  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom,  single capacity  was 
the  basis  of  securities  markets,  this  system  did  not  cause  too  many 
difficulties,  everyone  knew  his  place,  you  were  either  a  dealer  pure  and 
simple  or  a  direct  or  collective  investor.  This  system  was  never  completely 
unadulterated even  in  its  original  form,  some  countries  never  had  it at all, 
and  in  many  countries  the  banks  were  active  in  the  securities  market  as 
dealers  on  the  stock  exchange  floor  or  outside  the  stock  exchange  or  direct 
investors  as  in Belgium  or Italy.  A lot  of  countries,  like Germany,  have  had 
the universal  bank  for  a  long  time,  there  is  also  the  question  of  fiduciary 
management  and  that  meant  the  banks,  in  particular  in  France,  had  an  important 
role to  play  in  collective  management  of  assets.  When  conglomerates  as  such 
began  to  appear  on  our  markets,  as  has  happened  relatively  recently,  very 
often it is not  the  product  of  a  slow  development,  it is  in fact  the  result  of 
deliberate  policy,  pursued  with  the  agreement  of  or  as  a  result  of  pressure 
from  the  public  authorities.  In  Europe  it  was  particularly  important  to 
attract  major  American  and  Japanese  firms  to  European  markets  and  also develop - 120 -
market  liquidity  by  increasing  capitalisation  of  intermediaries.  Two 
developments  are characteristic,  first of all, the  developments  in the  United 
Kingdom  characterised  by  the  Big-Bang  in  October  1986,  but  also  the 
developments  in  France  which  took  rather  longer  but  which  principally  involved 
the decision  taken  in  March  1987  to authorise  the taking over of  stock brokers 
by  other  intermediaries,  particularly banks.  All  this happened  at  a  time  when 
there  were  big  changes  underway  in  the  securities  market.  At  national  level, 
private  savings  involved  securities  more  and  more  for  reasons  of  returns  and 
liquidity.  Then  there were  developments  in  collective management  and  also the 
creation of  new  financial  futures.  In  the  United  States they  are  particularly 
important  these days,  where  they  exceed  the  importance  of  traditional markets 
and  that  success  has  been  confirmed  in  Europe  as  well.  These  developments  have 
meant  that  the  same  firms  or  groups  of  firms  are  becoming  more  and  more 
important  in  national  capital  markets,  even  if  that  does  not  seem  always  to 
fit  in.  This  development  is  just  as  important  internationally,  where  major 
company  shares  are  negotiated  on  the  stock  exchange  floors  or  outside  stock 
exchanges  in  several  countries  and  we  also  have  the  emergence  of  the  Eurobond 
markets  and  also  Euro-equities  and  this  has  created  a  very  active 
international  market.  This  internationalisation  is  becoming  even  more 
important  because  subs i diaries  in  a  host  country  can  carry  out  activities 
authorised  by  the  law  of  the  host  country,  but  prohibited  in their  country of 
origin.  This  international  aspect  means  that  we  are getting the  same  financial 
multinational  financial  groups  appearing  more  and  more.  These  developments  are 
fundamentally  much  in  favour  of  market  developments  and  better  utilisation of 
savings,  better allocation of  resources,  but  we  must  accept  that  it is still 
rather difficult  to  regulate  international groupings,  since they  pursue  pretty 
uniform  policy  lines,  but  are  faced  with  different  types  of  national 
organisations and  it is not  always  clear which  doctrines are  involved. 
II.  THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  MULTIPLE  CAPACITY 
The  development  of  m~ltiple capacity, particularly in  conglomerates,  increases 
market  risks  and  causes  serious  problems  from  the  point  of  view  of  investor 
protection and  maintaining  solvency  among  intermediaries.  As  far  as  protecting 
the  investor  is concerned,  there  is more  likelihood of  fraud  or  there  will  be 
if special  precautions  are  not  taken.  Insider  trading  is more  likely,  since - 121  -
commercial  banks  know  what  is  going  on  in  all  the  fields  of  their  clients' 
activities,  and  one  single  actor  can  play  on  several  markets  in  different 
countries  subject  to  different  regulations  where  there  is  not  enough 
coordination.  Multiple  capacity multiplies conflict  of  interest  as  well,  as  we 
know.  As  far  as  ficuciary  management  is  concerned,  this  is  linked  with 
activities of  commercial  banking  and  financial  engineering.  There  is also the 
function  of  brokers  acting  for  other  parties.  The  traditional  solutions  to 
conflicts of  interest  are  moving  in three directions.  The  most  traditional of 
these  is effective separation of  incompatible  managements,  particularly in the 
field  of  commercial  banking,  market  making  and  individual  or  collective 
fiduciary management.  The  important  thing to  note  in  this particular  case  is 
maybe  not  so  much  the  actual  legal  separation  which  may  be  a  kind  of  a 
smokescreen,  but  the  actual  autonomous  effect  of  autonomous  management  by,  for 
example,  separation of  accounts,  separation of staff, complete  delegation  to 
the  manager  of  decision-making  powers,  autonomous  renumeration  of  those 
managers  and  various  other  pragmatic  formulae  of  that  type.  In  some  cases  it 
is  impossible  to  separate  functions,  so  you  need  to  apply  three  principles. 
First of  these  is absolutely  priority to be  given  to the  customers'  interests, 
in other  words  priority  to  the  customer  over  the  intermediary.  The  corollary 
of  that  is  that  the  intermediary  has  to  seek  the  best  possible  execution  of 
orders  on  behalf of  the  customer,  and  then  you  also  need  diligence  linked  up 
to  the  concept  of  the  financial  mandate.  In  all  these  cases  you  need  to 
guarantee  transparency  as  the  golden  rule  of  the  intermediary,  you  need  a 
written  agreement  between  the  intermediary  and  his  customers,  setting  out 
conditions  for  the  intermediary's  intervention,  and  for  each  transaction  or 
group  of transactions  the  customer  needs  to  know  if the  intermediary  is acting 
as  a  principal  or  as  an  agent  and  depending  on  the  legal  position  involved  you 
need  a  clear  definitiion  of  the  type  of  renumeration,  brokers  fees  or  the 
levying  of  a  commercial  margin.  Another  principle, which  has  to be  observed  in 
alt  cases,  is  that  which  prohibits  the  movement  of  confidential  information 
which  might  have  an  effect  on  the  prices  of  securities;  Chinese  Walls  are 
certainly not  always  opaque  within one  single group,  but  at  the  same  time  that 
principle must  be  firmly  adhered  to. - 122-
Solvency  of  financial  intermediaries 
Although  the  question  of  solvency  of  financial  intermediaries  has  to  be  seen 
against  a  new  background,  we  must  not  exaggerate  the  risks  involved. 
Bankruptcies  in  recent  years  in  the  United  States  have  been  the  result  of 
credit  errors.  On  the  contrary,  no  major  investment  bank  has  actually 
disappeared  after  last  year's  crash.  Increases  in  market  volatility  as  a 
result  of  concentration  of  institutional  investors,  has  meant  that  the  risks 
are more  numerous  and  more  acute, all the  rules,  or the  longstanding ones  have 
disappeared,  as  in  France  for  example  where  solidarity amongst  stock  brokers 
in  one  single  stock  exchange  was  the  fundamental  rule  which  guaranteed  the 
customers'  interests.  The  diverse  nature  of  intermediaries  therefore  means 
that  solidarity is no  longer  the order of  the day.  Now  there are  rules  fixing 
minimum  capitalisation  and  ratio  requirements,  which  are  becoming  more  and 
more  important  in  our  countries.  The  principle  should  be  that  professionals 
carrying  out  the  same  activities  should  be  subject  to  the  same  kind  of 
requirement  irrespective  of  their  status.  Banking  status  intermediaries 
probably  make  up  the  majority  of  intermediaries  and  stock  exchange  members  in 
France  and  in  each  country  they  are  subject  to  overall  supervision  organised 
by  the  Central  Bank  or  bodies  which  depend  on  the  Central  Bank,  such  as 
Banking  Commissions  <Commissions  Bancaires>.  They  have  the  job of maintaining 
surveillance  of  a  certain own  funds  ratio,  compared  with  liability.  Banking 
involvement  in  securities  activities  presupposes  refinement  of  management 
ratios,  it  is  not  possible  to  make  do  with  a  global  own  funds  liabilities 
ratio.  Ratios  need  to  be  adapted  to an  analysis of  risks  involved  in each  type 
of  operation  and  in  that  respect  I  think  we  can  express  satisfaction  at  the 
excellent  work  done  in  this  field  by  the  Cooke  Committee.  There  it  has  been 
observed  that  bank  supervision  traditions  lay  down  as  a  rule  the  fact  that 
ratios  have  to be  observed,  but  not  all  that  frequently;  however  given  the 
volatility of  financial  markets,  I  think that  much  more  frequent  surveillance 
of  ratios  is  in  order.  As  to bodies  which  do  not  have  banking  status,  again 
management  ratios  are  necessary  as  are  requirements  of  a  minimum  capital 
level,  these  are  necessary  in  all  countries.  There  should  be  a  close  link 
between  the  bodies  involved  in  doing  this  job  and  the  Central  Banks  or  the 
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The  need  for  effective controls 
It  is  also  important  to  monitor  the  rules  that  exist,  you  need  effective 
controls  in all markets,  first of all effective  internal  controls  in the  firms 
themselves  or  in  the  groups,  this  involves  a  control  of  accounts,  but  also and 
more  particularly  a  control  of  procedural  rules  and  professional  codes  of 
ethics which  apply  to  the  firms  themselves  and  to their  staff.  The  fact  that 
you  have  internal  control  of  procedures  does  not  mean  that  you  should  not  have 
external  controls  as  well,  carried  out  in  some  cases  by  professionals, 
inspecting,  for  example,  stock  exchanges  and  also the public authorities which 
generally  speaking  have  a  body  of  financial  market  inspectors  available  to 
them.  In  France  external  controls are done  by  the  Commission  Bancaire  for  the 
banks  and  the  Commission  des  Operations  de  Bourses  for  professionals  in 
general.  One  more  specific  control  requirement  applies  to  operations  on 
financial  futures  markets,  because  of  the particular dangers  involved  here.  On 
these  markets  a  system  of  deposits  and  margins  guarantees  a  day  by  day  check 
on  the  safety  of  transactions.  Given  the  plurality  of  markets  consolidated 
supervision of open  position of  intermediaries  is extremely  useful  and  this  is 
made  easier  by  the  unity  of  the  "Chambre  de  Compensation"  or  the  "Centrales 
des  Risques"  bodies,  which  in  turn  can  also  allow  for  supervision  of 
consolidated positions  amongst  the  major  institutional  investors  and  this  may 
be  particularly useful  for  these  investors  themselves.  At  all costs,  though, 
it is  absolutely  crucial  for  these  investors  to  organise their  own  strict and 
daily  internal  checks  on  their  positions  in  the  furtures  markets  as  a  whole, 
including  the  private  or  unofficial  markets  which  normally  speaking  do  not 
have  this element  of  protection  represented  by  the daily calls on  margins. 
Responsibility for  regulation  and  control 
It is very  important  to  know  exactly  who  is responsible  for  regulating  and  for 
checking  that  regulations  are  adhered  to.  Looking  at  the historical  background 
of this,  the  specific  nature  and  also  the  diversity  of  market  techniques  in 
securities  Led  to autonomous  regulation of  these markets,  by  the professionals 
responsible  for  the organised markets,  which  were  generally  speaking  groups  in 
the  securities  stock  exchanges.  However,  recent  tendencies  involve  a  more 
complex  organisation  here  and  we  have  the  development  of  independent  public 
bodies,  Like  the  Commission  des  Valeurs  Mobilieres,  which  rightly or  wrongly - 124  -
represent  the  higher  interests of  investor protection.  There  is also  a  greater 
involvement  on  the  part  of  the  bodies  which  monitor  the  banks,  because  of  the 
ever  increasing  importance  of  the  role  played  by  these  banks  and  the  possible 
repercussions  on  credit  and  currency.  I  am  not  sure  that  this  is a  bad  thing 
as  long  as  it  fills  all  the  gaps  and  guarantees  sufficient  contacts  amongst 
the professionals  and  as  long  as  we  are  sure that,  if a  conflict  arises or  if 
a  crisis occurs  then  the  rules of  competence  are  made  clear  in  advance. 
III.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONTEXT 
In  the  international  context,  the  heterogeneous  nature of  the organisation and 
rapid  developments  in  the  systems  are  making  international  coordination  much 
more  complex  in  the  securities field  than  is  the  case  in  the  field  of  credit 
and  insurance.  All  the  more  so,  since  the  international  nature  of  the 
securities market  makes  it  necessary  to  have  a  worldwide  approach  at  the  time 
same  as  a  European  one.  We  know  that  the  emergence  of  an  international 
authority  and  detailed agreements  will  apply  to all of  us,  but  it is  something 
which  is still in  the distant  future.  Contrary  to this  situation with  respect 
to  banks,  there  is  no  national  model  which  may  be  transposed  to  the 
international  level,  on  the  contrary there  is the  very  great  diversity which 
makes  it  very  difficult  to have  proper  coordination,  and  on  top  of  that  the 
markets  themselves  are  far  from  having  reached  the  same  stage  of  development 
in the  various  countries.  However,  it does  seem  necessary  to have  some  degree 
of  harmonisation.  For  as  long  as  we  do  not  have  it,  national  discipline  is 
unlikely  to  have  very  much  effect,  particularly  on  the  more  risky 
transactions,  and  people  are  going  to  go  for  the  systems  which  are  most  lax. 
That  last  point  involves  particular dangers  for  Europe,  given  the  principle of 
mutual  recognition,  the  internal  market  in  Europe  might  be  endangered  and 
there  would  be  increased  risks of  insolvency,  so  in  the  case  of  the  securities 
markets,  we  need  to go  down  the  same  path  along  which  the banks  have  already 
gone,  that  is  we  need  European  coordination  within  the  EEC  and  worldwide 
coordination  as  the  banks  have  already  demonstrated  through  the  Basle 
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Existing bases  for  co-operation 
There  is,  however,  already  some  degree  of  international  coordination amongst 
the  various  regulators of  securities market.  First  of  all  I  think it  is very 
important  to  note  that  a  lot  of  informal  links  already  exist  amongst  the 
regulators  in  the  different  countries.  Secondly,  bilateral  links  amongst 
markets  already exist and  they  continue  to be  crucial,  particularly where  one 
and  the  same  product  is  being  dealt  in  several  markets.  Thirdly,  the 
international  federation  of  stock  exchanges  has  begun  to  examine  a  worldwide 
code  of  conduct,  or  at  least  some  sort  of  body  of  principles.  The 
international organisation  on  securities  has  created  a  technical  committee  on 
international  transactions,  made  up  of  representatives  of  twelve  countries, 
which  make  up  more  than  95~ of  world  securities  markets  and  they  are  more  or 
less the  same  countries  as  appear  in the  Basle  Committee.  Some  of  the  problems 
on  that  Committee's  agenda  include  problems  of  solvency  of  multinational 
operators  and  these are  being  studied  in  liaison with  the  Basle  Committee. 
EEC  implications 
As  far  as  the  European  Community  is  concerned,  I  am  absolutely  sure  that 
closer  cooperation  is  necessary.  The  unity  of  the  financial  market  with  1992 
on  the  horizon,  involves  a  freedom  to provide  services,  mutual  recognition of 
national  regulatory  measures  and  the  monitoring  of  those  measures  by  the 
country  of  origin.  I  think  it  is  inevitable,  and  it  is  absolutely  crucial, 
that  we  have  some  harmonisation  against  the  background  of  the  minimalist 
philosophy  to which  Mr.  Padoa-Schioppa  referred this morning.  I  think,  like 
Prof.  Gower,  that  some  aspects  of  harmonisation  must  extend  upwards,  partly  in 
the field of  cooperation.  This  kind  of  closer  harmonisation,  it seems  to me, 
should  apply  to  the  rules  which  govern  the  qualifications  of  intermediaries, 
the  Code  of  Conduct  which  should  apply  to them,  prudential  rules,  particularly 
for  the non-banking  intermediaries,  and  finally,  it should  apply  to control  of 
entry  requirements.  In  the  field of  cooperation,  I  think  we  need  to develop 
exchanges  of  information  and  mutual  assistance,  particularly  in the  field of 
suspect  transactions  and  in  the  relevant  declarations  needed  for  pinpointing 
the  identify  of  the  real  owners  of  securities,  even  if  they  are  fiduciary 
shares.  This  is something  which  must  extend  beyond  the  constraints of  banking 
secrecy  in  cases  where  the  regulators  of  the  banking  markets  and  the - 126-
securities markets  have  a  need  to share  these  secrets.  And  it seems  to  me  that 
all of this should  at  least  accompany  if not  precede  the  institution of  mutual 
recognition.  The  European  Community  has  already  considered  these  problems, 
when  it  published  directives  and  when  it  prepared  new  directives  ten  years 
ago,  and  at  that  time  it  put  together  an  initial  European  Code  of  Conduct  on 
securities.  I  think  that  we  can  rely  on  the  possibility  of  that  work  being 
resumed  and  taken  further  as  a  result  of  the  new  market  conditions  which  will 
prevail  when  we  will  have  a  single  market  in  financial  services.  For  this 
reason  I  feel  that  when  this  Conference  is  over,  we  will  have  to  take  these 
matters  further  and  indeed  speed  up  the  work  going  on  in  the  European 
regulation  of  the banking  and  insurance  sector  and  also,  of  course,  in  the 
field of securities.  I  hope  that this  Conference  will  be  able  in  that  way  to 
lead  to  concrete  progress  for  the future. - 127-
o;scuss;on Panel 
Mr.  Cooke 
Does  Mr.  Biron  believe that  when  you  are  looking  at  consolidated  supervision, 
it  is  necessary  and  appropriate  to  make  a  distinction  between  groups, 
financial  groups,  where  the  bank  is  the  top  company  and  where  a  bank  is not 
the  top  company  in the group,  in terms  of  its structure  ? 
To  me  it  seems  important  to  make  a  very  clear  distinction,  conceptually, 
between  consolidated  supervision  and  consolidated  account in  g.  Con sol ida  ted 
supervision  permits  a  form  of  consolidated view,  without  necessarily  requiring 
consolidated  accounting  and  therefore  the  application  of  precisely  the  same 
methods  of  calculation of  solvency,  for  example,  in different  companies  with 
different  activities  in  insurance  or  securities,  allowing  for  the  short-term 
view  of  a  securities  intermediary  or  the  long-term  view  of  a  banking 
intermediary  or  the  special  perspective  of  an  insurance  company.  Does  the 
panel  accept  that  there  is  a  difference  between  consolidated  supervision  and 
consolidated  accounting  for  supervisory  purposes  and  whether  many  of  the 
problems,  at  least  in  the  early  stages  of  coordination  of  the  regulation  of 
financial  service groups,  can  be  handled  through  consolidated supervision,  as 
opposed  to consolidated accounting  ? 
Prof.  Biron 
Although  the  two  concepts  are  related,  they  mean  very  different  things. 
Consolidated  accounting  is a  form  of  accountancy  which  is subject  to a  number 
of  clear  rules.  Consolidated  supervision  goes  much  further,  using  consolidated 
accounts,  but  dealing  with  the  general  equilibrium  of  the  group,  its 
liquidity,  its  profitability,  overall  the  exchange  position,  the  risk 
situation, all this is a  very  broad  concept.  That  is  how  I  understood  the  1983 
Directive  in  conjunction  with  consolidated supervision. - 128  -
It  is  difficult  to  talk  about  general  principles  which  will  apply  to  every 
case,  but  in particular  for  the  supervisor  the  situation is  going  to be  very 
different  depending  on  whether  the  bank  is  at  the  top of  the  company,  or  is 
not,  being  just one  of  the  component  parts.  When  the  bank  is at  the  top  of  the 
whole,  it  shoulders  part  of  the  general  responsibility  for  the  group  of  the 
conglomerate,  its responsibilities  may  extend  further  than  a  purely  accounting 
responsibility.  One  can  start talking  here  about  moral  responsibility which  is 
difficult to quantify.  When  the  bank  is just  part  of the whole,  it is easier 
for  the  supervisor  to set  up  barriers and  to enhance  the  autonomy  of  the  bank. 
The  idea  being  to  isolate  the  bank  as  much  as  possible,  using  appropriate 
means  to  avoid  the  problems  of  the  whole  giving  rise to  serious difficulties 
in the  bank. 
Mr.  Cooke 
I  accept  that  there  is  a  difference  between  consolidated  accounting  and 
consolidated  supervision.  Mr.  Biron  said that  consolidated  supervision has  to 
be  undertaken  on  the  basis  of  consolidated accounting.  My  proposition  is that 
consolidated  supervision  can  be  undertaken  not  on  the  basis  of  consolidated 
accounting. 
Prof.  Biron 
I  would  hesitate  on  that  point;  I  think  that  consolidated  accounts  are  the 
starting point  of  consolidated  supervision.  When  you  are  before  a  group,  or  a 
conglomerate,  you  must  try  to  have  consolidated  accounts  and  you  must  start 
from  that. 
Mr.  Cooke 
You  must  certainly  have  consolidated  accounts,  but  you  need  not  necessarily 
conduct  consolidated· supervision on  the basis  of  those  consolidated accounts. 
In  other  words  you  can  deconsolidate  the elements  within  the  group,  you  need - 129-
to supervise  them  all and  certainly that  is  important  that  it is done.  It need 
not  necessarily  be  done  on  the  basis  of  the  single  set  of  consolidated 
accounts. 
Mr.  Muller 
As  we  have  recognised  in the  Directive on  consolidation,  you  cannot  always  use 
the accounting  technique of  consolidation for  a  group  of  companies,  because  it 
is  just  not  so  meaningful.  One  of  the  examples  is  that  I  have  not  seen  many 
consolidated accounts  of  a  banking  group  with  an  insurance  company  in  it.  The 
insurance  company  is  not  consolidated,  because  it  has  its  own  rules  of 
arithmetic  and  reserves.  I  think  that  there  should  be  a  kind  of  technique  and 
dialogue  between  supervisors  where  they  do  not  necessarily  have  to  consolidate 
fully  in  an  accounting  way,  because  it  is  just  not  meaningful  and  there  are 
all  kinds  of  devices  for  that,  for  instance,  how  do  we  deal  with  a 
participation  of  a  bank  within  an  insurance  group.  It  should  not  be 
consolidated  in  the  insurance  group,  because  also  there  it is not  meaningful. 
The  technique  is then  just  to  isolate  the  capital  endowment,  of  the  capital 
invested  in  that  area,  and  take  it  out  of  the  capital  base  of  the  banking 
group  or  vice  versa,  for  instance  of  the  holding.  There  are  all  kinds  of 
system  controls  where  you  do  not  necessarily  have  to go  through  the  ordeal  of 
a  consolidation,  because  it  is  just not  meaningful.  There  is a  kind  of  system 
control  in  them  which  is  more  important  than  just accounting.  Basic  elements 
are  the  risk distribution,  the  capital  adequacy  and  the  liquidity position. 
Mr.  Biron 
I  agree  with  you  that  consolidated  supervision  goes  much  further  than 
consolidated accounting,  but  I  would  express  a  certain  preference  for  having 
consolidated  accounts  and  these  consolidated  accounts  can  be  made  up  on 
several  assumptions.  You  can  have  a  complete  consolidation  or  you  could  have 
equity accounting,  which  is another  way  to evaluate their participation.  But 
it  would  be  always  good  for  the  controller  to  have  before  him  consolidated 
accounts. - 130 -
Mr.  Fitchew 
Taking  in  particular  the  case  where  there  is  a  financial  group,  which  is 
headed  by  a  non-bank,  are  Mr.  Cooke  and  Mr.  Muller  and  Prof.  Biron  saying  that 
over  and  above  the  need  for  the  banking  supervisors to  look  at  the position of 
the  banking  subsidiary  within  such  a  group  and  at  its  specific  position  and 
for  that  purpose  they  would  actually  need  to  deconsol idate  the  accounts  and 
look  specifically  at  whether  the  capital  adequacy  of  the  banking  subsidiary 
taken  by  itself  was  adequate.  Is  the  proposition  that  over  and  above  that 
there  needs  to  be  some  form  of  consolidated  supervision  of  the  group  as  a 
whole,  of  the  financial  health of  the  group,  looking at  the tests that  have 
been  mentioned,  such  as  liquidity,  exchange  rate exposure,  etc.  If  so,  if we 
are talking  about  a  group  which  is  headed  by  a  non-bank,  who  is  going  to  do 
it, which  set  of  supervisors  is to  take  responsibility  ? 
There  is also  a  question  I  would  like  to  put  to  Prof.  Angerer  :  Does  he  see 
any  need  at all  for  consolidated  supervision  of  this  kind  of  group,  because 
the  presentation  he  gave  of  the  German  situation  was  one  in  which  certainly 
the  insurance  companies  are  completely  self-contained  and  there  are  very 
strict  rules  as  to  their  degree  of  involvement  with  other  members  of  the 
group.  He  mentioned  that  one  might  need  to  have  co-operation  between 
supervisors  if  there  is  a  crisis,  but  there  is  no  need  for  any  continuing 
consolidated supervision  of  groups  of this  kind. 
Prof.  Angerer 
I  did  mention  that  there  would  not  be  any  point  in  having  consolidated 
accountancy.  Quite  rightly  somebody  has  said  that  solvency  requirements  in 
different  branches  are  highly different  and  of  course  have  different  aims,  for 
example,  we  have  a  holding  at  the  top  of  an  industry  and  this  holding 
masterminds  an  insurance  company;  what  sort  of  a  consolidated  account  would 
give  you  useful  information  here  ?  It  would  tell  you  about  the  capital 
structure,  but  this  is  very  different  indeed  from  the  information  you  would 
expect  of  a  bank.  If-you  have  a  consolidated account  for  this  sort  of  a  group, 
I  am  not  going  to  get  the  sort  of  information  which  I  need  at  all.  The 
important  thing  is,  and  of  course  this  is  something  which  you  can  get  via 
consolidated  accountancy,  is  the  sort  of  obligation  that  is  worked  out .. 
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according  to  own  capital.  I  have  said  that  insurance  companies  provide  a 
programmed  approached  to capital  investment  and  this must  be  spread.  We  have 
learned  from  our  experience  that  more  than  is usually the  case,  where  you  have 
a  parent  company  or  a  subsidiary,  dangers  might  arise and  this  is the  sort  of 
thing  one  must  rule  against.  Similarly  the  bank  supervisory  authority  might 
keep  a  very  close  eye  upon  the  bank  in  that  respect,  because  the  risk  of 
infraction,  which  we  have  mentioned  several  times,  must  be  very  carefully 
warded  against.  If  we  did not  do  what  I  just said,  then  I  do  not  think that 
there  really would  be  a  risk. 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
I  entirely agree  with  what  Dr.  Angerer  has  said, because  whether  the  insurance 
company  is  the  parent  or  the  subsidiary,  it  does  have  a  very  special  role  to 
perform  within  the group.  The  insurance  company  can  pay,  the other  companies 
do  not  have  money,  they  have  a  great  many  activities, but  one  can  always  milk 
the  insurance  company  and  unfortunately this sort of  process  escapes  unnoticed 
and  is  not  discovered  as  quickly  as  one  would  discover  in  the  case  of  the 
bank.  This  is  why  we  feel  that  our  problems  are  very  much  geared  to  the 
life-insurance companies.  One  must  do  one's  best  to  make  sure  that  there  is 
consolidated supervision,  even  though  legallly speaking  this  is not  necessary 
since there  is specialisation, one  must  nevertheless  make  sure  that  the  law  is 
properly  implemented.  One  must  also  have  consolidated accounts,  although  we 
all  know  that  it  is almost  impossible,  still  I  think  that  one  must  do  one's 
best  because  otherwise  you  run  the  risk  of  having  bank  or  insurance  companies 
which  are only  partially healthy.  An  insurance  company  very  rarely goes  bust, 
but  the bonus  drops  to floor  level,  so  one  really must  make  an  effort  here. 
Mr.  Lanciotti 
The  point  which  seems  to  be  questioned  here  is the  lead  regulator  arrangements 
set up  in the  UK.  These  would  not  seem  to be  very  meaningful  in the  case  of  an 
insurance  company,  which  is part  of  a  group. - 132  -
Mr.  Russell 
This  is somewhat  tentative  in the  UK  experience  and  the  arrangements  in  the  UK 
depend  on  the  legal  responsibility of the  regulator  for  the particular sector. 
So  that  in  the  case  of  a  conglomerate  the  fact  that  one  regulator  is  taking 
the  lead,  does  not  mean  that  the  legal  responsibility  is  passed  on  by  the 
regulator;  for  example  in  the  case  where  the  Bank  of  England  is  the  lead 
regulator  they  will  collect  information  and  check  for  example  the  question of 
capital  adequacy  on  behalf  of  the  insurance  regulator  and  on  behalf  of  the 
securities  regulator,  but  the  legal  responsibility will  continue  to  be  borne 
by  the  insurance  regulator  in  respect  of  the  insurance  operation  and  the 
securities  regulator  in  respect  of  the securities operations.  It is, at  least 
in  the first  instance,  a  question of  minimizing  the  burdens  for  the  provision 
of  information  and  making  sure  that  they  are  handled  with  the  least  intrusion 
on  the  financial  institution.  How  that  develops  in  the  future  remains  to  be 
seen. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
Could  I  ask  Mr.  Lanciotti  whether  what  he  had  in mind  is maybe  this,  a  theme 
which  has  come  out  of  the  discussions  today.  That  insurance  is  somehow 
different,  that  the  main  area  where  there  are  borderline  problems  of 
supervision and  borderline  questions  as  to  who  should  be  the  lead  supervisor, 
is  in the  area  between  banking  activity and  securities market  activity,  rather 
than  in the  areas  between  insurance  and  the  other two  sectors  ? 
Prof.  Schneider 
Perhaps  there  has  been  a  misunderstanding  here.  It  is  my  feeling  that  so  far 
this particular concept,  this very  unusual  British  concept,  is not  very  well 
known  for  other  Member  States.  A distinction between  supervision on  the  basis 
of  consolidation  and  consolidated  supervision  on  the  other  hand.  Two  years 
ago,  the  Bank  of  England,  in  the  quarterly  bulletin,  published  a  paper  in 
which  this  distinction  between  supervision  on  a  consolidated  basis  and 
consolidated  supervision  was  very  clearly  defined  and  described  in  detail. 
Looking  at  things  now  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  German  lawyer,  it occurs  to  me - 133  -
that  this  very  much  concerns  bank  supervision  in  respect  of  different  forms 
which  might  occur  within  the  conglomerate  in the  shape  of  different  financial 
undertakings.  This  would  apply  to  a  given  credit  institution,  but  there  is 
nothing  specifically  catered  for  when  it  comes  to  insurance  companies  and  it 
was  not  very  clear  to  me  exactly  what  relation  existed  between  the  bank 
supervision  and  the  consolidated  supervision.  I  am  not  quite  sure  that this 
has  been  made  very  clear,  I  think this is really something  we  are  not  familiar 
with. 
Mr.  Barnes 
The  paper  to which  the  previous  speaker  referred  was  a  paper  which  related to 
the  consolidated  supervision  of  banks  and  was  aimed  at  improving  our 
understanding  and  our  supervision of  the  capital  adequacy  of  the  bank.  We  have 
taken  powers  in  our  new  Act  to  obtain  information,  not  only  from  companies 
which  are  subsidiaries of  the  bank,  but  also  from  the  holding  company  of  the 
bank  and  also  from  sister-associate  companies  of  the  bank,  in  circumstances 
where  that  information  is  required  in  the  interest  of  the  depositors.  So  in 
terms  of  being  able  to get,  in order  to protect  depositors,  a  wide  spread  of 
information  from  the  group,  upward,  downwards  and  sideways,  we  have  now 
considerable powers.  The  question  then  arises and  that  is where  this business 
to  which  Mr.  Cooke  refers  to  of  the  difference  between  supervision  on  the 
basis  of  consolidated  accounting  and  consolidated  supervision,  becomes 
important,  is  what  is  the  most  helpful  method  as  a  banking  supervisor  to 
exercise  those  powers.  What  I  think  he  was  arguing  was  that  in  certain 
circumstances  you  do  better  to  obtain  information  on  a  single  entity  basis, 
but  not  necessarily  to  consolidate  it  in  accounting  terms  before  you  do  your 
capital  ratios.  We  would  argue  that  there  can  be  times  when  it  is  better  to 
get  a  lot of  information  which  enables  you  to  take  a  global  view  of  the  risks 
in  the  group,  without  tying  yourself  into  the  very  difficult  knots  of 
consolidating  the  information  on  an  accounting  basis  and  than  having  to work 
out  whether  you  understand  what  you  are  looking  at,  because  the  capital  ratio 
tests that  you  would. then  want  to apply  on  a  consolidated  group  basis  would  be 
irrelevant tests, because  you  would  be  adding  apples  and  pears  together. - 134-
The  concept  of the  lead  regulator  in  relation  to a  complex  group  really is an 
extra-statutory  coming  together  of  the  supervisors  of  the  individual  bits, 
enabling  them  to  share  information,  which  is  relevant  to  their  bits,  and 
thereby  improve  their overall understanding of  how  the  group  is operating.  So 
there  is  no  question  of  the  banking  supervisor  having  his  autonomy  over  the 
bank  taken  away  from  him,  or  the  insurance  supervisor  having  any  diminution  of 
his authority, but  if they  sit together  round  the table periodically under  the 
chairmanship  of  the  lead  regulator,  they  will  then  be  in  a  position  to share 
information  and  to  note  whether  there  are  things  happening  to  the  group 
overall  which  may  call  for  concern  and  which  none  of  them  have  noticed  in 
relation  to  their  observation  of  the  bit  for  which  they  are  responsible.  I 
stress  it  is  extra-statutory  and  its  main  function  is  to  provide  a  better 
overview  which  will  inform  the  individual  supervision  and  make  that, 
hopefully,  qualitatively more  acute. 
Mr.  Broker 
Mr.  Le  Portz  mentioned  the  international  conglomerates,  Japanese,  American 
securities conglomerates,  which  can  conduct  operations  in  foreign  countries  to 
a  larger  extent  than  they  can  do  in their  home  country.  From  a  Community  point 
of  view,  third  country  firms  that operate  in the  Common  Market  area,  how  does 
Mr.  Le  Portz  see  the  application of  the principle of  home  country  control  and 
supervision.  This  morning  it  was  said  that  in  the  area  of  solvency  contol, 
home  country  supervision  was  probably  applicable,  but  in  areas  such  as  codes 
of  conduct  <Mr.  Le  Portz  mentioned  conflicts of  interest),  I  just  cannot  see 
how  this  can  be  done  in  a  meaningful  way.  Codes  of  conduct,  conflicts  of 
interest  are  concepts  that  refer  to  the  market  place  in  which  these  firms 
operate,  if a  securities firm  operate  in the  London  market  in  a  wide  range  of 
securities  activities  that  may  give  rise  to  conflicts  of  interests,  that  is 
from  my  point  of  view  impossible  to  be  properly  supervised  from  the  Japanese 
supervisory  point  of  view.  How  do  you  see  these  problems  and  the  concept  of 
home  country  control  in  a  global  market  is  just  not  applicable  in  a  smaller 
area  such  as  the  Common  Market. - 135  -
Mr.  le Portz 
I  share  Mr.  Broker's  concern.  The  idea  of  country  of  origin  controls  is  a 
Community  concept  and  it  is  still  a  vague  one.  We  are  still  not  quite  sure 
what  the  Community  technique  of  controls  will  involve.  I  am  quite  convinced  of 
the  fact  that,  even  within  the  Community,  this  kind  of  rule  could  only  be 
accepted  if  we  have  minimum  harmonisation  in  parallel  so  that  Community  Member 
States  as  a  whoLe,  have  a  guarantee  of  investor  protection  irrespective  of 
whether  it  is  the  host  country  or  the  country  of  origin  that  is  involved. 
Otherwise,  I  think  this  is  something  which  would  not  apply  outside  the 
Community,  no  principle  of  this  type  has  been  established.  For  as  Long  as 
corresponding  guarantees  are  not  avaiLable  it  wiLL  be  up  to  the  national 
authorities  in  each  of  our  countries  to  guarantee  investor  protection  on  the 
basis  of  the  national  rule.  We  need  a  Community-wide  rule,  or  indeed  a  rule 
which  applies  throughout  the  world,  but  that  is  a  Longer  way  away. 
Mr.  Poveda 
I  think  that  the  answer  to  whether  one  consolidates  the  banking  and  insurance 
sectors  or  not  depends  on  a  number  of  factors  that  can  differ  between 
countries.  Until  a  couple  of  years  we  would  have  suscribed  to  the  generally 
accepted  idea  of  not  consolidating.  Banks  and  insurance  companies  in  Spain  ran 
sufficiently differentiated business  for  there  to  be  a  separate  treatment  with 
no  need  for  consolidation.  Since  then,  however,  a  new  type  of  Life  insurance 
policy,  with  many  common  features  with  a  medium  term  deposit,  has  been 
developed  by  some  saving  banks,  and  subsequently  by  other  insurers affiliated 
to  commercial  tanks.  A huge  transfer  of  money  has  taken  place  from  ordinary 
term  deposits  to  those  policies,  amounting  to  more  than  one  trillion  of 
pesetas,  or  about  half  of  the  annual  increase  of  the  money  supply.  This 
transfer,  coupled  wi~h the  corresponding  transfer  of  covering  assets,  between 
departments  of  a  saving  bank  (that  share  commercial  and  administrative 
services),  or  between  affiliates  of  a  financial  group,  makes  utopic  the 
separated  supervision  of  the  two  activities.  We  do  not  have  a  Legal  solution 
for  the  problem,  but  it  is  a  serious  one,  that  needs  an  early  solution. - 136  -
Dr.  Angerer 
If  it  is  the  case  that  an  insurance  policy  has  been  transferred  to  a  bank,  I 
do  not  think  that  is  admissible  in  terms  of  Community  Law.  I  have  already 
pointed  out  that  insurance  companies  may  only  conduct  insurance  business, 
banks  may  not  go  in  for  insurance  business  and  if the  products  in  an  insurance 
service,  it  cannot  be  conducted  by  anybody  but  an  insurance  company;  that 
solves  the  problem,  doesn't  it  ? 
Mr.  Fitchew 
It  seems  that  the  problem  is  one  of  transfer  of  funds  that  has  taken  place 
between  the  business  rather  than  a  bank  actually  carrying  out  insurance  or 
vice  versa. 
Mr.  Poveda 
In  Spain  there  are  types  of  Life  insurance  policies  which  are  Limited  within  a 
given  period  of  time  and  the  savings  banks  offer  this  service  to  their 
customer  at  the  same  time,  so  the  customer  can  choose  a  Life-insurance  or  else 
an  investment  which  is  clearly  defined  over  a  period  of  time.  The  transfer 
from  one  to  another  was  very  considerable  Last  year. - 137-
PART  3:  THE  COMMUNITY  DIMENSION 
The  blurring  of  frontiers  between  financial  sectors 
and  the  rise of  conglomerates  on  Community  Level; 
the  significance of  financial  conglomerates  for  the  harmonisation 
of  supervisory  legislation and  policies  in  the  EC; 
conclusions - 138 -- 139-
G.E.  FITCHEW 
Coapleting the Internal Narket  for financial  institutions 
in view  of the blurring frontiers 
between  the financial  services sectors 
As  everyone  at  this  Conference  knows,  we  are  trying  to  create  a  unified 
market  for  trade  in  financial  services on  the basis of the  following  trinity: 
harmonisation  of essential  rules  of  supervision; 
- mutual  recognition of  each  others'  financial  supervisors; 
home  country  control  and  the  "single  licence". 
At  the  risk  of  substantial  oversimplification,  the  Commission's  view  on  what 
needs  to  be  harmonized  in  the  financial  sector  in  this  process  are  the 
following: 
in all  cases  1)  criteria for  the granting of  licenses or authorizations: 
- fitness  and  properness 
- training and/or  experience 
2>  financial  solidity: 
- minimum  own  funds 
- a  solvency  standard  (banks  and  insurance) 
- effective  internal  audit  and  accounting  rules 
matching  rules  for  insurance  claims 
in  some  cases  3)  certains types of measure  for  the  protection of depositors, 
investors  and  policy holders: 
e.g.  - deposit  guarantee  schemes 
- separation of  investors'  funds 
- guarantee  funds  for  insurance 
4)  arrangements  for  cooperation  between  supervisors 
<not  exactly harmonisation  but  a  rule) - 140  -
Everything  else can  be  dealt  with  by  the  host  country. 
\ 
This  approach  is  already  a  difficult  enough  one  because  of  the  problems  of 
agreeing  on  what  are  the  essential  rules  of  supervision  which  need  to  be 
harmonized  and  on  how  they  should  be  harmonized. 
It  is  clear  that  at  least  some  of  these  areas  of  supervision  are  made  more 
complicated  by  the problem  of  conglomerates.  I  should  like to pick  out  a  few 
examples  in order to stimulate. 
WHO  CAN  OWN  WHOM? 
Some  countries or  some  supervisors  in  some  countries  take  the  view  that  banks 
should  not  be  owned  by  industrial  companies  - presumably  on  the  grounds  that 
they  could  be  managed  in  the  interests  of  the  industrial  companies.  Some 
countries,  including  some  Member  States,  take  the  view  that  insurance 
companies  should  not  own  banks  or vice  versa.  Italy - to take  a  specific  case 
takes  the  view  that  an  insurance  company  can  own  a  bank,  but  not  vice versa. 
It  is  clear  that  potentially  this  could  create  problems  within  a  unified 
European  market.  For  example,  if  in  Member  State  A a  bank  can  own  an 
insurance  company  but  in  Member  State 8  cannot,  does  it pose  any  problems  if 
the  insurance  subsidiary  in  A  can  branch  or  sell  onto  country  8?  More 
difficult,  can  the  bank  from  Country  A buy  an  insurance  subsidiary  in  8?  and, 
if  not,  why  not?  Can  a  bank  in  country  8  be  prohibited  from  having  an 
insurance  subsidiary at  home,  own  one  abroad? 
On  the  whole,  the  Community  legislation,  which  we  have  in  place  or  are 
preparing  is  pretty  agnostic  and  provides  that  differences  in  structure  of 
this  kind  and  should  not  be  an  obstacle  to  the  exercise  of  the  rights  of 
establishment  and  freedom  of  services.  It  follows  equally  from  this 
agnosticism that  we  have  not  allowed  these  structural  issues to pose  problems 
so  far  as  mutual  recognition  is  concerned.  The  line  we  have  taken  in  our 
banking  and  insurance  Directives  is  that  any  properly  authorized  bank  or 
insurance  company  can  benefit  from  mutual  recognition  as  a  basis  for  setting 
up  branches  and  supplying  services  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  they  are 
parts  of  larger  conglomerates.  But  this  does  not  answer  the  above  question 
about  whether  crossfrontier  conglomerates  should  always  be  permitted or  whose 
rules  should  apply  in  these  cases. 
.. - 141  -
We  have  not  included  the possibility  of  banks  acting as  agents  for  insurance 
. companies.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  cannot  do  so;  but  merely  that  they 
cannot  do  so  by  virtue  of  a  banking  License  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
recognition.  Non-banks  can,  for  example,  Lend,  but  not  take  deposits. 
Non-banks  can  also engage  in  Leasing,  safe  custody,  ect. 
There  will  no  doubt  be  other  problems  of  the  "who  can  do  what"  variety which 
arise as  our  work  develops.  For  example,  in  the  area  of  investment  services, 
there  is  the  U.K.'s  so-called  "polarization"  rules.  On  the  whole  we  are 
rather  inclined to  duck  this  issue - by  Leaving  pure  investment  advisers out 
of our  Legislative proposals  at  this  stage.  But  we  should  be  interested  to 
hear  your  views  as  to  whether  there  are  either  any  general  principles  or 
criteria which  can  help  in answering  the question  "Who  can  do  what?". 
FINANCIAL  STABILITY 
I  mentioned  financial  stability  as  one  of  the  main  aspects  on  which  we  have 
thought  it  necessary  to  lay  down  common  prudential  rules  as  a  basis  for 
mutual  recognition  and  home  country  control: 
- minimum  own  funds  and  a  solvency  ratio for  banks; 
- a  solvency ratio, matching  requirements  and  some  degree  of  harmonization 
of  technical  reserves  for  insurance  companies; 
- no  doubt  some  capital  adequacy  rules  for  providers  of  other  investment 
services; 
How  far  is  or  should  this  kind  of  rule-making  be  affected  by  the  financial 
conglomerate  phenomenon?  If all  these  rules  are well  conceived  and  properly 
applied,  and  of  course  supervised,  then  why  should  the  possible activities of 
subsidiaries  or  holding  companies  have  a  negative  effect?  If  financial 
institutions  and  their  groups  are  individually  and  in  group  fashion, 
regulated  and  supervised,  then  - it  might  be  argued  - the  activities  of 
parent,  subsidiary  or  affiliate  companies  could  be  considered  irrelevant. 
Irrelevant,  becaus_fl  no  different  from  any  other transaction or  investment  in 
the sense that all .the  usual  rules affecting that  financial  institution  (e.g. 
a  bank  or  insurance  company)  and  its  assets  and  liabilities  (e.g.  rules  on 
large  exposures,  solvency  margins,  technical  reserves,  limits  on 
participations or deductions  from  own  funds,  etc.>  will  have  to be  respected. - 142-
Of  course,  our  Legislation  provides  that  the  shareholders  and  managers  have 
to  be  "fit  and  proper".  Moreover  in  the  new  Second  Banking  Coordination 
Directive  we  have  incLuded  a  requirement  that  the  supervisors  shouLd  take 
corrective action if the  major  shareholders  of a  bank  seem  to be  engaging  in 
policies which  are  inconsistent  with  the  "safe  and  sound"  management  of  the 
bank.  But  otherwise  we  have  not  at  this  stage  thought  it  necessary  to  Lay 
down  rules  regarding acceptable  structures for  financial  conglomerates.  But 
we  should  be  interested to hear  of  any  other views. 
WHO  CAN  DO  WHAT?  (Specialisation) 
A related  but  not  identical  problem  is  who  can  do  what?  Here  there  is  one 
Community  rule  of  some  importance.  Insurance  companies  can  only  do  insurance 
(and  operations "directly arising there  from">;  and  only  insurance  companies 
can  do  insurance.  The  immediate  reason  for  the  adoption  of  this  restriction 
into  Community  Law  is a  historical  one,  in that  all of  the  then  Member  States 
maintained  more  or  less  strict  requirements  of  specialization.  Indeed,  some 
went  further,  in  requiring  the  corporate  separation  of  life  insurance  from 
non-Life  insurance activities and  Community  law  reflected this philosophy,  in 
its requirements  for  companies  formed  after the directive's entry  into force, 
subject  to a  grandfathering  clause.  This  rule  does  not,  however,  prevent  an 
insurance  company  owning  or  being  owned  by  a  bank  or  indeed  a  non-financial 
company.  Should  this  prohibition  on  insurance  companies  stay  in  force?  In 
favour  of  such  a  continouation  is the  idea  that  the  separation of  business  is 
necessary,  because  of  the  high  sensitivity of  the  insurance sector.  However, 
against  is  the  fact  that  some  products  are  90%  savings  versus  only  10% 
insurance. 
In  the  case  of  banking  we  have,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  Second  Banking 
Directive  taken  a  very  Liberal  view  of  what  contitutes banking.  In  particular 
as  most  of  you  will  know  we  have  included  in  the  list  of  core  banking 
activities all forms  of  securities transactions.  Moreover,  we  have  proposed 
that  "home  country"  rules  should  apply  in  this  case,  i.e.  where  a  bank  is 
authorized to  carry out  any  of  the activities  in  the  list  in  its  own  Member 
State,  then  it  must  be  permitted  to  carry  out  the  same  activities  in  any 
other  Member  State;  whatever  restrictions the  host  Member  State  may  impose  on 
its own  banks.  Even  here,  however,  we  felt  we  had  to draw  the  Line  somewh~re. - 143-
And,  in  theory the argument  could  be  perhaps  more  easily made  in  relation to 
insurance  companies  as  there  is  perhaps  less  debate  about  what  the activity 
of  insurance  essentially consists  of,  so  that  it  should  be  less  contentious 
to distinguish  insurance  from  non-insurance actitivites. 
However,  the  weakness  in this argument  arises out  of  the  fact  that  companies 
in groups  are not  in practice  regarded  or  treated by  the  business  community, 
or  indeed  the  public  at  large,  as  being  separate  economic  entities. 
Mr.  Angerer  recognized  this  kind  of  moral  responsibility  yesterday  even  in 
the  special  case  of  insurance  companies'  sector.  A bank's  non-bank  subsidiary 
may  have  to be  rescued  by  its parents  even  if  it is a  non-financial  company; 
a  conflict  will  then arise between  the  banking  rules  referred to above  (which 
at  a  certain point  will  obviously  prevent  further  financial  support)  and  the 
unwritten  rules  of  the  market  which  will  downrate  the  bank  if  one  of  its 
group  companies  is seen  to be  failing.  A vicious  circle then  comes  into play, 
at  any  rate  for  a  bank,  forcing  its cost  of  funds  upwards,  as  these  costs  are 
of  course  very  sensitive to  reputation. 
The  conundrum  arises  from  this  distinction  between  the  legal  theory  of 
separate  existence  which  implies  individual  corporate  responsibility  to 
creditors on  the one  hand,  and  the generally accepted  standards  and  behaviour 
of the market  place  on  the other,  in  which  reputable  groups  are  not  expected 
to allow  their subsidiaries to fail.  In  practice, this  means  that  they  do  not 
in fact,  allow  those  subsidiaries to fail.  Indeed  one  could  go  so  far  as  to 
say  that  there  may  in  some  cases  be  almost  an  unlimited  commitment  of  the 
parent  to  a  subsidiary  company  which  is  closely  identified  with  a  financial 
institution,  a  commitment  <whether  one  calls  it  a  moral  one  or  a  practical 
one)  which  can  only  be  brought  to  an  end  by  disposing  of  control,  in other 
words  selling it.  Such  a  course  is naturally not  an  easy  one  to  take  in  what 
will  be,  by  definition,  the difficult  circumstances  of  a  financial  crisis  in 
that  subsidiary. 
If  one  accepts  this  latter  reasoning  which  highlights  the  group  as  an 
economic  entity  in  preference  to  the  former  which  emphasises  the  legal 
separation of  its parts,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  financial  health  of  the 
whole  group,  or  conglomerate,  in  which  a  regulated  institution  is situated 
must  at  the  very  least  be  of  major  interest  to  both  its  creditors  and  to 
regulators.  But  the  relationship  between  the  supervisors  authorities -
particularly banking  supervisors - and  mixed  financial  conglomerates  clearly 
needs  to be  handled  with  great  care.  It is  bad  enough  that  the  central  bank 
should  be  the  lender  of  last  resort  to banks. - 144-
In  the  case  of  banking  groups  we  have  introduced  rules  on  consolidated 
supervision  and  the  aim  is  that  own  funds  and  the  solvency  ratio  should  be 
applied  on  a  consolidated  basis.  But  if  consolidation  is  appropriate  for 
banking  groups,  why  not  for  insurance  groups  also? 
Mixed  financial  conglomerates,  however,  would  seem  to  require  special 
consideration.  If a  bank  owns  all or part  of  an  insurance  company,  both  must 
separately  meet  their  separate  solvency  requirements.  It  is  clear  that  any 
double  counting  of  capital  would  have  to be  avoided.  But  should  there  be  any 
supervision  of  the  financial  health  of  a  conglomerate  as  a  whole?  The  EC 
banking  supervisors  have  recently  endorsed  the  view  that  consolidated 
supervision  should  apply  to  cover  conglomerates  headed  by  a  non-bank  holding 
company.  Does  this  extension go  for  enough?  As  Professor  Schneider's  paper 
notes  the  management  of  crises  poses  these questions  in  a  particularly acute 
form. 
CONFLICT  OF  INTEREST 
One  of  the  Commission's  working  documents  mailed  previously  to  the 
participants  (Second  Working  Paper,  XV/49/87,  pages  16  and  17)  raises 
questions  pertaining  to  conflicts  of  interest  in  some  detail.  Wherever 
financial  activities  of  various  types  <e.g.  broking  and  dealing  for  the 
institution's  own  account,  Lending  and  issuing  securities,  investing  the 
reserves  of  insurance  companies  and  managing  investment  funds)  are  carried 
out  "under  one  roof",  conflict  situations will  inevitably arise. 
Some  Member  State  have  introduced  fairly  elaborate  rules  to  govern  such 
"conflicts  of  interest",  "chinese  walls"  and  so  on.  Should  there  be  any 
harmonization  of  such  rules  at  Community  level?  We  have  proposed  a  Directive 
on  insider  dealing  which  is  of  some  relevance  here.  On  the other  hand,  we 
have  certainly not  thought  that  conflict  of  interest  rules  are  necessary,  for 
example,  in  the  Second  Banking  Directive.  It  is  fairly  easy  to  invent 
examples  where  at  least  in  theory  problems  could  arise  if  different 
jurisdictions  are applying  different  rules.  But  how  does  one  apply  conflict 
of  interest  rules  to  a  cross-border  conglomerate,  in  particular  if 
transactions  are  done  across  frontiers.  And  who  takes  the  supervisory  load 
<home  or  host  country). - 145  -
PROCEDURAL  ASPECTS 
Finally,  the  cooperation  of  supervisory  authorities,  which  is  obviously 
required,  calls  for  certain  arrangements,  not  only  at  national  but  also 
Community  level.  The  least  one  will  have  to  do  is  to  ensure  that  the 
necessary  flows  of  information  are  not  hampered  by  rules  on  professional 
secrecy,  but  without  neglecting the necessary confidentiality of  supervision. 
But  consideration  of  these  matters  could  potentially  go  much  further.  For 
instance,  if  one  is  planning  for  a  r5le  of  "lead  supervisor"  to  be  given  to 
one  of  the  authorities  concerned  within  a  Member  State,  one  might  raise 
similar  questions  with  regard  to  supervisors  from  different  countries  and 
with  a  leading  role  for  the  home  country authorities of  a  conglomerate,  under 
the  proviso,  of  course,  that  such  home  country  can  be  identified  for  an 
entire group. - 146-
THE  DISCUSSIONS  AND  THE  PANEL  DURING  THIS  PART  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 
WERE  CHAIRED  BY  MR.  McGOWAN,  CENTRAL  BANK  OF  IRELAND 
Discussion after Mr.  Fitchev's speech 
Mr.  Benelbas 
Mr.  Fitchew  has  talked  of  the  notion  of  what  is  fit  and  proper  to  the 
profession and  that  seems  to be  an  appropriate  approach.  To  try  to  put  this 
into  a  tangible  form,  one  would  have  to  look  at  a  number  of  different 
possibilities.  For  example,  suppose  one  has  not  actually  commited  a  crime 
which  would  be  thought  of  as  serious  in  some  other  field.  That  being  the case, 
if one  looks  beyond  that  question  of  the  basic  definition,  from  which  it  is 
fairly  easy  to  establish  a  rather  clear  general  area,  one  can  always  assume 
that  there are going  to be  major  conflicts between  the national  controlling or 
superv1sory  authorities  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  hand  any 
discretionary  powers.  Suppose  you  required  previous  experience  in  the 
financial  sector,  you  might  be  conservative  and  consider  that  prior experience 
is necessary  if people  are to do  their business  properly.  However,  if so,  we 
would  prevent  people  who  come  from  outside  stepping  into the  financial  sector 
and  taking  initiatives~ There  would  in fact  be  an  obstacle set up  to the entry 
of  outsiders  and  the  .financial  sector  would  be  a  closed  circle,  a  club.  I 
realise that  a  country  may  have  discretionary powers  when  it comes  to criminal 
proceedings  or  a  criminal  definition  of  a  given  activity.  If  we  move  beyond 
such  criteria  I  think  we  can  say  that  there  are  tremendous  concerns  and 
worries,  because  different  countries  see  things differently. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
It is  actually  extremely  difficult  to  lay  down  detailed  criteria  for  fitness 
and  properness.  We  attempted  to  do  so  most  recently  in  drafting  the  Second 
Banking  Coordination -Directive  and  we  ran  into  exactly  the  problem  that  you 
have  described,  once  we  had  written  down  the  proposition that  no  one  who  had 
been  convicted  of a  criminal  offence  could  be  regarded  as  fit  and  proper.  We 
found  it really  impossible  to be  more  precise  about  any  other  criteria  and  in - 147-
the end  the proposition,  that  no  one  who  had  been  guilty of  a  criminal  offence 
should  be  regarded  as  fit  and  proper,  seemed  so  widely  accepted  that  we 
decided  that  it was  not  worth  actually saying  that  in  the  legislation itself, 
since everybody  clearly follows  that  approach.  I  think that  in the  end  we  are 
left  with  having  to  rely  to  a  considerable  extent  on  the  discretion  and 
judgment  of the supervisors  in the different  Member  States themselves.  We  have 
included  in  some  of  our  Directives  requirements  for  appropriate  training  and 
experience  for  management.  Laying  down  requirements  of  appropriate  training 
and  experience  for  management  does  not  necessarily seem  to  me  to preclude  new 
capital  being  brought  in  from  outside  interests,  so  in  that  sense  it should 
not  result  in  a  closed  shop. 
Mr.  Clarotti 
It  is  true  to  say  that  in  1977  with  the  First  Coordination  Directive  we  did 
try to  bring  in  a  number  of  concepts  relating  to  the  integrity  of  the  person 
and  his  professional  experience.  When  we  worked  on  the  Second  Coordination 
Directive,  more  recently,  all  the  proposals  which  we  made  with  a  view  to 
drawing  up  some  very  objective criteria,  all  these  attempts  have  failed.  Some 
criteria fitted the situation  in  some  countries,  other did  not  and  the  minimum 
demoninator  was  fit  and  proper,  but  it  was  very  difficult  to  say  more  than 
that.  The  rest  has  to be  left  to  the  discretionary  power  of  the  supervisory 
authority.  At  one  point  we  thought  we  had  reached  an  agreement  more  or  less 
when  we  talked  about  some  form  of  failure  in  the  form  of  a  bankrupty.  Then 
people  said you  really cannot  demand  that  particular criterion for  ever,  so  we 
stated  looking  at  time  limits and  so  on,  in other  words  it was  impossible  to 
reach  an  agreement.  We  decided  that  that  point  would  be  Left  to  the 
discretionary powers  of  the  national authorities.  It  is a  pity,  but  situations 
do  diverge  considerably  in  some  countries,  in  Italy  for  example  in  the 
implementation  of  the  First  Coordination  Directive,  a  number  of  very  precise 
criteria  were  added  in  order  to  define  the  honourable  reputation  of  people 
involved  in  banking.  This  notion  of  fit  and  proper  has  been  inserted  into 
their  law,  but  as  it is still a  discretionary matter,  it was  not  possible to 
go  further. - 148-
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
In  our  system  the notion of fit  and  proper,  which  I  only  know  from  the  Danish 
description,  I  do  not  know  whether  they  are  correct  but  that  is a  thing  which 
you  cannot  simply  transpose  into  our  law  because  the  penal  code  has  quite 
another starting point.  It says  once  you  have  been  punished  and  are  released 
then  you  are  a  free  man  and  you  can  be  integrated  into  the  society  and  until 
you  have  a  conviction  you  are  free  to  do  whatever  you  want.  There  you  have 
this conflict  again  and  it is thought  to  be  a  fundamental  principle.  We  cannot 
be  the only  country  in  Europe  that  has  such  a  principle. 
Dr.  Knetschke 
How  is  the  Commission  to proceed  in an  agnostic  sort  of  style.  I  think  we  have 
to  be  pragmatic  and  put  out  pragmatic  feelers.  Looking  at  yesterday's 
discussion,  I  would  say  that  we  have  more  or  less  three  aproaches  to a  whole 
set  of  problems,  but  the  common  denominator  is certainly the  protection of  the 
consumer.  But  I  do  not  think  it  is  quite  enough  when  you  start talking about 
the  supervisory  authorities.  Insurance  is probably  the  branch  where  consumer 
protection is still important,  because  that  is a  very  specific  aspect  and  then 
there are  credit  matters,  credit  policy being  masterminded  by  the  central  bank 
and  then  of  course  another  approach  would  be  the  stock  exchange  approach.  It 
seems  to  me  that  there  are  three  approaches  and  the  idea  is  to  put  all  this 
under  one  hat,  if  we  want  to  harmonise.  We  are  certainly going  to  have  to do  a 
lot  of  intellectual  spadework. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
When  I  ·referred  to  the  Commission  being  agnostic,  I  had  in  mind  solely  the 
question of  structure as  to  who  can  own  whom.  I  certainly would  not  want  it to 
be  thought  that  we  were  agnostic  about  the  need  for  consumer  or  investor  or 
policy holder  protection. - 149-
Gunther  Broker 
Head of Financial Markets Division 
OECD,  Paris 
***** 
SOME  REGULATORY  ISSUES  PERTAINING  TO  FINANCIAL  CONGLOMERATES*) 
(Conclusions  from Discussions  on Ownership  Linkages 
in Financial Services held at 
the OECD  Committee  on Financial Markets  in 1987) 
1.  Introduction 
-Ladies  and Gentlemen,  first of all I  wish to thank Mr  Fitchew  for 
inviting the  OECD  Financial Markets Division to attend and  speak at the 
present most  interesting Conference on Financial Conglomerates.  I  welcome 
such  an intensified contact between the Secretariats of the two Organisations 
as  I  believe that this will be beneficial to the work  being carried out both 
in Brussels  and in Paris on subjects of  common  interest  such as  financial 
services. 
A~though  in contrast with most  other participants in the 
conference -- I  am neither  a  regulator nor  a  supervisor,  I  hope  to be  able to 
make  a  useful contribution by  reporting on  work  on the question of ownership 
linkages in financial·services that was  recently  (in  1987)  carried out  by the 
OECD  Committee  on Financial Markets.  The  subject of ownership linkages in 
financial services,  which includes the subject of financial  conglomerates,  was 
put  on the agenda of the OECD  Committee  on Financial Markets  because of the 
special attention that this question has  received in quite  a  number  of 
countries,  not  only within the  EC  but also in countries  such as  Canada, 
Finland,  Norway,  Sweden,  and last but  not  least,  the United States.  The 
question of ownership linkages in financial  services has  become  of topical 
interest in so many  countries for the  same  reason that has  been brought  out  so 
well in both Commission papers  serving as  a  basis for the discussion at the 
present Conference:  namely,  the general trend towards  the blurring of 
demarcation lines between previously more  specialised and separated sectors of 
the broad and complex markets  for  financial services.  This trend has often 
been referred to in terms of a  general diversification process in financial 
services. 
*)  As  an appendix to Mr.  Broker's speech  an  OECD  Staff Paper on  "Conflicts 
of Interest in Banking an Finance and their Control and  Management"  is 
presented in Annex  3. - 150 -
2.  Some  conceptual and definitional considerations 
The  OECD  Committee  on Financial Markets  considered four types of 
ownership linkages in financial  services which,  in practice,  may  be  combined 
in various ways,  inter alia,  via a  holding company  structure: 
a)  Ownership  linkages between financial  institutions of the  same 
category,  e.g.  interbank participations,  mergers,  acquisitions,  etc; 
b)  Ownership  linkages between different categories of financial 
institutions,  e.g.  between banks  and insurance  companies,  banks  or 
insurance  companies  and securities firms,  etc; 
c)  Financial institutions holding participations in non-financial 
enterprises; 
d)  Non-financial enterprises holding participations in banks or other 
financial institutions. 
In discussing regulatory issues pertaining to financial  conglomerates, 
any of these types of ownership  linkages in financial  services may  receive 
attention depending on the circumstances prevailing in a  given country.  One 
basic question for  financial policy in this regard is whether and to what 
extent policymakers  should support the general trend towards diversification 
in financial service activities by allowing financial or non-financial 
enterprises to move  into previously prohibited financial  service activities 
directly or via ownership  linkages  (participations,  mergers,  partially- or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries) .  The  formulation of the question suggests that 
policy issues pertaining to financial  conglomerates  should be  discussed 
irrespective of the corporate structure within which  financial  conglomerate 
activities are being conducted.  In other words,  from  a  regulatory and 
supervisory point of view,  a  universal bank operating in a  wide  range  of 
financial  services through different departments  of the  same  institution 
should be  considered as  a  financial  conglomerate  in the  same  way  as  a  holding 
company that owns  a  n~er of legally-separated entities operating in the  same 
wide  range of financial  se~vices. 
3.  Factors affecting the  scope  for the  formation of financial 
congolmerates  and their corporate structure 
The  scope  for the  formation of financial  conglomerates  and their 
corporate structures is essentially determined by the  following  factors: 
a)  The  large number  of activities that constitute the financial  service 
sector as  a  whole; 
b)  Legal  frameworks  applying to financial  service activities: 
The  degree of specialisation within the financial  service sector 
that is legally  ~posed by different legal  frameworks  applying to 
different categories of providers of financial  services; 
The  scope  for  "circumventing"  any  such legal barriers between 
different sectors via ownership  linkages; 
Recent  reform measures  designed to support the general trend 
towards diversification of financial  service activities. - 151  -
As  legal  frameworks  applying to financial institutions are of key 
importance as  regards the  scope  for the formation of financial  conglomerates 
and the corporate structure they may  take,  it follows that because of 
considerable country differences in such legal  frameworks,  the problems  raised 
by financial  conglomerates differ greatly from  country to country,  although 
the basic considerations and  concerns guiding financial policy may  and are 
~ikely to be the  same.  To  give  two  extreme theoretical illustrations:  in a 
country with a  legal  framework  that  imposes  a  relatively high degree of 
specialisation on different types of financial institutions,  the regulator may 
be  faced with the problem where  and to what  extent  he  should deregulate,  i.e. 
har.monize  the different legal  frameworks  or,  alternatively,  allow different 
categories of financial institutions to move  into each other's territories via 
ownership linkages,  i.e. via acquiring,  or setting up,  partially- or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
By  contrast,  in a  country with  a  widely tailored legal  framework  which 
allows  banks to operate in a  relatively wide  range of financial  service 
activities without  having to set  up legally separated entities specialised in 
one or the other activity,  the regulator may  increasingly be  faced with the 
question whether and to what  extent different types of financial  services do 
not  require different sets of prudential regulations and different supervisory 
practices.  To  give  a  few  more practical examples of current  issues for 
financial policy raised by financial  conglomerates:  In the light of the  1987 
stock exchange  crash experience,  the question may  arise in countries with 
universal banks  whether and to what  extent the securities-related activities 
of these banks  should not  be  made  subject to more  specific prudential 
regulation and special supervisory arrangements.  Another  example:  In  some 
countries in which there is a  trend towards  an increasing interpenetration of 
banking and insurance,  regulators may  be  increasingly faced with the question 
whether  and to what  extent this process  should not  be  controlled by  way  of 
re-regulation.  Final example:  Canada is a  country in which the legal 
frameworks  applying to different types of financial institutions have  become 
subject to fundamental  review and  refor.m.  Under the  new  financial  policy that 
has  been  formulated in  "New  Direction for the Financial Sector" 
(December  1986)  the traditional "four pillar" system -- banking,  trust and 
loan companies,  insurance  and securities firms  -- has  been deregulated in the 
sense that institutions from each of these  four  sectors are  now  allowed to 
enter the other three sectors via ownership linkages or to  some  extent also 
via broader in-house powers.  Thus,  banks -- as  well  as  federal trust and  loan 
companies  and  federal  insurance  companies -- are  now  allowed to conduct 
directly all government  securities activities including underwriting,  all 
money market activities including commercial  paper,  all activities in their 
own  debt  instruments,  secondary market operations in corporate bonds,  as well 
as  a  certain portfolio management,  mutual  fund  and other securities trading 
activities.  Other securities-related activities,  such as  new  issuing activity 
in corporate equities and bonds  and secondary market  activities in equities, 
and certain portfolio management  functions  need to be  conducted via  a  separate 
subsidiary. 
4.  Some  controversial conglomerate situations 
Although it is difficult without  further  study to provide  a  full 
picture of government  attitudes towards  financial  conglomerates it can be  said 
that  some  conglomerate situations,  or combinations of financial  services,  are 
of particular interest or of a  controversial nature in some  OECD  countries. 
The  following conglomerate situations may  be mentioned in this context: - 152 -
a)  Combination of banking and  insurance; 
b)  Combination of banking or insurance  and securities business; 
c)  Non-financial activities of banks  or other financial institutions; 
d)  Non-financial enterprise ownership of banks  or other financial 
institutions. 
While  in a  number  of countries legal  frameworks  require  a  strict 
separation of  insu~ance and banking  (Denmark  and the Netherlands,  for  example) 
there are other countries in which ownership  linkages between these  two 
sectors and the sale of insurance products via the banking network are 
tolerated or -- as  far as the latter is concerned -- actively encouraged 
(Australia,  France,  Germany,  the United  Kingdom may  be mentioned in this 
context) . 
As  far as the separation of banking and securities business -- or  some 
aspects of the latter -- is concerned,  the situation is in a  state of flux. 
In Japan the securities  "powers"  of commercial  banks  have  gradually been 
widened,  notably as far as  foreign branches  and subsidiaries of Japanese 
commercial  banks  are concerned.  The  same  applies to commercial  banks  in the 
United States where  the Glass-Steagall Act  is under  intense discussion and 
attack.  Canada  has  already allowed commercial  banks to move  fully into the 
securities business via increased in-house  powers  and  subsidiaries as  has 
already been mentioned.  In addition,  there is now  a  more  general trend 
towards  breaking the monopoly position of stock exchange  brokers by allowing 
banks  and other financial institutions to take participations in such broker 
firms  or set up  new  stock exchange member  firms  (France,  Italy,  Spain and the 
United Kingdom may  be mentioned in this context  in addition to the  Canadian 
case  just mentioned) . 
As  regards non-financial activities of banks  and other financial 
institutions there is a  striking split of views  between  OECD  countries.  While 
a  number of countries adhere to the principle of separation of  "banking and 
commerce/industry"  (Belgium,  Sweden,  the United States),  other countries 
pursue  a  relatively liberal policy in this field  (Austria,  Germany, 
Luxembourg,  Spain,  Switzerland,  Turkey and the United Kingdom),  although it 
needs to be mentioned that several of these latter countries  impose  limits on 
participations in industry and  commerce  (or  any other participations)  via 
specific capital ratio requirements. 
Relatively little is known  about  government  attitudes towards the 
question of bank  ownership,  in particular as  regards participations in banks 
held by non-financial enterprises.  It seems that only countries  such as 
Australia,  Canada,  the Netherlands  and Norway  have  formulated  a  specific 
policy in this field although in a  number  of other countries changes in bank 
ownership are closely controlled on  an  ad  hoc basis through corresponding 
reporting requirements  (Belgium,  France,  Italy and  Luxembourg  may  be mentioned 
in this context) .  I-n  fact,  there  seems  to be  a  more  general trend towards 
increased sensitivity on the part of policymakers  as  regards the issue of bank 
ownership. - 153  -
5.  Basic policy concerns  - I  am  now  turning to the more  fundamental  question of the reasons  for 
which  policymakers or regulators are,  or should be,  concerned about  the trend 
towards  diversification in financial services,  the blurring of demarcation 
lines within the financial  services sector and the related trends towards the 
formation of financial  conglomerates.  In this regard,  the  following three 
broad objectives of financial policy are relevant: 
a)  Ensuring efficiency in the financial  services markets  through an 
adequate  level of competition  (efficiency meant  in the broad sense 
of adequate  supply of financial services); 
' 
b)  Ensuring the stability,  safety and  soundness of the financial  system 
as  a  whole  (protection against  system failure); 
c)  Ensuring adequate protection of the demanders  of financial services 
against  fraud  and malpractices  and  losses that may arise from 
insolvencies of individual providers of financial  services; 
Whether,  to what  extent,  and in what  sense there is a  need for 
regulation and  supervision of ownership linkages in financial  services and of 
financial  conglomerates  ought to be  judged against these broad financial 
policy objectives.  Does  a  given financial  conglomerate,  or combination of 
financial  services activities,  increase the efficiency of the  system in that 
it widens  the  range  and  improves  the quality of services offered?  Is there  a 
danger that the conglomerate,  or the combination of financial  service 
activities in question,  reduces the  scope  for  competition in the  financial 
services markets  and increases the concentration of financial  power  so that 
ultimately the efficiency of the system may  deteriorate?  Does  the  formation 
of  a  particular conglomerate,  or  a  particular combination of financial  service 
activities,  tend to increase the overall risk exposure in the  system? 
Finally,  does  the formation of conglomerates,  or  a  particular combination of 
financial  ser~ice activities,  increase the danger of malpractices through 
abuse  of conflicts of interest situations and self-dealing,  i.e.  intra-concern 
operations which are potentially harmful to the extra-concern client?  These 
seem to be major questions that need to be  considered in an effort towards 
designing policies towards  financial  conglomerates. 
Guided by the three basic concerns,  or objectives of financial policy 
just mentioned,  regulators  have to deal essentially with the  following more 
specific issues: 
a)  Conflicts of interest; 
b)  Self-dealing  (i.e.  intra-concern operations); 
c)  Insulation of risks  withi~ a  conglomerate or concern; 
d)  Concentration of power,  dominant  market  positions. 
Canada,  France  and the United Kingdom are  examples  of countries in 
which questions relating to conflicts of interest and  self-dealing receive 
particular attention as regulatory systems are being reformed in the direction 
of a  further blurring of demarcation lines between previously separate 
financial  service sectors.  Further detail on the issue of conflicts of 
interest is given in the Annex  which is a  reprint of  a  Special Feature 
published in nFinancial Market  Trendsn  No  38  (OECD,  Paris,  1987) . - 154-
Discussion after Nr.  Broker's speech 
Prof.  Angerer 
There  is  one  rather  important  question  of  structure  which  has  turned  up  very 
clearly.  Mr.  Broker  asked  what  conditions should  apply  to participations.  It 
seems  to  me  that  we  are not  taking sufficient  account  here  of  the  fact  that  we 
have  now  learned  that  there  are  very  different  forms  in  which  groups  and 
conglomerates  are  put  together.  It is  not  a  question of  who  can  be  authorised, 
• we  know  when  we  look  at  the  legal  situation  that  these  things  exist  in 
different  forms.  First  of  all there  is the  question of  simple  participation, 
even  if  it  is  majority  participation,  which  is  not  used  in  order  to  exert 
direct  influence on  business  policy.  Secondly  you  have  the  situation where  you 
get  the  decentralised  grouping  where  there  is  some  influence  exerted  perhaps 
on  staffing  policy  and  financial  policy,  but  otherwise  the  individual 
companies  in  the  conglomerate  are  given  a  pretty  large  measure  of  freedom  in 
pursuing their business  policy.  For  example,  the  BAT  conglomerate  allows  its 
subsidiary  Eagle  Star a  pretty  wide  ranging  room  for  manoeuvre  in determining 
its  policy.  Thirdly  the  very  highly  concentrated  conglomerates  where  the 
subsidiaries are  really only  conducted  as  a  local  establishment,  but  they  are 
kept  on  pretty tight  rein  neverthless.  It occurs  to  me  that  the  fact  that  you 
have  these different  forms  in  which  conglomerates  are  put  together,  means  that 
these will  have  to be  dealt  with  differently  in  our  various  legal  systems.  In 
the  case  of  co-determination  the  conglomerate  is  considered  as  one  unit  and 
when  accounts  are  being  put  together  in  part  the  conglomerate  is  regarded  as 
one  unit.  In  supervisory  law  in part  the  decentralised conglomerate  is of  the 
essence.  In  individual  countries,  for  example  in  the  Federal  Repulic  of 
Germany,  there  are  differences  in  the  case  of  insurance  law.  This  kind  of 
centralised position  is not  allowed,  but  the  opposite  is  the  case  in  banking, 
in fact  the  question has  not  even  really been  discussed.  Therefore,  I  would 
suggest  that  an  undifferentiated view  of  the question of  whether  participation 
is possible or not,  it is  really going  to depend,  to a  very  large extent,  on 
the  level  of  centralised conglomerates,  or decentralised conglomerates  and  one 
can  draw  further distinctions  as  well. - 155  -
Mr.  Broker 
These  distinctions  within  the  different  types  of  concern  in  the  formation  of 
conglomerates  is  also  important  for  the  question  of  the  contagion  effect 
whether  the  concern  of  the  holding  company  feels  responsible  to  bail  out  one 
of  its subsidiaries.  One  can  easily see  different  examples  where  in  some  cases 
a  big  bank  just  coldly  drops  a  subsidiary  that  does  not  make  any  profit, 
while,  in others,  they  say  "we  must  come  to  the  rescue"  and  they  help out.  It 
is  not  a  one  sided  affair,  one  can  see  all  forms,  both  highly  centralised 
formations  and  highly decentralised formations  where  one  piece after the other 
may  be  sold off. 
Mr.  Jonkhart 
Question  to  Prof.  Schneider.  I  fully agree  with  the  analytical distinctions, 
but  maybe  there  is a  practical  problem  involved.  Suppose  that  for  supervisory 
purposes  we  make  a  distinction  between  the  different  types  of  participation 
and  the  different  types  of  conglomerates.  Suppose  that  among  those  different 
types  of  participations there  are  certain  types  that  the  supervisor  would  not 
like to see,  would  like  to  forbid  them.  Once  you  have  given  permission  for  a 
type  of  participation  that  you  can  go  along  with,  how  do  you  prevent  the 
company  or  the  conglomerate  from  evolving  in  such  a  way  that  it makes  abuse  of 
your  permission  and  shifts  towards  an  undesirable  form  of  participation ?  You 
are  just  taking  three  different  types,  but  you  could  also  make  ten different 
types,  it is a  matter  of  refinement  and  where  do  you  draw  the  line  between  one 
type  and  the  other type. 
Mr.  Fitchew 
In  the  particular  Belgian  case  where  a  closely  controlled  participation  by  a 
bank  in a  non-banking  institution is not  permitted,  is the distinction between 
a  closely  controlled  conglomerate  and  a  losely  controlled  conglomerate  one 
which  is a  matter  of  law  or  is it a  matter  of fact.  If it is a  matter  of  fact, 
what  are  the criteria for  determining that  ? - 156  -
Prof.  Schneider 
First  of  all  we  are  talking  here  of  questions  of  fact.  The  fact  whether  a 
conglomerate  is organised  in a  centralised or  a  decentralised  fashion.  Since 
there are  certain  legal  consequences,  attempts  have  been  made  to  try to draw 
these  distinctions  between  what  is  centralised  and  what  is  decrentralised, 
because  of  the  legal  consequences.  There  are  certain  legal  markers  which  have 
been  laid down  in order to draw  this distinction.  Secondly,  if we  are  to stick 
to the  mosaique-type  theory,  in  other  words  we  only  have  supervision  of  one 
individual  undertaking  in  the  conglomerate  and  not  of  the  whole  conglomerate, 
you  do  not  have  a  conglomerate-wide  supervision,  you  can  only  defend  that 
theory  if you  do  not  believe that the  concentrated conglomerate  is acceptable. 
Mr.  Jonkhart's question  is perfectly justified.  How  do  you  provide  guarantees 
for  the  decentralised conglomerate.  If you  look  at,  for  example  Danish  law, 
very  interesting provisions exist  there;  if I  understood  correctly there is a 
prohibition  against  there  being  a  personal  identity  in  the  members  of  the 
particular bodies  in  question,  in  case  of  the  parent  company  and  in  the  case 
of  the  subsidiary.  I  know  that  there are  some  countries where  the  identity of 
members  is  prohibited,  so  that  the  subsidiary  can  make  up  its own  mind.  Our 
British  colleague pointed out  to  me  that  the  supervisory authorities feel  that 
personal  responsibility of  the  members  of  the  board  of  the  subsidiary could  be 
reinforced,  their  own  responsibility,  their  independance  vis-a-vis  factual 
influences.  It  is not  so  much  the question  of  the  legal  implications,  it is 
the  de  facto  influence  exerted  by  the  parent  company.  If  you  compare  the 
different  legal  systems  you  realise  that  each  legal  system  has  different 
rules,  or  in part they  have  rules on  guaranteeing  independence,  but  they  are 
put  together  in very  different  ways  and  they  are also  listed separately. 
Prof.  Biron 
I  tried to draw  a  distinction between  companies  or  integrated groups  and  those 
which  are  not  intregrated.  One  has  to  adopt  a  pragmatic  approach  basically, 
because  groups  can  be  organised  in  all  sorts  of  different  ways  and  our 
experience has  always  been  that  the  group  does  not  always  tally with  the  image 
which  they  themselves  project.  They  might  be  very  closely integrated, but  that 
does  not  appear.  This  is  why  the  Belgian  authorities  adopted  an  essentially 
pragmatic  approach,  taking  account  of  any  contingency  which  might  occur.  We 
have  a  protocol  on  the banking  function  and  the banking  autonomy  and  sometimes 
we  have  required the bank,  or  we  have  required the  conglomerate,  to  increase 
the bank's  capital.  We  do  not  have  precise  rules at  all,  we  do  not  say  this 
must  happen  or that. - 157-
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1.  Introduction 
1.  As  financial  conglomerates  emerge,  the  question arises  how  to  con-
trol  them;  previous  speakers  at  this conference  have  made  this suffi-
ciently clear.  From  the  place  in the  program  some  of  you  may  be  expec-
ting  me  to  answer  this question.  To  start with a  dissapointment:  I  will 
not  do  so,  if only  because  I  don't  know  the  answer either.  What  I  will 
do,  however,  is  to  address  some  elements  of  the question of  which  I 
think  that  they may  be  relevant.  I  will  do  so  in the  light  of  the Dutch 
experience with some  legal  instruments  that  came  into  force  in 1979 
and  which  were  particularly designed  to control  the  structure of  the 
financial  services  industry.  To  the best  of  my  knowledge  the Dutch 
legislation is rather  unique  in having  created  such  instruments  exclu-
sively to  control the  financial  industry;  the only country with similar 
specific instruments  I  am  aware  of,  is Norway.  Most  of  the countries 
today  base  their policies  on general  merger  rules  and  general anti-
trust legislation. 
2.  The  general outline  of  my  presentation will  be  the  following.  First 
of all I  will give  you  a  brief  summary  of  the  system  currently into 
force  in the Netherlands,  including  its history and  its reasons  for 
being  in existence.  In  the  second  part  of  my  presentation I  will 
address  the  issue whether  or not it would  be a  good  idea  to introduce 
such  a  system  on a  European level.  Here  a  clear distinction must  be 
made  between  the  instrument  itself and  the  way  it has  been used  in the 
Netherlands  during  the past  decade.  This  is an  important distinction, 
because  my  conclusion will  be  that  the  instrument  itself may  be useful 
on a  European level,  but  the way  it has  been used  sofar in the 
Netherlands  should not  be  copied  along  with it, not  because it was  a 
poor  use  of  the  instrument,  but  simply  because  of  a  difference  in basic 
conditions  in the  environment. 
2.  The Dutch  experience 
3.  Let  me  start by  describing  the  current  legal situation in the 
Netherlands.  From  thereon I  will picture the actual  policy presently 
pursued  and  I  will  try to  provide  you  with  some  insights  in the  reasons 
behind this policy.  I  will conclude  this  part  of  my  speech with some 
remarks  on  the future  of  the  system. 
4.  Under  the  current Act  on  the  supervision of  the credit  system it is 
required  to obtain a  so-called  'declaration of  no-objection'  both in 
case a  bank wishes  to obtain an  interest in excess  of  five  percent  in 
any  other corporation (bank  or  non-bank,  financial  or non-financial) 
and  in case  somebody  wants  to  be  able  to  exercise a  voting  power  in 
excess  of  five  percent  in a  bank.  Note  the difference  between  'owner-
ship',  which is relevant  in case  the  bank  is  the controlling  party and 
'voting  power'  in case  the  bank  is the party  to  be  controlled.  I  will 
come  back  to this difference  later on,  when  the  lessons  that  can  be 
learned are to  be _discussed.  A rather similar  provision is embodied  in 
the Act  on  the supervision of  insurance  companies.  The  major  difference 
is that  in the latter case  the  provision sees  only  to  the situation 
where  an  insurance  company  wants  to obtain an interest in a  bank.  As 
such it is  complementary  to  the  provision in the  banking  legislation. - 159 -
5.  The  declaration of  no-objection as  meant  by  the Act  on  the supervi-
sion of  the  credit  system is given  by  (or,  on  behalf  of) the Minister 
of  Finance after having  consulted  the Nederlandsche Barik  in its role  as 
the  supervisor  on  the  credit  system.  However,  the Minister  can only 
grant  a  permission in the  case  of  a  positive advice  of  the Central 
Bank;  hence  both  the Minister  and  the Central Bank  have  a  vetoing 
power.  Likewise  the declaration of  no-objection on  the  basis of  the 
insurance legislation is given  by  the Minister  of  Finance after consul-
tation of  the Verzekeringskamer  and  here again he  needs  a  positive 
advice. 
6.  Both acts give explicit  considerations  on  which  applications  for  a 
declaration of  no-objection are  to  be  judged.  In  the case  of  the  ban-
king  legislation these grounds  are a)  sound  banking  practice and  b) 
whether  or  not  the  proposed  action would  or  could  lead  to an undesira-
ble  development  of  the  credit  system.  The  Central Bank  judges  the 
application on  both grounds,  the Minister  of  Finance  only on the 
latter.  Similarly applications  in the  context  of  the  insurance  legisla-
tion are  judged  on  the  basis of  'sound  insurance practice'  and  'unde-
sirable development  in the  insurance  industry'. 
7.  Sofar  for  the  facts.  At  least as  interesting,  of  course,  is the 
policy  that  governs  the  use  of  these  legal  instruments.  The  central 
idea  is  to avoid  an undesirable concentration  of  financial  power  and  to 
ensure  sound  banking  practice.  In  the past  decade  the political empha-
sis has  been  on  the first criterion.  During  this  period  the  three  main 
policy rules  have  been as  follows: 
1.  a  strict separation  between  banking  and  insurance, 
2.  domestic  take-overs  of  any  importance  by  any  of  the  top-5  banks  were 
not  favoured, 
3.  no  banque-d'affaires. 
Originally the  separation between  banking  and  insurance  was  not  limited 
to mutual  ownership  but  it included  limitations  in the  commercial  co-
operation as well;  the  latter limitations  however  where  lifted at  the 
end  of  1986.  With  respect  to  banques  d'affaires  one  should  thirik  of 
banks  having  permanent  and  substantial interests in,  for  example, 
industrial  companies,  or,  more  general,  in any  non-related  area.  Normal 
investment  bank  activities are,  of  course,  permitted  (of  course  within 
the  boundaries  of  prudential  supervision). 
8.  As  mentioned  before,  the  major  force  behind  the  separation policy 
tradionally  has  been the fear  for  a  concentration of  financial  power.  A 
number  of  Dutch  banks  rank  among  the  largest  banks  in the world,  as  do 
a  number  of Dutch  insurance  companies.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
domestic  (guilder)  market  is relatively small.  A further concentration 
between  those  largest  companies  could result  into  too dominant  a  party 
in the  home  market.  This  applies,  of  course,  only  to  the  largest 
companies.  However,  if large  banks  and  large  insurance  companies  have 
to  be  kept  separate,  considerations  of  avoidance  of  a  distortion of 
competition force  towards  a  policy where all banks  and  insurance  com-
panies are  to  be  kept  separate. 
9.  The  roots  of  the  policy  just  described are  in the  seventies,  which 
came  after a  periode  that  had  shown  a  series  of  substantial mergers  in 
the  financial  industry.  Ever  since,  conditions  have  changed.  First  of 
all a  large  number  of  foreign  banks  and  foreign  insurance  companies 
have  entered  the Dutch  market.  In  such an  environment  with enhanced 
competition,  the  fear  for  monopsonistic  behavior  diminishes.  Secondly, - 160-
in the meantime  also  the  balance  in relative  strength between banks  and 
insurance  companies  had  been  improved.  Moreover,  the  role  of  other 
institutions  such  as  pension  funds  had  increased  substantially  thus 
also adding  to an  increased competition.  Thirdly,  the  awareness  of  the 
fact  that  the  top  financial  groups  from  the Netherlands  can only main-
tain there international position (and  hence  their  meaning  for  our  own 
domestic  economy)  if they  have  sufficient growth opportunities  increa-
sed.  Fourthly,  the Dutch  financial  markets  have  increased substantially 
during  the  past  decade,  which  is yet another  reason why  the fear  for 
dominating  financial  power  has  diminished. 
10.  The  developments  just described have  led  to  the  wish at  the side of 
the monetary  authorities  to  liberalize  the  regime.  Accordingly  the dis-
cussions  with  the  parties  involved - i.e.  the  banking  industry and  the 
insurance  industry  - where  opened  in the  Summer  of  1985.  For  this wish 
to  liberalize there  was  yet  another  reason.  It  had  turned  out  that in 
practice a  policy  of  complete  separation leads  to  very detailed  regula-
tion at  the  level  of  the  individual institution.  The  reason  for  this 
is,  that  there are many  forms  in which  a  financial  group can organize 
itself.  In each and  every  case it becomes  necessary  to accompany  the 
declaration of  no-objection with a  set of  permanent  conditions  that aim 
to avoid a  violation of  the  complete  separation rule  by  what  may  be 
called a  'back-door construct'.  To  give  just one  example,  it is per-
fectly feasible  that an international financial  group  based  in,  let us 
say  country X,  wishes  to  obtain the  shares  of  a  Dutch  bank.  Suppose 
that  for  tax  reasons it wishes  to  do  so  through a  holding  company  on 
the  Dutch Antilles  and  a  Dutch  subholding.  In that case it becomes 
necessary  to require all parties  involved  - i.e.  the  parent  group,  the 
holding  company  and  the  subholding- to abstain directly and  indirectly 
from  any  insurance activity in the Netherlands  if one  wishes  to 
maintain a  complete  separation.  The  regulatory  burden then soon  becomes 
increasingly  troublesome. 
11.  The  discussions  started in 1985  led  to  the  conclusion that although 
the  regime  could  be  relaxed  on  a  number  of  issues,  there still was  a 
considerable fear,  both political and  in a  large  part  of  the financial 
industry itself,  that a  complete  opening  up  on  a  rather short  notice 
would  have  a  number  of  undesirable  consequences.  As  a  results only  a 
limited  number  of  steps were  taken and  it was  agreed  upon  that  by  the 
second  half  of  1988  the  discussion would  be  continued.  The  major  steps 
set at  the  time  were 
a  complete  freedom  of all commercial  relations, 
the  freedom  to  obtain a  mutual  shareholding  interest for  investment 
purposes with a  maximum  of  15%  (where  the  voting  power  is  limited to 
5%), 
the  freedom  to  own  or  to establish capital market  institutions (in 
particular:  mortgage  banks),  which  abstain  from  deposit  taking. 
The  general separation between credit institutions and  insurance  com-
panies,  however,  was  maintained. 
12.  Since  the first steps  agreed upon in 1986  developments  have  conti-
nued,  the major  new  element  being  the  1985  White Paper  by  the EC 
Commission.  At  the  time  of  the  discussions all parties concerned were, 
of  course,  familiar with  the existence of  the White  Paper.  Nevertheless 
I  think  that it is fair  to  recognize  that  only  recently most  people 
start to  realize  the  far  reaching  consequences  as well as  the  fact  that 
1992  no  longer  is a  myth.  And  indeed,  those  consequences  are far  rea-
ching.  In the  fast  majority  of European  countries  banks  and  insurance - 161  -
companies  can  be  part  of  the  same  financial  group,  for  instance under  a 
common  holding  company.  A similar  development  is  notable in Canada, 
whereas  also  in the U.S.  the  system  is under  consideration.  To  refuse 
access  to either the  bank  or  the  insurance  company  of  such a  group  to 
the Dutch market  because  of  the  fact  that  they  are in the  same  group 
clearly would  violate the  idea  of  freedom  of  establisment  and  of  rende-
ring  services  in a  truly Internal Market.  Without  any  doubt  this shall 
be  a  serious consideration in the  domestic  discussions  yet  to  come.  By 
the way,  note  the  striking similarity with  the discussion on  the access 
for  banks  from  countries  where  general  banking  is allowed  and  countries 
where  commercial  banking  and  investment  banking  are separated. 
3.  Lessons  that  can  be  learned 
14.  Does  the  foregoing  mean  that  explaining  the Dutch structural policy 
towards  the  financial  sector at an EC  Conference  on financial  conglome-
rates in the nineties  is an excercise  of  mere  historic  and/or  curiosi-
ty value?  Clearly  I  hope it is not,  but  I  believe  that  indeed  something 
can  be  learned.  From  the current situation in Europe it is clear that 
there would  be  no  majority  to establish a  complete separation between 
financial  subsectors  - be  it between  banking  and  insurance or,  for 
instance,  banking  and  investment  - on a  European level.  And  indeed,  I 
do  not  know  any  valid  reason why  one  would  like to do  so.  The  Dutch 
policy clearly emerges  from  a  situation where  there was  a  fear  that 
large financial  groups  would  dominate a  relatively small  home  market. 
Considering  Europe  as  one  market,  there is no  reason at all for  such  a 
fear,  on  the  contrary.  What  are  considered  large institutions in a 
small  home  market  are still relatively small  institutions on an inter-
national  level,  rightly seeking  for  more  co-operation to maintain  there 
international  position.  Last month's  announcement  of  the co-operation 
between  the  Belgian Generale  Bankmaatschappij  and  the Dutch  Amro  Bank 
is  just  one  example.  Opening  up  the  coutry-by-country barriers will on 
the  contrary increase  competition and  provide  opportunities  for  greater 
efficiency  from  which  ultimately we  will all benefit. 
15.  Recall,  however,  that  the  policy instrument  of  a  'declaration of 
no-objection'  was  not  only created  to  counter an undesired  concentra-
tion of  power  in banking  and  insurance:  it was  also created  to give 
room  to  considerations  of  sound  banking  practice and  sound  insurance 
practice.  In other words,  the declaration of  no-objection is also  a 
prudential  instrument,  particularly designed  for  the emergence  of 
financial  conglomerates. 
16.  Considering  the  instrument  as  a  prudential  one,  the question arises 
as  to what  benefits may  be  expected  from  it. In  my  opinion,  based  on 
the Dutch  experience,  the  benefits  may  be  in three different,  albeit 
interlinked areas: 
- ex ante  testing  on sound  banking  (and/or  insurance) practices, 
- ex ante  testing as well as  permanent  testing  afterwards  of  'fit and 
proper  ownership  conduct', 
- information on  ~nd control  of  the  group  as  a  whole. 
Let  me  explain each of  these  items. 
17.  Whenever  a  financial  institution- or,  for  that matter,  a  financial 
group  - is  planning  to participate in any  other  corporation the first 
concern  from  a  prudential  point  of  view  obviously is whether or not 
such a  ~articipation could endanger  the creditors'  interest.  In other. - 162 -
words,  one would  like  to  verify whether  or  not  the  financial  institu-
tion is solvent  enough  to  participate and,  maybe  even  more  important, 
whether  or  not  the organization is sufficiently well equipped.  A system 
of  a  declaration of  no-objection in this  respect  works  as  a  'nihil 
obstat'  and  - if the  proper  sanctions  go  along  with it - can insure 
that  no  irreversable action can  be  taken until  the  supervisor  is satis-
fied. 
18.  Likewise  the  supervisor  has  the  opportunity  to  judge the  'fitness 
and  properness'  of  the  ownership  in advance  in case  anybody  wants  to 
excercise any  substantial voting  power  in a  financial  institution.  Note 
that  the  concern here is not  directly one  of  financial  solvency,  but 
rather  indirectly.  The  direct  concern is one  of  undesirable  influence 
on  the  management  of  the  financial  institution by  other parts of  the 
group,  also in the  best  interest  of  the  creditors.  A construct  of  a 
'declaration of  no-objection'  in advance  is superior  to  a  requirement 
that  the  institution should  provide  the  supervisor with the  names  of 
its shareholders,  because  in many  cases  shares  are to  bearer,  as  a 
result  of  which  shareholders  can remain  anonymous,  even  to  the  company 
itself.  This  expecially may  so  in the  case  of  a  financial  institution 
listed at  the  stock  exchange.  Linking  the declaration of no-objection 
to excercising  voting  power  has  the advantage  that  the shareholder 
himself  has  an interest  in revealing his  indentity and  in observing  the 
conditions  eventually set at the  time  of  the declaration.  Attaching 
conditions  to  the  declaration of  no-objection moreover  turns  out  to  be 
a  very  effective  instrument  to ensure  that  the  behavior of  the 
shareholder  remains  'fit and  proper'  after  the  initial permission.  The 
ultimate sanction may  be  that  the votes  are legally  ignored  in case  the 
conditions are not  met. 
19.  The  conditions  attached  to a  declaration of  no-objection also  pro-
vide  an  opportunity  to  monitor  the  totality of  the  conglomerate  to 
which  the  financial  institution belongs.  For  one  thing it provides  an 
opportunity  to  require financial  information on  a  permanent  basis. 
Clearly,  another possibility would  be  to  control  the financial rela-
tionships  such  as  lending,  borrowing  and  paying  dividends  between the 
institution and  other  parts  of  the  group.  Yet  another  possibility is  to 
require that  actions  by  other parts  of  the group  such  as  take-overs  or 
mergers,  which are  considered potentially influencing  the  soundness  of 
financial  institutions are referred  to  the  supervisor in advance. 
4.  Conclusion 
20.  Financial conglomerates  can  take  many  forms  and  the supervisory 
issues  involved  can  be  very  complex  indeed.  The  foregoing  by  no means 
pretends  to have  solved  these  problems  or  even  to have  addressed  them 
all properly.  For  one  thing  the difficult question of  co-ordination 
between  the different  types  of  supervisors  - banking,  insurance,  secu-
rities - was  not  even mentioned.  The  same  is true  for  the co-ordination 
between  the  supervisors  in different countries.  However,  whatever 
system  eventually will emerge,  it is my  feeling  that making  take-overs 
by  financial  institutions and  excercising  voting  power  in financial 
institutions  subject  to explicit approval  may  turn out  to  be  a  useful 
element  of it. It may  do  so  especially if the  occasion of  the  approval 
gives  the  opportunity  to  specify  conditions  tailored  to  the situation 
at  hand.  The  experience  in  the Netherlands  at  least  makes  it clear that 
the  instrument  is capable  of  supervisory guidance  of  the  formation  of 
financial  conglomerates  in albeit not  a  perfect,  but still a 
sufficiently helpful way. - 163-
Perspective  of  cooperation  among  the 
competent  authorities. 
Christen Boye  Jacobsen,  Deputy  Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry and 
Trade,  Copenhagen,  Denmark. 
Denmark has the strictest statutory restrictions on other business in  the financial 
sector. Most  "other activities" are prohibited, not only  in  the bank or the insu-
rance  company  itself,  but  equally  through  affiliated  daughter  companies. 
It may  thus seem a  paradox to you  that we  were the first EC-country to merge 
the banking and insurance supervisory authorities. In  logic - alas, the worst legi-
slator of all  - we  were  to be the last. But well is  it written that the first shall 
be  the  last  and  the  last  the  first. 
The explanation to our paradox is  that the merger was primarily decided upon  due 
to factors other than the intermingling of banking and insurance in practice. This 
does not mean that this problem is unknown - on  the contrary. But financial cog-
lomerates in  Denmark are outside my  subject. I just mention that in  Denmark the 
insurance  companies  took  the  lead  in  the  BOles. 
The main motive for  the merger was a  general health control leading to a  com-
plete reorganization of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. With budget problems, 
with already the highest taxes in  the world, and with an unstable political situa-
tion  that renders budget cuts  in  the  big areas of social welfare, unemployment 
alowances,  or education a  tabu,  a  strict system  for  what rests  is  a  must.  This 
requires an effecient administration, and in  the wake of this the Ministry of Tra-
de and Industry was totally restructured. It was the biggest reshuffle ever made 
in  the central administration. 19 agencies were merged into 8, e.g. in  maritime - 164 -
shipping  7  into 1.  Among  the merged were  also  the supervisory  authorities for 
banks  and  insurance. 
During the same period there sat under the  chairm~nship of our permanent secre-
tary a  comittee dealing with the new activities of banks and insurance companies. 
The committee was informed of our merger, but had no  right to discuss this albeit 
most  important development because  it  formed  part of a  grand scheme for the 
whole  ministry.  I  will  at this point make on excursion about a  scism that arose 
between us  and those who  represent a  background of theoretical economy. They 
have  grown  in  influence  in  our administration as a  natural consequence  of our 
economic distress.  But  they  tend  to  think  that  the  Banking  and Insurance Acts 
primarily form part of economic and monetary politics and tend to underrate the 
needs for investor protection. Often lhey are hampered by  lack of legal knowledge 
and of experience in  practical administration and tend to look at financial sectors 
isolated from  the rest of business. Nothing is, we think, more detrimental to the 
financial  sectors as  if legislation and administration were to regard them as an 
extention of political and regulatory burocracy. Indeed the coglomenrate question 
illustrates the importance of subjects _like  company and monopolies law and prac-
tical "Fingerspitsgefllhl" as more relevant than economic theory. This showed an-
admittedly  strange  - ancillary  need  for  strengthering  the systems,  including  a 
new appeals board, in  order to keep our system efficient and respectable and thus 
being  able  to  treat the sectors as what  they are and ought to remain, business 
forming  part of private  economic  life  albeit  under  control mainly  for solvency 
reasons. 
This also illuminates that the merger forms part of a more active industrial poli-
cy. 
An  active industrial policy is relatively recent. But in  the BOles we experienced a 
need to infuse new dynamism into the economic life. As  cheaper capital in scale 
is  needed the financial sectors suddenly became more interesting to the political 
thinking  (also as a  tax object) and conversely took greater interest in  investing 
in  shares themselves. Equally important is that the financial world forms part of 
the growing services sector. But the frequent political discussions require a strong - 165  -
"sparring partner" and "knowledge bank" for our minister, and thus the need for a 
stronger  supervisory  authority  manifested  itself  anew. 
A  frequent  argument  an  favour  of the merger was that in  case of a  crash of a 
big company or a  sector the combined personel gives a  bigger "masse de manou-
vre" to direct to the area  in  question. Of course it means that other areas are 
depleated. But the answer to this is  that the old intense control will end anyway 
because we cannot afford it. The supervisors are thus forced to invent new and 
modern controls imbracing  the auditors, actuarians and internat controls of the 
individual  companies. 
Thus,  gone are the days of the cartesian maxime: "Je depense, done je suis haut 
fonctionaire". 
I shall now turn to another problem. What can we learn for general use from the 
Danish  experience. 
First of all I submit that you shall - before setting out - clearly realise what you 
want, do not want, and what cannot be achieved. It was intended that the system 
should  work  more  smooth.  We  hope  it will,  but  there  will  be  then  no  saving  in 
the form of reductions in  personel. Generally speaking we hoped to avoid dilluting 
both the effeciency of the supervisory legislation and the competitive abilities of 
companies. 
But then the real problem arises. To  what extend are insurance and banking alike. 
3 times in  two years there had been debates in  parliament, an argument in  favour 
of merging being that financial sectors, and thus controls, are alike. The govern-
ment repulsed this idea convincingly. In  coping with new activities we must not 
forget,  under  the  impression  of new  producets and  new  magic  words,  that the 
core of banking and the core of insurance are, shall and will for a  foreseeable 
future remain different. The short term nature of much banking business, and in 
consequence a  kind of liquidation accounting in  banking illustrates this when com-
pared with  the excessive long  term natur of life  insurance business. It is  clear 
that in frontier areas can there be a  usefull overlapping such as extending actua-
rian control to  the many  pension schemes offered by  banks and marketed in  an - 166-
often unfair comparison with insurance schemes and mixed schemes. It is possible 
clear that a  so-called "synergy"effect can arise in  areas such as the control of 
the annual accounts out of an intellectually more demanding work. In  this area I 
think that our collegues in  the other countries have a  potentially greater advan-
tage of common control due to less strictness - or greater laxness, according to 
tastes. But theoretically the opposite can happen through the phenomen known  in 
science  as  resonance  or coherence  which  also  applies  to  public  administration. 
This calls for the absence of too much optimism and a  nearly excessive virgilance 
in  the genesis phase of the new authority vis a vis a  well qualified personel with 
a  great mobility. I guess that we are all aware of the scarcity of actuarians a-
vailable at public wages. This required with us reliance repon modern organization 
and management theory in  order to retain an attractive and efficient organization. 
In  the proces of merging I observed the importance of adapting all statutory in-
struments. It was a  huge  work  to  bring  all  the  big  acts  into  the new harmony. 
Indeed it required many  hundred  amendments. I  think we  managed it, but there 
remains one illustrating problem. Before the merger the Insurance Supervision had 
a  director,  a  board  and  an  appeal bard.  The  banking  authority  had  its director 
under  the responsibility, direction of and appeal to the secretary of state. Now 
the Insurance Bussiness Act states: "The Financial Services Authority consists of a 
directorate  and  the  Insurance  Board". There you  see an  imbalance. It  is  illogic, 
and  the further question of a  Banking Board - so far undiscussed - springs to the 
mind, whether politically desired or not. Thus the merger in  itself will foster so-
me  change  in  future,  e.g.  in  group  law. 
This  leads me  to  discussing  whether  the merger should  lead  to  a  kind of cover 
organization for two departments for banks and insurance respectively, or whether 
a  real new integrated structure should be created. For many reasons, I think the 
latter solution should be aimed at as far as possible. Otherwise the cost/benefit 
ratio will deteriorate, and you  will have neither a  common culture for all employ-
ees nor any  "synergy."effect. As mentioned above you will, however, at the same 
time have to respect the differences in  business of banking and insurance. Other-
wise  you  may  hamper  a  development  of  new  products  and  competition. - 167-
On the whole the picture till now  is  a  fairly  rosy one. One problem I can see is 
if insurance company has invested in a  sick bank or vice versa. If there are sepa-
rate authorities, overtures from the banking supervision to the insurance company 
to save the bank through a  bad investment can be countered by  its sister autho-
rity. But under a  merged authority,  what  then  ?  My  fear is  that the long term 
interests (i.e. insurance) can be jeopardized in  order to accomplish the political 
short  term  gain  of  saving  a  bank. 
Another grey area is the confidentiality. Those working with insurance accounting 
shall  keep  their knowledge secret to  outsiders,  and  equally  those  working  with 
banks.  But what to do,  if the persons are  the  same?  This  has not been clearly 
solved, but it is  a  problem under the 1st  banking directive. It will at some later 
stage call for technical amendments. This is  all the more required as a  positive 
cost/benefit requires investment in  the best data equipment and the storing and 
comparing  of  much  information. 
So  far, I have not described any cooperation among authorities except in  its most 
integrated  form. 
What  about old  fashioned  cooperation ?  During my  term as Director General in 
the Insurance Supervision I was bemuzed to find  it quasi non existing in  a  formal 
or systematical sense,  though  the problem of blurred  frontiers  is  25  years old. 
The need continues to exist because two relevant authorities work alongside the 
merged supervision of banks, Stock Exchange, and insurance companies. First the-
re is  the office for protection of consumers and fair trading, also under our own 
minister. Secondly there is the authority supervising the mortgage credit institu-
tions under the minister for housing.  Your  know  that this is relatively the most 
important in  the world, essentially an oligopole of 3 institutes, with a total balan-
ce  of  725  billion  D.kr. 
The  first  formal  cooperation among  all  the authorities in  the  financial market 
took place in  the summer of 1986. It is  likely to grow, but not in a  formal way. - 168-
Advertizing for long term saving notably pensions, has led to a  war between can-
panies, and between banks and insurance companies. It will incease cooperation to 
ensure  fair competition and a  reasonable  level of consumer protection. Market 
developments, individual contracts, coglomerates etc. will in  themselves increase 
the  need  for  consumer  protection. 
Another need for coorperation arises from new activities in mortgage credit. The 
first  banking  directive opens the market, and  forms of "wild west" transactions 
can affect the banking system and the Stock Exchange, supervised by  the Finan-
cial  Services  Supervision  Authority,  and  this  generates  cooperation. 
In  concluding I will just mention that in  order to simplify I "forgot" two impor-
tant areas. First the Stock Exchange that has been semiindependant under Banking 
Supervision for more than 50 years. Secondly monopolies legislation which also is 
under the competence of the supervisory authority. Thirdly  how  the merger af-
fects  the  increasing cooperation relations to  the authorities in  other countries 
which,  in  theory,  it  should  facilitate. - 169-
D;scuss;on  Panel 
Chairman  (Mr.  McGowan) 
There  were  three  things  running  through  this discussion.  One  was  banks;  from 
time  to time  I  was  disappointed  that  I  did  not  see  "credit  institutions" used 
rather  than  banks,  because  I  felt  that  we  were  trying  to  identify  those 
institutions which  guarantee  their  liabilities,  but  on  the other  hand  not  the 
value  of  their assets.  That  is  one  sort  of  area  that  ought  to  be  identified 
and  there  are  special  responsibilities  relating to  it.  As  a  central  banker  I 
got  worried  this morning  when  I  heard  Mr.  Fitchew  talking  about  the extent  to 
which  the central  banks  might  have  to stand  behind  the  whole  financial  sector. 
I  think  that  is  one  area  which  has  been  coming  through  and  there  is a  message 
in  it;  perhaps  it  has  been  developed  well  in  recent  years  and  we  ought  to 
continue  down  that  road.  I  do  not  think  it is as  simple  as  that,  because  the 
ownership  issues  comes  up.  Should  banks  own  various  institutions or  who  should 
own  banks  ?  I  have  a  feeling  that  the  insurance  business  is quite  unique,  it 
is difficult  to  see  whether  there  is  much  scope  for  co-operation  in  the  areas 
between  the  banks  and  the  insurance  sector,  although  perhaps  more  emphasis 
should  have  been  put  on  the  separation of  the  life and  non-life business.  I  do 
not  know  where  the  securities  people  come  into  the  discussion,  should  they 
come  closer to banks,  closer  to  insurance or  are  they  quite  independent  ? 
Mr.  Jolivet 
The  discussion  which  we  have  heard  about  different  experiences,  in particular 
the  OECD,  show  that  if we  start discussing  structural harmonisation,  we  are 
going  to  come  a  cropper  over  some  serious  issues.  The  structures  we  are 
talking about  are very  much  rooted  in our  policital and  legal  backgrounds,  for 
example,  the mechanism  concerning anti-trust  makes  it very difficult.  Another 
example  which  makes  things  more  complicated,  we  have  always  concerned 
ourselves  with  the  notion  that  you  have  shareholding  companies  in 
conglomerates  or  mutual  societies,  but  this  is only  a  very  small  part  of  the 
picture.  The  fact  is  that  we  are operating in  an  open  area,  an  open  financial 
zone,  thus  we  cannot  just  stand  in  isolation from  that  space.  The  fact  is that 
the multinationals  find  that  our  rules  are  pretty  amusing,  the  big  American 
banks  when  they operate  in  Europe,  forge  ahead  with  insurance,  they  are  very - 110-
glad  to do  so,  because  it gives  them  experience  should  the market  ever  be.open 
to  them  back  home.  If  we  were  to  start  harmonising,  I  would  be  rather 
disinclined  to find  this of  much  interest,  speaking at  least  in  a  supervisory 
capacity.  There  are  many  problems  which  are  linked with  the  legal  structure of 
conglomerates  and  I  do  not  think  harmonisation  is  going  to  solve  those 
problems.  A number  of  supervisory  authorities  are  worried  because  there  are 
perfectly  fit  and  proper  persons  about,  who  purchase  insurance  companies. 
Since  the  solvency  level  in  Europe  is  rather  low  and  since  in  some  companies 
there  is  considerable  added  value  in  insurance  companies,  it is very  tempting 
to buy  them  up  so  that  you  can  do  some  asset  stripping  and  then  it goes  on  to 
the market.  That  is a  conglomerate  problem  which  we  are  very  worried  about  as 
supervisory  authorities  and  I  do  not  think  harmonisation  is  going  to  help  us 
there.  I  am  not  saying  that  we  do  not  have  any  difficulty with  structures,  but 
I  think  that  one  must  pinpoint  a  number  of  specific problems. 
In  banking  one  can  say  that  competition  prerequisites  in  different  branches  of 
activity  are  one  and  the  same.  This  is  something  which  I  think  was  very 
clearly demonstrated  in  the  speech  given  by  the  Dutch  speaker.  So  my  point  is, 
it  is  important  for  us  to  take  a  very  careful  look  at  the  question  of 
competition. 
Mr.  Muller 
The  phenomenon  of  the  conglomerate  is there,  we  have  to take  it as  it is.  We 
should  not  have  any  ambitions  in  saying  it  should  be  centralised,  it  is  just 
there  in  a  very  competitive  world  market.  We  have  to  tailor  our  supervisory 
intervention  to  their  structure,  not  force  them  to  change  their  structure. 
What  is  actually binding  us  together  here  ?  It  is  primarily  the  worry  about 
the  stability of  those  institutions  that  are  under  our  different  supervision, 
that  is  our  common  root.  We  will  maintain  our  responsibility  as  an  insurance 
supervisor,  as  a  security supervisor,  as  a  banking  supervisor,  but  we  have  to 
recognise,  although  we  will all  retain our  own  primary  object,  that  as  soon  as 
our  institution  works  in  a  conglomerate,  that  will  have  an  influence  on  its 
stability.  I  felt  that  in  Mr.  Angerer's  speech,  and  he  is very  clear  on  the 
philosophy  of  insurance  supervisors,  that  they  would  like  to  maintain  as  long 
as  possible  chinese walls,  also  there  they  take  into account  the possibility 
of  contagion  risk, moral  responsibility and  others.  We  all share that,  perhaps - 171  -
to different  degrees,  and  I  think  the banks  are  perhaps  more  exposed  by  their 
names  and  have  more  tradition,  but  we  all  share that.  Firstly,  I  would  say 
that  we  should  try  to find  instruments  that  will  help  us  to  be  aware  of  what 
happens  in  the  conglomerate.  Secondly,  that  we  can  co-operate  with  our 
colleagues  and  that  has  to be  translated  into  instruments.  In  the first  place 
we  should  have  an  instrument  to be  aware  what  happens  in the holding  or  in the 
other  area  of  the  group.  I  would  subscribe  to  Mr.  Jonkhart's  proposal  for  a 
kind  of  technique  which  is  not  so  loose,  but  to  have  an  instrument  to 
intervene.  I  wonder  whether  Art.  9  in  the  Second  Coordination  Directive  for 
Banking  is  already  tailored  for  that  ?  We  should  strive that  throughout  the 
machinery  of  the  Commission,  the  three  supervisory  groups  should  have 
instruments  to  know  what  is  happening  in  a  group,  so  that  later on  they  can 
discuss  between  the  different  areas  of  supervisors  and  that  requires  a 
relaxation of  the  secrecy  provision. 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
We  came  on  a  natioal  level  to  the  same  conclusions  as  those  which  Mr.  Muller 
just  mentioned,  because  what  matters  is  that  we  know  what  is going  on,  the 
transparency  question.  The  Norwegian  report,  with  all its  prohibitions  is  a 
long  list  of  all  things  that  should  be  avoided  at  national  level  and  at 
European  level,  because  we  cannot  guess  what  are  the  abuses  of  the  future. 
Behind  this  there  is  even  a  more  fundamental  question.  Is  it  up  to  us, 
supervisors,  to  lead  the  evolution  in  economic  life,  is  it  us  who  are  the 
economic  life and  the  others  are  just our  executive officers  ?  We  think  that 
we  should  stand  away,  control  the  solvency,  but  leave  to economic  life what  is 
their part  of  the  job,  namely  to  lead  us  into the  future.  We  should  come  in, 
if something  goes  wrong,  but  we  should  not  try to structure the future.  If  we 
try to structure banks  and  insurance  companies,  why  not  the  other  industries, 
for  example  the textile industry? 
Mr.  Jonkhart 
What  is  so  special  about  the financial  industry,  what  is  common  to  insurance, 
banking  and  securities,  this  is probably  best  caught  in the  word  "trust".  If 
you  buy  a  product  of  a  textile company,  you  do  not  need  any  trust,  you  pay - 172  -
once  you  have  seen  the  product.  With  those  three  industries  it  is  the  other 
way,  you  give  away  your  money  and  then  you  have  to  expect  what  will  happen. 
That  is also  the  very  reason  for  supervision.  Do  we  need  a  sort of  structural 
policy  for  financial  conglomerates  on  a  European  level,  I  tried  to  explain 
that  at  the  time  we  had  good  political  reasons  in  the  Netherlands  why  we 
wanted  such  a  policy  on  a  local  level,  but  I  also tried  to explain  that  you 
never  should  adopt  such  a  policy  on  a  European  level.  That  is  something 
different  from  the  question  of  being  informed  on  a  financial  group.  I  think 
that  the  intervention of  Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen  disregards  that  aspect.  How  many 
supervisors  are  there  here  in  this  room,  who  actually  know  who  owns  their 
banks,  insurance  companies,  brokers,  what  are  their  particular  relations 
within  groups  ?  If  those  groups  are  managed  from  out  of  one  single  point, 
particularly outside  your  country,  then  you  get  the  feeling that  you  want  to 
know  a  little bit  about  it  and  you  would  like  to  have  an  instrument  to  get 
that  information  one  way  or  the  other.  As  a  regulator  you  would  like to  rule 
the  world  and  manage  all  those  institutions  as  if  they  were  your  executives. 
Between  that  and  knowing  nothing  is  trying to  know  a  little bit  and  trying to 
get  an  instrument  to  guide  the  developments  away  from  what  you  think  is evil 
and  towards  what  you  think  is  a  more  reasonable  development. 
Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen 
In  Mr.  Jonkhart's  presentation one  of  the  advantages  of  the  Dutch  system  was 
that  you  would  find  out  what  was  happening  to  a  conglomerate,  wherever  its 
headquarters  were,  and  you  would  say  yes  or  no  to  this  development  or  that 
development.  First  of  all  the  problem  is how  good  are  you  at  guessing,  but  the 
more  you  say  yes  or  no,  the  more  you  are  taking  on  the  responsibility  for 
success  or failure.  I  think  the  failure  of  part  of  a  group,  for  which  you  had 
taken  on  the  direction of  development,  would  leave  the  people  who  would  have 
lost their money  coming  back  to the authorities to  say,  why  don't  you  bail  it 
out  ?  This  problem  of  the  extension  of  the  responsibility  of  banking 
supervisors  accross  these  groups  is  something  that  has  to  approached  with 
great  care. - 173-
·Mr.  .lane iot  t i 
I  will  start  off  from  the  position  which  the  Commission  seems  to  be  taking, 
that  is to  say  the  agnostic  position.  I  should  like to  ask  whether  this word 
means  the  same  thing  when  it  is  applied  to  relations  within  the  financial 
sector,  the three sectors  represented here,  or  between  those  sectors  and  the 
industry or  the trade,  which  is  outside  those  three  segments.  It is  my  view 
that  perhaps  this  agnosticism  should  take  on  a  rather  different  field, 
depending  upon  whether  it  applies  to  the  first  or  the  second  of  the  cases  I 
described.  In  my  country,  we  were  rather  worried  about  agnosticism  in  the 
relations between  the  financial  sector  on  the  one  hand  and  the  other  aspects 
of the economic  world  on  the other.  I  should  also  like  to say  that  even  within 
the financial  sector,  the more  agnostic  we  are  about  structures,  the more  we 
should  feel  worried  about  prudential  issues.  Many  speakers  have  already 
pointed out  that  should  agnosticism  mean  absence  of  information,  it  would  be 
the  worst  of  all  worlds  if  one  were  not  able  to  do  anything  about  structures 
and  if  one  did  not  have  the  necessary  equipment  to  process  information,  to 
co-operate  with  the authorities.  If  we  did  not  have  the  right  instruments  for 
the  collation  of  information  and  co-operation  with  the  authorities.  Would 
agnosticism not  imply  information  in the  case  of  conglomerates  too,  that  is to 
say  the  consolidated  vision  of  the  group  in  which  we  would  co-operate  in 
supervising  the  different  branches  of their  activities and  here  I  would  refer 
to  what  Mr.  Cooke  has  said  about  supervising  the  conglomerate.  Could 
co-operation  not  take  on  a  very  tangible  form  in  the  case  of  the  financial 
sector  supervision  ? 
Name  unknown  (French  speaker) 
In  the  light  of  our  discussion  I  would  just  like  to  refer  to  a  couple  of 
provisions  which  we  have  in  French  law.  The  first  of these  rules,  which  we  had 
traditionally  since  the  1940's,  is  control  on  the  shares  in  the  banking 
system.  I  turn to  Mr.  Jonkhart,  he  gave  us  an  excellent  description of  the 
system  which  applies  in  the  Netherlands,  but  I  would  like  to point  out  that 
that  is a  system  that  we  are very  accustomed  to.  Since  the  1940's,  we  have  had 
a  provision which  compels  credit  institutions  regularly,  on  an  annual  basis, 
to declare  where  their shares  are.  Obviously  this does  not  apply  to  companies 
quoted  on  the stock exchange,  but  in  the  case  of  the others  we  have  a  complete - 174  ~ 
knowledge  of  what  the  situation  is.  We  also  have  a  prior  authorization 
procedure  for  certain thresholds  to be  breached  and  indeed  that  was  reinforced 
last  year,  because  we  introduced  new  thresholds  where  authorisation  was 
necessary  in  advance  for  investment  or  dis-investment.  I  think  that  these 
provision  taken  as  a  whole  would  meet  the  points  of  prudential  concern  that 
Mr.  Jonkhart  mentioned  and  our  experience  is  that  these  provisions  are  not 
only familiar  to the  banking  community,  but  they  are very  acceptable to them. 
The  second  type  of  provision,  which  we  have  in  our  banking  law  in  France, 
which  may  well  be  important  as  a  reply  to the  questions  that  have  been  asked, 
was  introduced  into the  new  banking  laws  in  1984  and  they  give  the  inspectors 
in  the  bank  of  France  the  right  not  just  to  verify  which  establishments  are 
subject  to  banking  law,  but  also  their  subsidiaries  or  their  shareholders. 
This  is  what  in  our  usual  jargon  we  call  "des  droits  de  suite"  the  right  to 
follow-up.  I  think  that  that  meets  Mr.  Cooke's  concern.  It  is  clear  that 
supervision  on  the  basis  of  consolidated  accounts  is  probably  not  enough  and 
that,  where  appropriate;  the  person  doing  the  verifying  in the  banking  sector 
needs  to  make  up  his  mind  on  the  financial  soundness  of  some  non-banking 
subsidiaries of  credit  institutions and  he  would  also need  to  make  his  mind  up 
about  the  financial  soundess  of  some  of  the  shareholders.  For  the  shareholder 
to  be  accepted  as  a  significant  shareholder  in  the  credit  institution,  he 
needs  to  have  a  sound  financial  basis  and  if appropriate  we  need  to  be  able  to 
verify  the  existence of  that  sound  financial  basis.  You  have  loans  granted  to 
a  shareholder,  it  is  not  always  a  good  thing if  it  is clear that  there  isn't 
that  sound  financial  basis. 
Prof.  Gower 
It  must  be  some  consolation  to  Mr.  Fitchew  to  know  that  on  one  matter  we 
appear  to  be  unanimous,  namely  that  increased  collaboration  between  various 
regulators  is  a  good  thing  and  must  take  place  particularly  in  view  of  the 
problems  of  multinational  and  other  conglomerates.  It  is  perhaps  interesting 
that,  if this  was  a  similar meeting  in  the  USA,  I  do  not  think  there would  be 
unanimity  on  that  basis.  One  of  Sir  Kenneth  Berrill's  senior  colleagues  was 
explaining  to  the  American  investment  bankers  in  London  that  there  would  of 
course  be  constant  collaboration  between  the  Bank  of  England  as  the  banking 
regulator  and  the  Securities and  Investment  Board  as  the securities  regulator, 
to  which  all  the  Americans  said  no,  certainly  not,  there  must  not  be  any - 175-
collaboration.  What  the banking  regulator  is doing  is to protect  the interest 
of  the  depositors.  If  we  are  really  going  to  achieve  this  friendly 
collaboration,  I  somewhat  share  the  view  of  Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen,  that  it  is 
unlikely  to  happen  if they  are  not  really brought  into one  body.  It  is very 
nice to  see  all the  UK  regulators sitting together  in  apparent  harmony,  but  if 
you  think that  they  have  always  behaved  as  if they  were  friends,  you  would  be 
deceiving youselves.  If it  were  practicable  I  do  agree  with  the  observations 
of  Mr.  Boye-Jacobsen.  But  probably  the only  way  to get  constant,  proper  and 
friendly  collaboration  is  to  bring  everybody  together,  it  may  be 
impracticable,  but  I  certainly  think  that  it  will  not  happen  in  practice to 
the  extent  that  it  ought,  unless  there  is  a  body  of  this  sort.  You  cannot 
prescribe precisely what  is meant  by  fit  and  proper,  it obviously  depends  on 
the discretion  of  the  supervising body,  it has  got  to  make  a  value  judgment, 
but  what  you  can  prescribe  by  instrument  is  what  information  the  supervisor 
shall get,  or  try  to get,  before  he  decides  whether  the  person  concerned  is 
fit and  proper.  That  is the  philosophy  which  is adopted  under  the  new  British 
legislation;  anybody  applying  for  authorisation  has  to  fill  in  an  elaborate 
questionnaire,  which  is designed  to  list the  information  about  who  really owns 
it and  so  on,  not  only  a  questionnaire  about  the  existing  situation,  but  a 
business plan  indicating  how  the  body  proposes  to operate.  That  I  think  can  be 
done  by  an  EEC  instrument  and  if it is to  be  meaningful,  it seems  to  me  it is 
essential  that  it  should  be  done  by  an  EEC  instrument.  We  cannot  have  a 
situation  in  which  the  UK  takes  this elaborate  method  of  ascertaining whether 
someone  is fit and  proper  or not,  if some  other  country,  Denmark  for  example, 
is  simply  going  to  ask  "what  is  your  name  and  address,  are  you  still  in 
prison"  ?  If  it  is  impossible  under  present  Danish  law  to  ascertain details 
about  the  applicant's  former  criminal  record,  then all  I  can  say  is that  the 
EEC  instrument  will  compel  Denmark  to  change  that  and  if  Denmark  does  not,  I 
think the  European  Court  will  hold  it is directly  inforceable.  The  Commission 
should  prescribe  in  some  detail  what  a  country  has  to  do  about  getting 
information  before  it  accepts  somebody  as  being  authorised  to  undertake  this 
type of  a  business,  which  is distinguished  from  buying  goods. - 176  -
Mr.  Cooke 
Agnosticism  does  carry  with  it  the  importance  of  transparency  and  of 
information and  also of  co-operation  and  collaboration.  We  are  in a  situation 
where  the  current  thinking  is  towards  the  integration of  financial  services.  I 
wonder  how  long  this particular phase  will  last,  how  far  isthe need  to pursue 
particular  Community  objectives  in  the  context  of  this  particular  phase 
appropriate,  or  whether  we  do  not  run  some  risk that  if we  try to pursue  some 
Community  legislative  proposals  in  this general  area  does  not  run  the  risk of 
falling  into  the  trap  that  others  referred  to  of  constraining  the  national 
economic  evolution  and  development.  In  relation  to  the  problem  of 
conglomerates  as  a  whole,  the  need  to  move  to  some  early piece  of  Community 
law  is  perhaps  a  question still  at  the  moment.  The  most  important  element  is 
in  fact  to  ensure  that  the  transparency  is  there,  to  ensure  that  the 
co-operation  can  actually  be  pursued  and  conceivably  it  might  require  a 
European  initiative  to  achieve  that.  For  the  rest,  what  we  may  actually be 
talking about  in practice over  the  period  immediately  ahead,  is  the  manner  in 
which  co-operation  is  in fact  undertaken,  the  form  of  co-operation  is actually 
quite  difficult,  when  one  looks  at  the  diversity  of  organisations  that  are 
represented  around  this table,  no  doubt  this  is  something  the  Commission  has 
got  very  much  in  the  front  of  their  mind.  In  the  UK,  in  looking  at  the  whole 
question  of  financial  conglomerates,  what  are  we  talking  about  and  what  is the 
problem,  you  actually need  to  look  at  what  the  actual  institutional  groupings 
are  in  your  country  and  we  certainly,  in  the  context  of  lead  regulation 
arrangements,  need  to  be  aware  how  many  groups  are  there  actually  in  this 
situation.  There  are  perhaps  about  a  hundred  of  them,  of  which  about  fifty  are 
perhaps  significant  in  economic  terms.  It  is  not  a  bad  approach  in  an  area 
where  you  are  probably  not  going  to  be  structurally  purest  to  hold  up  to the 
light the  actual  institutions  that  are  presenting  the  problems  that  you  will 
be  having  to deal  with.  I  am  not  sure whether  it would  enlighten a  great  deal, 
but  I  think it might  be  worth  looking  a  little more  closely in each  country  as 
to the  nature  of  the  particular  groups  that  present  the  real  problems  and  see 
where  that  took  one  in  relation  to  the  need  for  co-operation  with  other 
authorities. - 177-
Mr.  Fitchew 
It  seems  to  me  that  there  was  a  broad  consensus  that  the  Community  and 
Community  legislation should  not  seek  to harmonise  structures,  we  should  not 
try  to  control  at  a  Community  level,  to  lay  down  rules  as  to  who  could  own 
whom,  who  could  own  what.  That  is certainly  my  own  view.  There  was  equally  a 
broad  consensus  that  it  was  desirable  that  there  should  be  greater 
transparency,  both  within  Member  States and  between  Member  States,  about  the 
structure of  financial  groups  and  about  what  the  shareholdings actually  were. 
Again  that  is  certainly  something  that  I  would  tend  to  agree  with,  I  think 
agnosticism  about  the question  of  who  should  be  allowed  to  own  whom  certainly 
should  not  be  taken  to  imply  ignorance  about  what  the  structures  of 
shareholdings  and  of  groups  actually are.  In  fact,  as  Mr.  Muller  pointed out, 
in  the  Second  Banking  Coordination  Directive  we  have  said  something  on  this 
subject  and  indeed  we  have  gone  a  little way  further  than  simply  providing  for 
transparency.  We  have  said first  of all that  there should  be  a  regular  annual 
provision  of  information  about  who  the  shareholders  are  in  credit 
institutions,  that  is  dealing  with  the  upstream  problem,  but  we  have  gone 
beyond  that,  in  Art.  9,  in  saying  that  the  Member  States  should  ensure  that 
the  influence  exercised  by  the  important  shareholders  has  to  be  compatible 
with  the  safe and  sound  management  of  the  bank.  Moreover,  we  have  proposed, 
and  this  is  clearly going  to be  more  a  controversial  area,  a  rule  relating to 
down-stream  participations  in  proposing  a  limitation  on  the  extent  to  which 
banks  can  hold  participations  in non-financial  companies  in the  commercial  and 
industrial  sector.  I  think  the question  which  we  may  have  to ask  ourselves  in 
the  light  of  this  Conference  is  whether  banking  is  a  special  case,  as  Mr. 
Padoa-Schioppa  suggested,  because  of  the  particular  importance  of  banks  in 
ensuring  the  integrety  of  the  payment  system,  the  money  transmission  system 
and  because  of  the  very  important  macro-economic  consequences  of  systemic 
failure  in the banking  system,  that  one  needs  to have  greater transparency  and 
to  the  extent  that  we  have  proposed  and  I  have  just  described  in  the  Second 
Banking  Coordination  Directive,  some  measure  of  control  by  the  supervisors 
over  the  influence  exercised  by  the  major  shareholders.  What  I  think  we 
perhaps  need  to  look·  at  is  whether,  at  least  a  requirement  for  transparency 
about  major  shareholdings,  should  be  introduced  in the other  two  sectors,  in 
insurance  and  in  securities markets. - 178-
The  second  topic  that  I  wanted  to  come  on  to  is  consolidated  supervision. 
There  I  very  much  agree  with  the  comments  made  by  both  Mr.  Lanciotti  and  Mr. 
Cooke,  that  if  we  are  to  be  agnostic  on  the question of  structures,  then  that 
should  imply  more  emphasis  being  given  to  prudential  supervision.  I  think 
there  is  certainly  general  agreement  among  the  banking  fraternity  that  we 
should  try to deepen  and  extend  the  arrangements  for  consolidated  supervision, 
in particular  to  extend  the arrangements  of  consolidated  supervision to  cases 
where  a  banking  group  may  be  headed  by  a  non-bank  institution.  I  think  again, 
perhaps  we  will  need  to  ask  ourselves  whether  that  approach  is  one  which  is 
needed  in  the  case  of  banks  only,  or  whether  a  similar  approach  for 
consolidation  may  not  need  to  extend  to  the  other  two  sectors,  at  any  rate 
where  there  is  a  conglomerate  structure.  Under  the  same  general  heading  of 
supervision,  there  is  of  course  the  question  of  solvency;  the  banking 
supervisors  present  will  know  that  we  are  starting  work  now  on  the  treatment 
of  position  risk,  or  market  risk  as  it affects  the  banking  sector.  That  same 
problem  presumably  needs  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  case  of  non-bank  operators  in 
the securities markets  as  well  as  banks. 
The  third  topic  :  conflicts of  interests which  we  have  not  discussed  a  great 
deal.  The  paper  which  was  circulated  arising  from  the  work  done  under  Mr. 
Lanciotti 's  chairmanship  by  the  Groupe  de  Contact,  suggests  that  actually 
quite  a  large  number  of  Member  States,  perhaps  the  majority,  do  have  rules 
relating  to the  treatment  of  the  avoidance  of  conflicts of  interest  in  banking 
groups.  In  some  cases  the  rules  are  laid  down  by  legislation,  in  some  cases 
they  are  laid  down  by  the  supervisors,  in  some  cases  they  may  be  in  the  formal 
rules  adopted  by  the  industry  itself.  We  will  certainly need  to  look  at  the 
question  of  conflict  of  interest  and  whether  we  should  seek  to  ensure  some 
degree  of  harmonisation  in  the  investment  services  directive,  that  we  are 
currently  preparing;  if  that  is  the  case,  then  such  rules  on  conflict  of 
interest  will  probably  need  to  cover  both  bank  and  non-bank  operators  in  the 
securities markets. 
Fourth  and  finally  the  question  of  exchange  of  information  between  the 
supervisory authorities.  I  think there  was  certainly a  consensus  that this  is 
the  subject  which  we  should  look  at  at  a  Community  level,  that  the  proper 
supervision  of  financial  conglomerates,  perhaps  particularly  in  any  crisis 
situation,  is  going  to  require  exchanges  of  information  between  the  three 
different  set  of  supervisors  and  it does  appear  that,  at  least  in  some  Member - 179-
States,  the  secrecy  imposed  on  the  individual  sets  of  supervisors  can  be  a 
barrier to those  exchanges  of  information.  I  think  we  will  want  to  look  to see 
whether  that  is  a  subject  that  should  be  tackled,  perhaps  by  a  legal 
instrument  at  a  Community  level  and  presumably,  if that  is the  case,  it would 
be  a  legal  instrument  covering  all  three  sectors.  I  am  not  sure  whether  I 
interpreted Mr.  Cooke's  question  rightly  as  to whether  he  was  asking  whether 
the  Commission  envisaged  some  form  of  institutional  arrangements  for 
co-operation between  the three sets of  supervisors.  That  is a  subject  we  have 
not  thought  about  at  the moment,  I  think  in  the first  instance what  is needed 
is  to  ensure  that  there  are  no  barriers  to  the  bilateral  exchanges  of 
information.  Dealing  with  any  specific  problem  cases,  it  will  normally  be 
bilateral  exchanges  of  information  that  are  required.  That  brings  me  to the 
question  of  how  we  propose  to  carry out  future  work  in  this area,  within  the 
Commission.  First  of  all,  following  this  Conference  we  will  be  circulating 
both  all  the  papers  that  have  been  received,  the  texts  delivered  by  all  the 
participants,  and  as  soon  as  the  translations  have  been  done,  Prof. 
Schneider's  report  and  we  will  be  very  interested  to  have  any  comments  that 
anyone  is moved  to  send  us  when  they  see  these  in  print.  Apart  from  that,  we 
do  not  at  present  want  to  propose  any  formal  working  party  comprising 
representatives of  each  of  the three  sectors,  I  think  it would  be  a  mistake  to 
set  up  a  working  party  which  just  operated  in  a  vacuum  as  a  talking  shop.  I 
think  however  that  in  the  areas  that  I  have  mentioned,  the  arrangements  for 
exchange  of  information  between  supervisors,  the  question  of  consolidated 
supervision,  occasions  will arise,  as  we  come  forward  with  specific proposals 
when  it will  be  useful  to bring together,  at  least  two  and  in  some  cases  three 
of  the different  market  sectors  concerned.  We  would  like  to  retain flexibility 
to deal  with  that  on  an  ad  hoc  and  pragmatic,  if not  totally agnostic,  basis. 
I  think  that  is all  I  have  to  say  about  our  future  work  at  this stage. - 180-- 181  -
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Appendix  to Mr.  Broker's speech: 
CONFLICTS  OF  INTEREST  IN  BANKING  AND  FINANCE  AND 
THEIR  CONTROL  AND  MANAGEMENT 
FOREWORD 
ANNEX  3 
The  OECD  Committee  on Financial Markets  and its Expert Group  on  Banking 
have,  in  recent  years,  carried out considerable work  in the field of banking 
regulation.  While this work  has  culminated in the publication of the  study  by 
Mr.  R.M.  Pecchioli,  the  Expert  Group's  secretary,  on  "Prudential Supervision 
in Banking"  (OECD,  Paris,  1987)  some  special  regulatory  issues  addressed  in 
that  study  have  been  followed  up  in  more  detail because of their topical 
nature.  The  assessment,  control and  management  of  conflicts  of  interest  in 
banking  and  finance  has  been  one  of  these  issues.  Problems  raised  by 
conflicts  of  interest  have  been  gaining  in importance as banks,  securities 
firms  and  other  financial  institutions  have  increasingly  diversified  their 
activities  not  only  in countries  in which  commercial  banking has  been legally 
separated from  the securities  business  or  some  important  securities-related 
activities,  but  also  in  countries  with  universal  banking  systems.  This 
development  has  been  often  referred  to  as  the  trend  towards  universal 
banking.  It should be noted,  however,  that conflicts of  interest  do  not  only 
arise  for  commercial  banks  moving  into the securities business or vice versa; 
they  also  exist  within  securities  firms  operating  in  a  wide  range  of 
securities-related  activities  such  as  the  brokerage  business,  new  issuing 
business,  portfolio management,  investment  research  and  investment  advisory 
services. 
Net provisions generally include,  in  part  or  in  full,  charges  for 
value  adjustments  in  respect  of  loans and securities,  recoveries from such 
adjustments,  losses  on  loans,  and  transfers  to,  and  from,  reserves  for 
possible losses on  such assets. 
For  technical  and  methodological reasons not all countries submitting 
data on  financial statements of commercial  banks  for publication in  the  "OECD 
Bank Bulletin" have  been  covered by the present Special Feature. .. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conflict of  interest  considerations  play  an  important  ro:e  in  the 
context  of  policies  towards  the  structural  organisation  of  countries' 
financial  systems,  notably as  regards the  desirability  of  separating  certain 
areas  of  financial service activities such as,  for  example,  commercial  banking 
and securities-related  activities,  by  legal  arrangements.  In  this  sense, 
policies  designed  to  handle  conflict  of  interest  problems  in banking  and 
finance  have  an  important bearing  on  competition policies in  this  field  as  a 
separation  of  functions  introduced  on  conflict  of  interest  grounds  may 
represent limitations on market access  and hence on the scope  for  the  working 
of  competitive  market  forces.  There  is  another  relationship  between the 
conflict of  interest issue and  competition  policies  insofar  as  reliance  on 
adequate  competition  is  often  seen as  an  acceptable approach towards  dealing 
with certain broader conflict of  interest  situations  such  as  may  arise  for 
universal  banks,  for  example,  as  regards the respective promotion of deposit 
taking  business  on  the  one  hand  and  selling securities  to  small  investors  on 
the other. 
In  recent  years,  the  discussion  on  conflict of  interest problems  in 
banking  and  finance,  which has  a  long  histo~y, notably  in  the  United  States, 
has  seen  a  considerable  revival  in  a  number  of countries such as  Canada, 
France,  Germany,  the United Kingdom  and the United States.  In  Canada  and  the 
United  States  the  conflict of  interest issue receives particular attention in 
connection with policies towards,  or discussions on,  structural  and  regulatory 
reforms  of  the  financial  system which  are strongly influenced by the general 
trend towards  the blurring  of  demarcation  lines  between  formerly  separated 
sectors of  the financial  system. 
In  the  United  States  the  ongoing  debate  in  this  field includes  a 
critical review of the Glass-Steagall Act  of  1933,  which,  largely  on  conflict 
of  interest  grounds,  introduced  a  separation of  commercial  banking  and  a  large 
number  of  securities-related activities.  In France efforts are  being  made  in 
connection  with  comprehensive  securities market  reforms  to deal with conflict 
of  interest problems,  inter alia,  by  the  introduction  of  a  legally  binding 
code  of  conduct  applying  to  market  operators.  In  Germany,  questions of 
conflicts  of  interest  were  discussed  in  considerable  detail  by  the 
Gessler-Commission  whose  report  on  "Basic Questions  of the Credit System"  was 
published in  1979.  The  Gessler-Commission  looked  into this question  mainly  in 
the  context  of  a  critical review of the universal banking  system and  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  latter  system  had  functioned  satisfactorily  and 
should,  therefore,  be  maintained.  Any  necessary  reforms  dealing  with 
conflicts  of  interest  could  be  taken care of  by the banks  themselves within 
the framework  of the universal  banking  system.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  where 
important  securities  market  reforms,  often  referred to as the "Big Bang"  of 
27th October  1986,  paved  the way  for  the  formation  of  large  capital  market 
groups  operating  in  a  wide  range  of  securities-related  activities,  the 
question  of  an  appropriate  management  of  conflicts  of  interest  received - 189-
particular  attention  in  connection  with  the  implementation  of  the  new 
Financial  Services  Act.  The  importance of this question is highlighted by the 
following  paragraph of  the White  Paper  on  "Financial  Services  in  the  United 
Kingdom"  issued  by  the  Department  of Trade  and  Industry,  London,  in January 
1985: 
"Conflicts of Interest 
The  rapid  increase  in the number  of  firms  engaging  in  more  than  one 
type  of  investment  business  and  the blurring of demarcation lines (for 
example,  between  brokers  and  jobers) have made  it  more  important  than 
ever  that  investors  are  adequately  protected  against abuses arising 
from  conflicts of  interest within  investment business." 
DEFINITION  AND  PRACTICAL  EXAMPLES 
Definition 
Stated  in  an  abstract way,  a  conflict of  interest  situation  arises  for 
a  bank  or any  other enterprise -- dealing with a  client if it has  a  choice 
between  two  solutions for  a  deal,  one  of  which  is  preferable  from  its  own 
interest  point  of  view  while  the  other  represents  a  better deal for the 
client.  A conflict of  interest situation arises also  for  a  bank  or  another 
financial  institution  if  it  carries  out  activities involving two  different 
groups  of  customers  and  if it has  to strike a  balance  between  the  respective 
interests  of  the  two  customer  groups.  A practical example of the latter case 
is  the  new  issuing,  or  underwriting,  business  which  always  requires  a 
compromise  between  the  interests of the issuer and  those of the buyers of the 
securities.  As  soon  as  a  financial  institution -- or  any  other  enterprise --
offers  two  or  more  technically  or  functionally  unrelated services leaving 
scope for  certain choices,  it is faced with the problem of  how  much  effort  to 
put  into the promotion  of  each of these different services. 
As  financial  institutions  often  operate  in  a  wide range of different 
financial services they are  bound  to  be  confronted  with  a  relatively  large 
number  of  conflict  of  interest  situations.  This explains why  conflicts of 
interests  in  banking  and  finance  generally  receive  more  attention  than  in 
other sectors of  the economy. 
Practical examples  and  related concerns 
The  practical  examples  of conflict of interest situations listed below 
are,  apart  from  the  general  conflict  between  banking  and  non-banking 
activities,  grouped  under  two  headings:  first,  conflicts  .. - of  interest 
considered as  typical  of  universal  banks;  second,  conflicts  of  interest 
between  different  types  of  securities-related  activities.  The list is not 
intended to  be  exhaustive;  nor  is it intended to discuss the pros  and  cons  of 
the arguments  put  forward. 
Banking activities versus  industrial and  commercial activities 
The  principle  of  separation of  "banking  and  commerce"  which is applied - 190-
in most  countries to varying degrees  in the sense that  bank  participations  in 
industrial  and  commercial  enterprises  are  either  prohibited  or  severely 
restricted,  is essentially based  on  conflict·  of  interest  considerations.  A 
typical  concern  in  this  regard was  expressed by the U.S.  Congress  in a  House 
Committee Report  of  1955  on  the extension of the Bank  Holding  Company  Act: 
"If banks were permitted to own  non-banking  businesses they  would  be 
compelled  in  many  instances  to extend credit to such businesses to 
the detriment of other competitive businesses  in  the  community  and 
possibly  also  to  a  degree  which  would  be unsound  from  a  banking 
point of view."  (U.S.  Congress,  .House  Report  609,  84th  Congress, 
1st Session 1955.) 
Conflict  of  Interest  Situations  Considered  as  Typical  of  Universal Banks 
Combining  both Banking  and Securities-Related Activities 
Deposit business  versus  securities  brokerage  and  related  investment 
advisory business 
It  is  sometimes  feared  that  banks  might  promote deposit  taking for 
balance-sheet growth reasons  to  the  detriment  of  promoting  household 
savings  in  the  form  of  securities.  The  argument  may,  however,  be 
reversed  if  banks  were  particularly  interested  in  promoting  their 
securities underwriting  business. 
Deposit  business  versus  fund  management  (trust  business  i.e.  the 
management  of  mutual  funds,  pension  funds,  and  private  securities 
portfolios on  a  discretionary basis) 
Banks  should  not  be  allowed  to  use  managed  funds  for  strengthening 
their own  deposit base. 
Combination-of  corporate credit business  and  securities  brokerage  and 
investment advisory services  and  security trading  on  own  acount 
Banks  should  not  be  allowed to  influence their securities business with 
clients (brokerage and  investment advice)  or  their  securities  trading 
business  (on  own  account)  through  company  information  obtained  in 
connection with  lending activities. 
Corporate credit business versus  new  issuing  (underwriting)  business 
Critics  of 
would unduly 
profit  and 
development 
this  combination  of  activities  fear that universal banks 
favour  their credit  business  with  corporate  clients  for 
balance-sheet  growth considerations to the detriment of the 
of  an efficient corporate bond  and  equity market. 
Combination of credit business  with  private  customers  and  securities 
brokerage  and  investment  advisory  services,  security  trading on  own 
account  and underwriting  business 
Banks  should  not  unduly  encourage  private  securities  purchases  via 
imprudent  lending to private customers  to  finance  such purchases. !-
• 
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Conflict  between  the  banks'  involvement  in industrial and  commercial 
enterprises  via  participations,  proxy  voting  rights  and  mutual 
interlocking  membership  on  supervisory  boards  and  their  securities 
business with private customers 
Banks  should  not 
commercial enterprises 
shareholders. 
abuse  their 
against  the 
relationships 
interests  of 
with  industrial  and 
small  and  minority 
Conflicts of Interest Between Different Types  of Securities-Related Activities 
Combination  of  securities  brokerage  (agency)  business  and dealing  on 
own  account  (jobbing,  market making) 
Securities firms  or securities  departments  of  universal  banks  should 
not unduly benefit from  serving client orders  from their own  books. 
Combination  of  security dealing  on  own  account  (jobbing,  market making) 
and trust business  (fund management  for pension funds,  mutual  funds  and 
discretionary portfolio management  for private persons) 
The  market  making  function  should  not  be  based on security holdings 
managed under  trust business.  Undesirable  own  holdings  of  securities 
should not be  dumped  into funds  under management. 
Combination  of  new  issuing  (underwriting)  business  and trust business 
(fund management  for  pension  funds,  mutual  funds  and  discretionary 
portfolio management  for  private persons) 
The  new  issuing  departments  of  securities  firms  or universal banks 
should not.be allowed  to  demonstrate  their  placing  power  by  dumping 
low-quality  issues  or  not  adequately  priced  issues into funds  under 
management.  Conversely,  funds  under  management  should  not  unduly 
benefit from  the pricing of  new  issues to the detriment of  issuers. 
Combination  of  investment  research  and  securities  trading  on  own 
account  (jobbing,  market  making) 
Securities trading on  own  account  should  not 
manner  from  early  information  on  purchase 
released  by  investment research departments. 
benefit  in  an 
recommendations 
unfair 
to  be 
Combination of  investment  advisory  services  and  securities  brokerage 
business 
Investment  advice  should  not  be  biased  in  favour  of  overtrading 
("churning")  i.e.  unnecessarily  high  turnover  of  the  securities 
portfolio of private clients intended to generate high fee  income. - 192 -
OVERVIEW  OF  BASIC  CONCERNS 
Public  policy  concerns  about  conflicts  of  interest  are essentially 
motivated  by three types  of basic  considerations:  efficiency  considerations, 
·investor  protection  considerations and prudential i.e. stability and  soundness 
considerations.  In  addition,  it  should  be  mentioned  that,  in  practice, 
discussions about conflicts of  interest  have  often  been  closely  related  to 
fears  about  concentration  of  power  in banking  and  finance,  or in the economy 
as  a  whole,  and measures  intended to  deal  with  conflicts  of  interest  by  a 
separation  of  functions  have  often  been  motivated  also  by considerations 
regarding  the  prevention  of  undue  concentration  of  power  and  financial 
resources. 
As  far  as  the  efficiency aspect of conflicts of interest is concerned 
it has  been argued that a  financial institution  operating  in  different  broad 
areas  of  financial  services  such  as  retail  banking,  corporate  financial 
services,  securities-related  activities  etc.  cannot be expected to be equally 
efficient and  competitive in all these services  at  the  same  time  and  will, 
hence,  tend  to  offer  less  than  lowest cost and highest quality services in 
areas of activity which are less profitable  or  in  which  the  institution  in 
question  has  less  experience  or  less  qualified  staff.  In  other  words, 
according  to  this  argument  the financial service needs  of particular customer 
groups or  of  the  economy  as  a  whole  will  be  better  satisfied  if  more 
specialised  institutions  were  responsible  for  offering  particular types of 
services or for  dealing with particular  customer  groups  instead  of  allowing 
multi-function  institutions  to  operate  in  all these areas at the same  time. 
Policy makers  can deal with this problem either by  imposing  a  certain  degree 
of  specialisation  between  financial  institutions,  or  setting  up  special 
institutions dealing with particular  financing  problems;  or  they  can  take 
appropriate  measures  designed  to  improve  the  efficiency  of less developed 
sub-markets for financial services  by  increasing  the  scope  for  competition 
and,  in  particular,  facilitating  market  access  from  inside or outside the 
country.  This latter  approach  has  generally  become  the  preferred  way  of 
dealing  with  this  aspect  of  conflicts  of  interest as the authorities have 
accepted,  and  often supported,  the general trend  towards  despecialisation  and 
diversification  of  activities  in  banking  and  finance.  It is increasingly 
realised that universal banks  tend to be more  flexible to adjust  to  new  needs 
of  market  participants  and  structural  changes  in  the  financial  services 
markets  than  specialised  institutions  that are legally prevented from moving 
into new  areas of business. 
The  second  type  of  concern  about  conflicts  of  interest  which  is 
motivated  by  investor protection considerations goes  a  step  further  than  the 
efficiency  concern.  It  is  argued  that  in  certain  conflict  of  interest 
situations  the  quality  of  service  offered may  suffer to such an extent that 
investors  need  special  protection  against  intentionally  bad  service  and 
malpractices.  This  applies mainly to securities-related activities in which  a 
'  securities firm,  or the  _securities  department  of  a  universal  bank,  has  a 
fiduciary  function  vis-a-vis  clients  which,  moreover,  may  have  little 
experience with  securities  transactions.  It  is  feared  that  professionals 
which  may  have  various  choices  for  doing securities business with clients may 
unduly weigh their own  interests against those of their  clients.  In  some  of 
these  cases  the  authorities  go  beyond  reliance on market forces  and market 
discipline and handle conflict of  interest  situations  by  codes  of  conduct, - 193-
rules  of  practices  or  conditions  for  doing  business,  the superv1s1on and 
control of the observation of which may  be left to self-regulatory bodies. 
The  third type of  concern about conflicts of  interest  is  motivated  by 
stability  and  soundness  considerations.  It  is  argued  that  in  extreme 
situations  a  conflict of  interest can lead  to  mismanagement  and  unacceptable 
risk-taking  in  business  areas  in  which  a  given  financial institution has 
little experience  and  for  which it is not "fit and  proper",  and  that  ·in  order 
to  protect  the  general  public  against  undesirable  failures  and  losses 
appropriate precautionary measures need to be taken.  This  concern  played,  for 
example,  a  major  role  in  the  United  States  in  the debate leading to the 
introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act of  1933  which approached  the  underlying 
conflict  of  interest  problem by  a  separation of  commercial banking and a  wide 
range  of  securities-related  activities.  Today,  the  prudential  aspect  of 
conflicts  of  interest,  like  other  risk  aspects  of  banking  and 
securities-related  activities,  is  generally  being  dealt  with by prudential 
regulation and  supervision rather than by  a  separation of functions. 
CONTROL  AND  MANAGEMENT  OF  CONFLICTS  OF  INTEREST 
Conflicts of  interest in banking  and  finance  can  be  handled  in  many 
ways  depending  on  their  nature  and  the  severity  of  concern  that  the 
authorities  attach  to  them.  In  principle,  the  following  approaches  are 
available: 
Separation of  functions  by separating the institutions  which  operate 
in conflicting types  of  financial services; 
Disclosure  of  information  necessary  for  recognising  and  judging 
conflict of  interest situations; 
Ensuring 
regards 
business; 
effective  competition 
the  institutions  with 
by  providing  sufficient  choice as 
which  consumers  may  wish  to  do 
"Chinese  Wall"  arrangements  inside  financial institutions designed 
to separate departments  carrying out conflicting types of operations; 
Codes  of  conduct,  rules  of  practices  and  conditions  for  doing 
business prescribing how  professionals should deal  with  conflict  of 
interest situations; 
Arrangements  for  in-house and external monitoring of the handling of 
conflict of interest situations; 
Effective  complaints  procedures  for  consumers  who 
victims of abuses of conflict of interest situations. 
have  become 
An  extreme  solution  to  dealing  with conflicts of interest is to seek 
their  avoidance  by  a  strict  separation  of  institutions  operating  in 
conflicting  financial  service  activities.  This approach could even go  as far 
as  requiring also separate ownership of such institutions  which  would  prevent 
• ... 
• 
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a  financial  institution  from  operating  in  conflicting  business  areas via 
separately capitalised  subsidiaries.  Examples  of  this  approach  are:  the 
separation  of  "banking  and  commerce"  which applies to varying degrees  in most 
OECD  countries;  a  full  or  partial  separation  of  commercial  banking  from 
securities-related  operations  traditionally  applying  in Canada,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  although  there  are  at  present  strong  pressures  in  these 
countries  for  reducing  this separation;  and the separation of the jobber and 
broker  functions  which until the  1986  "Big  Bang"  applied  to  members  of  the 
London  Stock  Exchange.  As  it  is  now  widely  accepted  that  financial 
institutions often see an entrepreneurial advantage in combining  a  wide  range 
of  financial  services  for  the  benefit  of  the  general  public, it is also 
increasingly recognised that  conflicts  of  interest  are  bound  to  occur  in 
banking  and  finance  more  frequently  than  in other sectors of the economy and 
that public policy should mainly  focus  on  the avoidance of abuses  of  conflicts 
of  interest rather than  on the avoidance of their occurrence. 
One  widely  accepted  broader  approach towards  protecting investors and 
consumers  against abuses of conflicts of  interest  by  providers  of  financial 
services  is  based  on  the  principles of adequate disclosure requirements  and 
effective competition.  According to this  approach  the  clients  of  financial· 
institutions  should  be  fully  informed about all aspects of the business they 
are doing with financial institutions (nature of the  transaction,  capacity  in 
which  the  institution is acting -- as  agent or principal --, risks,  return and 
costs  involved etc.);  any such  information  should  be  readily  available  in 
understandable  form.  In  addition,  there  should  be  an  adequate  level of 
competition  providing  sufficient  scope  for  consumers  to  choose  amongst 
financial  institutions  with  which  they  wish  to do  business.  This approach 
generally applies to broader conflict of  interest situations in  which  a  given 
financial  institution  may  promote  one line of business,  for example,  deposit 
taking to the detriment of another line of  business,  for  example,  securities 
brokerage and  investment advisory services with private savers. 
In  a  number  of  more  specific  conflict  of  interest  situations the 
authorities attempt to  avoid  their  abuse  by  requiring  that  multi-function 
institutions  apply  "Chinese  Wall"  arrangements  by which different departments 
are functionally  separated  in  the  sense  that  information  giving  rise  to 
conflicts  of  interest  cannot  be exchanged  between  them neither on  a  personal 
contact basis nor via  in-house  information  flow  arrangements  or  access  to 
files.  Such  separations  of  functions  often  apply  in  multi-function 
institutions  to  the  corporate  finance  department,  the  trust,  i.e.,  fund 
management  department,  securities brokerage,  trading  and  investment  advisory 
services,  and  the  investment research department. 
Chinese  Wall  arrangements  are,  however,  often  seen  as  requiring 
complementary codes  of behaviour,  rules of practices and  conditions  for  doing 
business  which  need  to be respected by providers of financial services with a 
view to providing further  investor and  consumer  protection  against  abuses  of 
conflicts  of  interest.  This  applies  in  particular  to  the  profession of 
securities dealers.  In the  London  market,·  for  example,  securities  dealers 
acting as principals  i~e.  on  own  account,  have to respect three principles: 
The  principle  of  fair  dealing  which  implies that unfair practices 
are avoided  and  that deals are executed  in accordance with  the  rules 
governing  the London  market; - 195 -
The  duty  of  skill,  care  and  diligence  when  investment advice is 
given  which  should  correspond  to  the  needs  and  the  level  of 
experience of the client;  or when  orders are executed; 
The  duty  of  disclosure  of  information on  the capacity in which the 
dealer  is  acting,  the  interest  he  may  have  in  a  particular 
transaction and  the fees he  is earning. 
Securities  firms  acting as  agents of clients for  buying  and selling securities 
have to respect  the  principles  of  "best  execution"  and  "subordination  of 
interests",  which  includes  that client orders must  be given priority over the 
execution of  own  transactions and that orders must  be executed in  the  client's 
best interest. 
Furthermore,  public  policy  dealing effectively with abuses of conflict 
of  interest situations  needs  to  provide  a  basis  for  effective  monitoring 
arrangements  at  three  levels:  first,  at  the  in-house  level  of  the 
institutions themselves  so that the management  can control how  any  conflict  of 
interest  situation  is  actually  handled;  second,  at  the  level  of  any 
self-regulatory organisations responsible for setting up  rules  and  procedures 
applying to their members;  and,  third,  at the level of the authorities. 
Finally,  there  need  to  be effective complaints procedures for clients 
who  have  become victims of  abuses  of conflicts of interest.  The  importance  of 
this  latter  point  is  highlighted  by  the fact that in Canada,  the Technical 
Supplement to the Green  Paper  on  "The  Regulation  of  Financial  Institutions: 
Proposals  for  Discussion",  published  in June  1985,  contains  a  proposal for  a 
new public body dealing with conflicts  of~  interest  in  banking  and  finance: 
the  Financial  Conflicts  of  Interest Office.  It may  be noted  in this context 
that some  countries  go  so  far  as to provide bank  customers  with  legal  rights 
against  the  supervisory  authority  itself  whereas other countries implicitly 
refer  them to their banks  as  legal counterparts. 
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